MOSCOW (Alexei Makarkin, for RIA Novosti) - U.S. President George Bush wrote in a letter to his Latvian colleague, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, that the end of World War II signified the beginning of the occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Prior to that, Gunther Verheugen, the deputy chairman of the European Commission, had called on Russia to admit that it had illegally occupied the three Baltic republics, if it wanted to maintain neighborly relations with the European Union.
What do these two events, which happened almost simultaneously, signify? First, they confirmed that trans-Atlantic differences over Russia should not be overrated, setting the "good" U.S. against the "bad" Europe (or vice versa). Both sides have taken a consolidated, and, to a varying extent, tough position on the matter.
Second, the West is expressly pragmatic, concentrating on its political interests rather than abstract matters. The U.S. did not recognize the integration of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1940 and publicly denounced it, unlike the Europeans, who did nothing of the kind. The U.S. sealed its stand on the matter in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.
But the U.S., which understood the legal aspects of the matter very well, did not describe the events of 1940 as occupation, knowing that this would have provoked a highly negative reaction of the Soviet Union and then Russia. The point at issue is not only emotions. According to international law, an occupied country may demand compensation from the occupier after its liberation.
The Americans kept silent in the 1940s, when the Soviet Union and the U.S. fought as Allies against the Nazis. They did not say anything on the matter during the Yalta Conference, where the borders of the post-war Europe were defined and they could have spoken up for the Baltic states. Neither did they protect the emigre governments of Poland and Yugoslavia, recognizing instead those authorities which came to power in those countries after the Red Army had liberated them from the Nazis. The main objective then was to defeat Nazi Germany, which meant protecting "small nations" was relegated to the fringes of U.S. policy.
The U.S. remained silent from the 1950s to the 1980s, as it was unwilling to create an additional pretext for conflicts with the Soviet Union within the global confrontation between the two superpowers. In fact, America had more than enough reasons to take a principled stand. For example, an Estonian government in exile worked in Sweden because the old cabinet had not been officially fired in the turbulent year of 1940. Prime Minister Juri Uluots emigrated to Sweden, where he proclaimed himself acting president in strict compliance with the Estonian Constitution. The U.S. could have invited him to Washington (that government in exile worked until 1992) and used this for denouncing the Soviet Union as an occupier. But the U.S. did not support virtual political forces, preferring to deal with real factors, such as the Soviet Union.
The Americans did not mention the occupation during Gorbachev's perestroika, when their main objective was to ensure the reunification of Germany on their terms (with NATO membership) and to dismantle the Warsaw Pact without provoking the resistance of the Russian bear, who could have acted unpredictably if had been labeled an occupier. Such a misunderstanding could have had highly unpleasant consequences for the U.S. and Europe, including a new Iron Curtain.
The U.S. and Europe acted with great restraint in the subsequent years as well, because they wanted to ease the eastward expansion of NATO and the integration of the Baltic countries into the bloc. Russia could not influence that process, yet the West tried to minimize the political risks and refrained from unduly tarnishing relations with Russia. Besides, by 2001 Russia and the U.S. had become partners in the counter-terrorist coalition and "unnecessary" claims were completely out of place.
Only now that the Baltic countries have joined NATO and the EU and the counter-terrorist coalition is no longer important for the U.S. (9/11 is history, the Taliban have been ousted from Kabul, and there are conflicting reports about bin Laden) has it decided to take a stand and utter the fateful word, "occupation." A resolution to this effect has already been submitted to Congress this year.
The U.S. no longer needs to spare Russia's dignity, or else it would not have planned a "color revolution" in Belarus, which is Russia's partner in the Union State.
In other words, the U.S. and Europe have again demonstrated the utter pragmatism of their policy: Keep silent when you necessary to avoid offending a partner you need or a strong rival. But uphold democratic ideals in the fight against the Soviet regime when it has already become history and is no longer dangerous.
Alexei Makarkin is the deputy general director of the Center of Political Technologies
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial staff.
