Kazakhstan: no revolution in sight

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MOSCOW. (Tatyana Stanovaya for RIA Novosti.)

Presidential elections in Kazakhstan are scheduled to take place on December 4, 2005, and the media is busy exploring the possibility of another "color revolution" in the post-Soviet space. However, Kazakh political forces are not powerful enough to oppose the incumbent President, which suggests that a Ukrainian, Georgian or Kyrgyz-style revolution is not likely in Kazakhstan.

A "color revolution" begins with a powerful opposition, whose efficiency depends on three key factors: the ruling elite has to lose part of its electorate and administrative resources; the opposition must rally to nominate a common leader; and it must offer a viable and popular platform.

But it seems that the feeble Kazakh opposition cannot nominate a charismatic leader who would resemble Viktor Yushchenko or Mikhail Saakashvili. This is quite a problem, with presidential elections looming in two months.

The national opposition got off to a good start. Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, Speaker of the Kazakh Parliament's lower house, Mazhilis, unexpectedly quit the presidential team in October 2004 and sided with the opposition. Tuyakbai, the third most important man after President Nursultan Nazarbayev, was prosecutor-general until 2000, subsequently was elected to parliament and became Mazhilis Speaker with President Nazarbayev's support. In the summer of 2004, Tuyakbai headed the Otan ruling party's ticket in the run-up to the September 19 Mazhilis elections. But he decided to resign as speaker soon after election results came in. Tuyakbai also left Otan because Nazarbayev's future was uncertain: at that time, it was unclear whether the President would have the right to take part in the elections or not. A struggle for power intensified within the ruling elite. Tuyakbai's political ambitions outweighed his personal loyalty, and he decided against becoming the driving force behind Otan because this did not provide him with any sizeable dividends after the elections. Nazarbayev withdrew his support of Tuyakbai as the new parliament's speaker. As a result the new opposition leader joined other disgruntled politicians who were unable to find a place for themselves in a new situation.

Tuyakbai began to criticize the authorities in late 2004, eventually winning the opposition's acclaim. At that time, Ukraine was in the throes of the "orange revolution." Tuyakbai, who resembled former Ukrainian prime minister Viktor Yushchenko, advocated honesty, the need for democratizing Kazakhstan's political system and equal opportunities for all political forces.

Political processes in Ukraine and Kazakhstan held many similarities at that time. Kazakh opposition came with the idea to plant Ukrainian chestnuts all over the country, destined to symbolize a Kazakh-style "chestnut revolution."

However, it became increasingly apparent that the opposition lacked the potential for staging a "color revolution." The Coalition of Democratic Forces for Just Kazakhstan, which nominated Tuyakbai for president, failed to become a unified opposition movement. The Ak Zhol party, the most vocal critic of official authorities, joined the coalition. However, this led to an intra-party split when part of Ak Zhol activists, headed by leader Alikhan Baimenov, decided to run in the presidential election independently. Moreover, the coalition's Communist wing also decided to nominate its own candidate some time later.

All other politicians registered as independent candidates are unable to offer any serious competition to Nazarbayev.

As a result, Kazakh opposition is not unified; it comprises ambitious politicians who have separated from the ruling elite. They find it hard to establish common ground, all the more so as the opposition lacks an alternative national platform. By contrast, Yushchenko's European integration concept had broad popular support in Ukraine.

Kazakhstan is a more unified country than Ukraine, which is divided along geographical lines (east-west), or Kyrgyzstan (north-south). Nazarbayev, who represents the most influential southern Kazakh zhuz (clan), has established a stable balance of power, skillfully integrating the interests of eastern and western clans inside the system.

However, the main blow against the prospects of a "color revolution" in Kazakhstan was dealt by the Ukrainian government crisis. The success of Georgian and Ukrainian "revolutions" had exerted a powerful psychological impact, emphasizing the importance of street protests. It seemed that such protests made it possible to put pressure on the authorities and force them to resign. However, the results of such actions are evident both in Kyrgyzstan, whose new leaders are on the verge of a crisis, and in Ukraine, where the power split has already taken place.

Tatiana Stanovaya is leading expert of the Center of Political Technologies.

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