MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - The Russian military presence in Georgia has become the key issue of the Caucasian Big Game in the last few months.
Discussions of the timeframe and speed of their withdrawal from Georgia overshadowed the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
But the Russian presence (including military) in the South Caucasus is not an element of its "imperial resurgence." Ensuring stability in the former Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus is a fundamental condition of Russia's peaceful domestic development and the preservation of its integrity.
Russia is a Caucasian state because ten of its Federation members are located in the North Caucasus. Another three (Volgograd and Astrakhan regions and the Republic of Kalmykia) are part of its South Federal District and have become involved in the Caucasian socio-economic, political and cultural projects in the last decade. The territory of Russia's North Caucasus is bigger than the independent states of the South Caucasus.
Nearly all ethnic-political conflicts in South Russia are closely connected with conflicts in the former Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus and vice versa (the Georgia-Ossetia and the Ossetia-Ingush conflicts, the Georgia-Abkhazia confrontation, the Chechen problem, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the difficult relations between the "indigenous" population of the Kuban and Stavropol territories and migrant Armenians).
Besides, the Russian North Caucasus and the states of the South Caucasus have a common problem of "divided nations" (Lezghinians, Ossetians and Avars) and persecuted nations (Meskhetian Turks).
Hence, security in the Russian Caucasus cannot be ensured without restoring stability in the neighboring Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia took over the burden of geopolitical leadership in the former Soviet area. The Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed by the Caucasian powers Russia and Armenia (Azerbaijan and Georgia acceded to it later) became an attempt to develop an integration strategy in the sphere of security.
But the treaty failed to become an effective instrument of the Caucasian geopolitics. The leaders of Georgia more than once spoke of its declarative nature. Azerbaijan believes that the problem of Nagorny Karabakh was provoked by the Armenian aggression and hence views the CST as ineffective for ensuring its territorial integrity and security.
Peacekeeping operations, which Russia undertook in the 1990s, became more effective instruments of the Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Russian peacekeepers have been maintaining peace in the zone of the Georgia-Ossetia conflict since July 1992 and in the zone of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, since July 1994. In autumn 1993, the units of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus helped stop the civil war in Georgia between the supporters of Eduard Shevardnadze and the deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
The Russian peacekeeping operations in the region proved to be much more effective than comparable actions of the U.S. and its allies in Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo.
The Russian military facilities in Georgia were mostly located in problem regions, which complicated, to a degree, Russia-Georgian relations. The bases were deployed in Batumi (Adzharia), Akhalkalaki (Dzhavakheti), Vaziani and Gudauta (Abkhazia; the provisional capital of the self-proclaimed republic in 1992-1993).
Georgia viewed the Russian military presence as the bridgehead for the Kremlin's neo-imperial policy. In 1997, Georgia adopted the law on the protection of the border, under which Russian border guards were obliged to hand over their functions to their Georgian colleagues. The Russian "border" presence in Georgia was discontinued in 1999.
At the Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (November 1999), Russia and Georgia agreed on the withdrawal of Russian bases. These Istanbul agreements were formalized as the official supplement to the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe.
The current aggravation of Russia-Georgia relations is connected with the bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The importance of the Batumi base for Russia's policy is close to zero, but an accelerated withdrawal of the Akhalkalaki base will create quite a few problems. The base is located in the Samtskhe-Dzhavakheti region populated by Armenians, who view the Russian presence as a guarantee of personal and ethnic security.
The Russian diplomatic inaction with regard to the Akhalkalaki base is shocking. The Russian presence there is not a military but a political question. If we leave Akhalkalaki, we will lose the trust of the Armenian population of the Transcaucasus.
This issue can and should be presented not as a Russia-Georgia conflict but as a problem of Georgia-Armenia relations. We could apply the methods of Mikhail Saakashvili and elevate the problem to the international level, involving influential Armenian lobbyists in Europe and the U.S. and the Yerevan authorities. Regrettably, the same policy was pursued with regard to the two bases and so withdrawal from Akhalkalaki is inevitable.
But the issue of Russian military bases has one more crucial aspect. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the South Caucasus would not encourage an intensive post-conflict settlement in the zones of ethnic conflicts there. The Georgia-Abkhazia, Georgia-Ossetia and Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts can be mothballed but will not be settled until the leaders of the independent Caucasian states offer their people a new political agenda and new forms and methods of national development.
Worse still, withdrawal from Akhalkalaki is fraught with Georgia-Armenia contradictions. The potential refusal to send Russian peacekeepers to the zones of Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and Ossetia can provoke a new round of ethnic tensions. In a word, demanding a speedy liquidation of the Russian military presence without filling the gap with a substantiated security policy does not promise a tranquil future to the Greater Caucasus.
Sergei Markedonov, candidate of history, is head of the department of ethnic relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
