It is too early yet to try to assess the consequences of the dramatic events in Ukraine. The collisions over the presidential election, the confrontation between the authorities and the opposition are not over yet. Following a ruling of the Supreme Court, the second round of the election will be re-run (there is no legal precedent for this in the world), the political system will be reformed (with some presidential powers to be turned over to the government and parliament), and election legislation will be overhauled.
It is clear that what has happened and is happening in Ukraine will have a serious effect on the future of Ukraine, on the political situation in Russia, on Russia-Ukraine relations, and on Russia's relations with the EU and, on a broader plane, with the West. It will not be an exaggeration to say that the political crisis in Ukraine and its eventual resolution will largely determine the future look of Europe.
Politics Based on Myths
The events in Ukraine have had an extremely negative effect on Russia's relations with the EU and the US. The Russian ruling class was shocked by the West's direct and effective support for Viktor Yushchenko, which Russia interpreted as a clearly anti-Russian strategy. Russia and the West made several gross mistakes with regard to the Ukrainian crisis. The biggest one was that they did not view Ukraine as a field of possible political cooperation but as a battlefield for an answer to the crucial question: Will Ukraine stick with Russia or leave it for the West?
This approach to the Ukrainian election, treating it as a political Battle of Stalingrad in the Russia-West war, was counterproductive from the very beginning and was based on political myths rather than on an appropriateassessment of realities. Several of these myths have had particularly destructive consequences.
Myth Number One: Viktor Yushchenko is an absolutely pro-Western candidate whose victory would mean the irretrievable loss of Ukraine, its departure to the West, and an irrepairable loss for Russian civilization, which will lose the roots of
Kievan Rus.
Myth Number Two (no less destructive): Viktor Yushchenko is the embodiment of democracy in Ukraine and his victory alone will mean victory for democratic forces, which is why the West must support this candidate by all possible means. Seeing Mr. Yushchenko as the embodiment of democracy is naive, to say the least. His team includes five former vice-premiers and nine former ministers. It is clearly a state-momenclature group that has stood at the helm and tasted the fruits of power fighting to regain the administrative commanding heights.
Myth Number Three: Viktor Yanukovich is a pro-Russian candidate and his victory will stop Ukraine drifting to the West, ensure the implementation of Moscow's plans for creating a common economic space of CIS countries, and grant the Russian language the status of a second state language in Ukraine.
In point of fact, Mr. Yanukovich did not represent Russia's interests but the interests of the Donetsk financial-industrial groups. President Leonid Kuchma nominated him as a candidate, but not as a strong successor. There are many stronger and more charismatic politicians in Ukraine who would have been much more formidable rivals for Mr. Yushchenko. But President Kuchma needed not the victory of Mr. Yanukovich but the support of the powerful Donetsk clan in his struggle against Mr. Yushchenko's opposition forces for constitutional reform.
A Yanukovich victory would not have guaranteed special privileges for Russia; rather, it would have created problems. After his election, President Bush had to seek support for his plans from those Americans who had voted for John Kerry. Likewise, Mr. Yanukovich would have had to begin by taking a step towards the opposition (which is above all western and southern Ukraine), trying to convince them that he was protecting the interests of his country rather than of Moscow. Moreover, the Donetsk financial-industrial groups are known for their tough position on allowing Russian capital to emerge on the Ukrainian markets.
A Yushchenko victory would not have been a tragedy or the loss of Ukraine either. It is true that his position was stronger in western Ukraine, where a much smaller part of the electorate has any sympathy for Russia. But like Mr. Yanukovich, if Mr. Yushchenko has won, he would have had to take a step toward the voters in eastern Ukraine. Besides, Mr. Yushchenko upheld more liberal economic views and could have simplified the entry of Russian business into the Ukrainian economy and vice versa.
On the whole, Russian concerns about Viktor Yushchenko look strange because he had been Ukrainian premier and had dealt with Russia before, and it was not a tragedy for Russia.
Is It Really a Revolution?
Many analysts tend to view developments in Ukraine as a revolution. This may be an exaggeration, but hundreds of thousands of people are protesting in the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. The supporters of Mr. Yushchenko are better organized and visible, though the election split Ukrainian society into two parts along a precise geographical dividing line.
The main question we must answer is why the routine clan fighting in the ruling elite has provoked such unrest that has split the nation. The main reason for the open protest by the people is not their sympathies for candidates but their unwillingness to tolerate the corrupt oligarchic regime that only imitated democracy, and the firm belief of most Ukrainians that they have been robbed of the election results.
The stakes at the Ukrainian election were extremely high, and both Russia and the West tried to influence its outcome. A powerful group of Russian "political technologists" was sent to Ukraine to support Mr. Yanukovich. But their most effective methods disregarded the factor of society and its opinion. These methods can still bring results in Russia, but not in Ukraine. As a result, Russia initially positioned itself as a side in the conflict, which prevented it from playing a much more rewarding part of an intermediary.
The acute political confrontation in Ukraine spotlighted one more vital element of the situation. In its post-Soviet history as an independent state, Ukraine has failed to develop as an integral political nation. Contradictions and differences between its regions are so apparent and acute that a growing number of experts have come to the conclusion that Ukraine does not have a historical future as a unitary state. The only chance to preserve its integrity is to become a federation. But this calls for political will from the leadership, internal political stability, and external support.
What lessons can we draw from the events in Ukraine today?
First, modern Ukraine has a complex political and social structure. Outside influence on it can only be successful with a proper understanding of and due respect for its specific national features.
Second, Ukraine is a friendly country for Russia and this reality will not be changed by election results or Western "intrigues," but it could be changed by an inept Russian policy that is not based on clearly formulated state interests.
Third, it would be more expedient for Russia and Ukraine to elaborate a common strategy of integration with European structures. At the very least, Ukraine should not be viewed as a sanitary cordon between Russia and the West but as a bridge to Europe.
The Russian "political technologists" suffered a crushing defeat in Ukraine, but the West should not try to exploit this Russian policy mistake. On the contrary, it should do its best to encourage Russia's mediation in the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.
Will Ukraine remain friendly to Russia or become the new dividing line in Europe? The answer to this question depends on the steps taken by Russia, the West and Ukraine.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
