MOSCOW, (RIA Novosti political commentator Peter Lavelle). Western punditry cannot accept that a "colored revolution" in Russia is very unlikely.
This is probably partly due to the general built-in media bias against Russia and a very specific bias against Vladimir Putin's Kremlin, as well as local Russian spin-doctors and journalists weaving the most incredible scenarios of gloom and doom. In the meantime, it would appear the recent "colored revolutions" are undergoing "staglution."
There should be more focus on the prospect that "colored revolution" or Western-styled "rent-a-crowd" regime changes have run their course in the post-Soviet space. This is not to say that many people in former Soviet republics have abandoned hopes for a more democratic future. Rather, it should be remembered that a number of regimes have taken precautions against outside funding, training, and agitation. Add to this the possible disillusionment with the results Georgia, Ukraine, and - to some extent - Kyrgyzstan have achieved since their "colored revolutions."
One could go as far as to claim the "colored revolutions" are experiencing post-revolution "staglution" (stagnating revolution) and may not serve as examples for others to emulate or outsiders to fund.
In Ukraine, the "Orange Revolution" appears to have been completely squeezed of its once inspiring appeal. Former political allies, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko are in a competitive political embrace, each waiting for the other to submit or be defeated.
Yushchenko, with an eye on the March 2006 parliamentary elections, has focused on defeating his political opponents by political means. Yushchenko's approach to the economy has been very general, primarily concerned with assuring fiscal and monetary stability, creating a favorable investment climate and building solid foundations for sustainable growth. In short, Yushchenko can be described as an economic liberal supporting a laissez-faire approach.
Tymoshenko is very different. Judging by her public statements, Tymoshenko supports strong state intervention in the economy and a statist economic policy. While Yushchenko uses political means to deal with his enemies, Tymoshenko is attempting to exert economic and financial control over political opponents through tough state regulation. Her call to revisit past privatizations and even possible renationalization of numerous formerly state-owned firms has not only shaken business confidence, but has also alarmed minority shareholders in former state firms. Potential foreign investors have also questioned Tymoshenko's intentions.
Neither Yushchenko nor Tymoshenko have tackled what the "Orange Revolution" was supposed to change: state meddling in the economy instead of reform, endemic bureaucratic corruption, arbitrary application of the law, and petty politicians juggling for power to secure their rent-seeking status. Both may face the ire of voters for their lack of progress and "politics as usual" approach in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
While Georgia's bout with "staglution" is similar to Ukraine's economic and reform problems, it has been dramatic in terms of its inability to institutionalize the democratic ethos of the "Rose Revolution."
One of the first things Saakashvili did when he came to power was to change a remarkably modern constitution (established in 1995). He amended the constitution to create a "super-presidential" system, eliminating checks and balances and concentrating powers in the executive branch.
Media freedoms have eroded since the "Rose Revolution" - particularly television. Of the six private TV networks operating in Tbilisi before the revolution, only four have survived. Of those four, one belongs to the brother of the president's national security adviser, while another is in the possession of the defense minister's best friend. A new independent network has been refused a transmission license. Investigative reporting has basically died and been replaced with political reporting pliant to government sensitivities.
In April, the legislature passed laws to approve central and district election commissions with presidential appointees, without any representation for opposition groups.
Saakashvili has publicly said - without a bat of an eye - parties that disagree with him on issues such as the presence of foreign troops in Georgia or membership in the European Union, which he supports, should be "outlawed." How can this politician realistically - even rationally - claim to be an international leader of democracy when he is not democratic at home and does not have a solid track record of economic reform?
It is too early to meaningfully comment whether Kyrgyzstan is undergoing "staglution" - it may even be worth doubting if a revolution actually occurred in this Central Asian country with the departure of former President Askar Akayev. Kurmanbek Bakiyev was overwhelmingly elected president in a free and fair vote, but the state institutions have remained the same. The unholy alliance of drugs and religious agitators present the new president with the enormous task of creating economic opportunity in his impoverished country. As long as the volatile Fergana Valley remains the transit route for Afghan drug lords and Islamic fundamentalists, Kyrgyzstan will face uncertainty and instability.
Those looking for a "colored revolution" in Russia should consider the impact of such in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Each country is experiencing some form of "staglution." Each faces many of the same issues and problems before their respective "colored revolution."
It should be expected that many governments in the post-Soviet space have learned some of the lessons of "colored revolutions" - "rent-a-crowd" street demonstrations can change governments, but not a country's problems. Until the leaderships of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate they can overcome "staglution," the next "colored revolution" will probably remain on hold.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
