MOSCOW (SERGEI KARAGANOV, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, for RIA Novosti)
A major problem the Russian people and the Russian nation are facing is the relations with the EU, which embodies Europe in political, social and ideological terms. Relations with Europe have and will determine Russia's self-identification and development.
This issue needs lengthy and serious consideration, which need not be replaced with references to Russia's European nature for geographical reasons - Europe's border running along the Urals is quite conventional, or to trade volumes - half of exports of many North African countries goes to the EU too.
Russia and Europe share the bulk of historical and cultural legacy, Christianity and the race. But Europe has always comprised a set of values and a certain political culture. Both notions are quite flexible. Though obviously stemming from the culture of the previous centuries, the current European political culture has numerous fundamentally new features.
As for politics and security, Europe of the EU is trying to overcome the cursed legacy of bloody wars, not without success, and we should be grateful for that.
The new Europe refrains from using force in conflict settlement or the balance-of-forces policy, and places human rights and ethnic non-discrimination above the interests of nations, and well-being above ethnic pride. Religious tolerance, the new team spirit, and the social welfare state concept are reigning in Europe -- formerly the land of religious wars and inquisition, dominated by individualism and capitalism.
A new post-European civilization, and the first relatively successful prototype of world government are taking shape today.
Three hundred years ago, Russian Tsar Peter the Great plugged our country out of many-century stagnation and turned it towards the European development model, which was more successful in the technological, social and political respect. Since then, Russia has randomly returned to the European model. It opted for the utopian Communist path (also borrowed from Europe), which distanced the country further from Europe. Then it returned to the beaten track. Over nearly fifteen years, Russia caught up with Europe incredibly fast, covering three years in one.
Europe and Russia drew closer together again only to realize how different they were. Russia was moving towards the Europe of de Gaulle, Churchill and Adenauer, and when it got closer, it saw the Europe of Brussels bureaucracy and new political correctness. However, Russia did not bother to learn more about this new Europe created by Western Europeans and joined by many in Central and Eastern Europe. Russian officials developed formal contacts with their European colleagues, particularly under Putin, but never asked themselves what they wanted from this Europe and these relations. Only one pointless goal was made clear: Russia does NOT want to join the EU, to the joy of those Europeans who did not want the trouble of including Russia into the new Europe. Russia also declared its plans always to be an independent center of force.
All these came at the time when the Russian population was declining together with its share in the world's GNP, and its position between rapidly developing China and collapsing Greater Middle East.
Such ambitions are not merely shortsighted - they are dictated by the political elite's desire to live as before when they did not have to comply with common laws and could rule without accountability.
As a result, Russia's interaction with the rest of Europe was soon reduced to nothing. Their relations have been lacking content and the development vector for two years now, and mutual mistrust has been growing. Bluntly speaking, such silence is called crisis, if we are not talking in diplomatic parlance. There are two possible solutions: either to expose the crisis and define positions of the partners; or to hush it all up and feign ignorance.
For a variety of reasons, the parties opted for the second option by signing four road maps at the Russia-EU summit in Moscow on May 10.
The Europeans signed the documents in an attempt to retain their influence over Russia and to keep it closer in the conditions of intensifying cross-Atlantic competition. Besides, they also wanted to secure some individual privileges, as usual.
Russia agreed to approve these incredibly hazy documents in an effort to avoid risks or the aggravation of relations now that it does not have enough skilful bureaucrats who can bargain, and regarded as a country with a cumbersome image rejecting European values and Europe in general.
However, what's done is done - the documents have been approved. Now it is time to proceed further, restricting the illusion of normalcy, which would let bureaucrats continue with their idleness in the next few years.
Russia should urgently decide what it wants from Europe and set itself the most ambitious goals without fear. If NATO begins to expand to Ukraine, then Russia should follow suit and join NATO, particularly now that NATO is not what it was before. If the EU expands towards Russian borders, we should perhaps consider accelerating gradually the rapprochement and integration with it via a political union, an association, a free trade zone, etc. Then we should draft a new agreement with the EU to replace the 1994 partnership and cooperation agreement to expire in 2007, and the abovementioned road maps that have no practical or legal significance. We should not give in on specific issues in Kozyrev's manner, although the road maps offer opportunities for such concessions that may have far reaching consequences. Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister in the early 1990s, knew what he was making the concession for - he was guided by the unrealistic idea of immediate unification with the West. Now Russia is paying for it with the upsurge of anti-Western sentiments. It is time to think it all over and resolutely move ahead, avoiding previous mistakes.
The opinions expressed in the article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
