MOSCOW. (Alexei Makarkin, deputy director of the Center for Political technologies, for RIA Novosti)

The Christian Orthodox community in Ukraine is split among a number of openly competing churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP); the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), under the leadership of the former Metropolitan Filaret, who the Russian Orthodox Church anathematized; and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which was kept alive by supporters of Ukrainian independence in the 1940s.

In the latest development in the long-standing confrontation between these churches, the Constantinople Patriarchate has expressed its desire to act as arbiter in the Ukrainian interchurch dispute. The Moscow Patriarchate is unsurprisingly opposed to this, as it believes that Ukraine falls under its own jurisdiction.

Ukrainian Orthodox believers opposed to the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate had previously appealed to the Constantinople Patriarchate, but Istanbul had been very wary of getting involved, as it had thought that the UOC-MP was the only church with canonical standing in Ukraine.

The situation changed after Viktor Yushchenko won the presidential election. The new president supports the idea that there should be just one church in Ukraine, a unified national church, which by its very nature could not come under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. This explains why Ukrainian supporters of the Constantinople Patriarchate have stepped up their efforts. Archbishop Vsevolod (Maidanovsky), one of the leading hierarchs of the Constantinople Patriarchate, visited Ukraine last March and informed President Yushchenko that when Patriarch Dionysius of Constantinople transferred the Kyivan Metropolitanate to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow in 1686 he had been acting on his own authority, without the consent of the Holy Synod. Therefore, Constantinople does not recognize the autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Church beyond the borders of Moscow's rule; that is, it does not recognize its jurisdiction in Ukraine.

Constantinople clearly wants revenge for the numerous setbacks that it has suffered over the years. For several centuries the territory controlled by the Constantinople Patriarchate, the "first in honor" of the Orthodox sees (that is traditionally the most revered), kept shrinking. Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria seceded in the 19th century, and even Greece left to establish its own Orthodox Church of Hellas (although the Constantinople Patriarchate had historically been Greek).

In the last 100 years, Constantinople has increased its missionary activities in the US, but even there the "first in honor" Patriarchate does not have a monopoly: the Russian Orthodox Church granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in America, which was established on the basis of Russian dioceses set up in the "New World."

Then there was the issue of Estonia. Moscow and Constantinople clashed head on over this small country in the 1990s, and now there are two competing churches in Estonia.

Constantinople now has a chance to oust the Moscow Patriarchate from Ukraine by offering its patronage to the creation of a unified Ukrainian church, which would give it canonical legitimacy (hence the reference to the events of 1686). And we have seen moves being made towards this. However, Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople remains conspicuously silent about Archbishop Vsevolod's pronouncement, even though it concerns a crucial issue in interchurch relations. Constantinople appears to be testing the waters before making any decisions of principle. And there are good reasons for this.

Firstly, Ukraine is not Estonia. If Constantinople directly interferes in Ukrainian Orthodox affairs, the two Churches could fall out for a long time. During the dispute over Estonia, Moscow suspended ecclesiastical contacts with Constantinople for several months. But now a rift could have much wider consequences. With Greek Orthodoxy in crisis (due to the corruption scandals in the Jerusalem and Hellenic Orthodox Churches), further interchurch conflict could seriously damage the international standing of Orthodox Christianity. Moreover, if this were to happen, Constantinople would be "the guilty party."

Secondly, it is not known how stable the new Ukrainian government will prove to be. Already there are dissentions in the ranks. President Yushchenko may manage to "regulate" the situation, but what if he cannot? The ancient Constantinople Church cannot allow itself to become bogged down in an unstable political situation.

Last but not least, Constantinople will struggle to find partners within Ukraine. The UOC-MP will not entertain a partnership, and given that this Church unites the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian Orthodox parishes, more than 10,000 of them, this poses something of a challenge to the Constantinople Patriarchate.