MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Peter Lavelle). Russia’s liberal agenda is not dead; rumors of its passage are premature.
In fact, an authentic Russian liberal agenda is only now beginning to form, and it does not need the traditional liberalism of the intelligentsia, or today's nationalist agenda.
Russia’s intelligentsia has surrendered to the state the critical issue of nationalism, and the country’s rising middle-class is set to create Russia’s own patriotic liberalism.
Commentaries on Russian politics almost always focus on the Kremlin’s ruling elite, its big business allies, and parties within and outside parliament. This kind of commentary is not really about politics, it is about power. For the past few years, this concept of politics has taken sway, undoubtedly with popular acceptance. The politics of power during Vladimir Putin's presidency focused on sustained economic growth and overall social stability. Given the chaos of the 1990s, when millions were impoverished and socially dislocated, the desire for any form of normalcy is entirely understandable.
The Kremlin’s politics of power is essentially devoid of ideological rigidity. It has skillfully captured most of the ideological spectrum for its own purposes - again will popular backing. Politics as ideology, as practiced during the Yeltsin years, remains decidedly out of fashion.
This lack of ideological rigidity has had some interesting, and for the West disappointing, side effects for opposition parties. Political opposition to the Kremlin and its popular pedestal party United Russia has forced them to demonstrate ideological rigidity in order to define themselves.
Russia’s nationalist parties have benefited most of all from the Kremlin’s politics-as-power approach. Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), and Dmitry Rogozin’s “Rodina”, are free-riders benefiting from politics-as-power; in correctly capturing a nationalist-patriotic platform, they are welcomed by a significant part of the electorate. The LDPR and “Rodina” are valuable in the current political setup in that they provide a vent for national pride, without actually exerting any real power to influence Kremlin policies.
Russia’s liberal opposition has fared far worse. Representing what could be called the traditional liberalism of the intelligentsia, they too speak in terms of power. Their demand to be elected, and to rule, on the basis of their increasingly rigid ideological stance over human and property rights, is simply untenable under the current conditions, and what the vast majority of the electorate understands as Putin’s normalcy. Additionally, their agenda, phased in the way that it is, simply does not address the needs and interests of the average Russian voter.
What limits the widespread appeal of Russia’s nationalists and liberals is their self-identification, and their sense of exclusivity from each other; Russia’s nationalists aren't liberal, and the liberals aren’t nationalists. What each is not, the Kremlin’s United Russia is. This is the element that has made the presidency of Putin so popular, and it can't last for very much longer.
Russia’s civil society, more specifically its growing middle-class and more self-confident stratum of entrepreneurs, is rarely the focus of media attention. This is understandable when it comes to the realm of politics. At the moment, politics is not particularly important for those who appreciate Putin’s normalcy - although this will eventually change.
Putin’s normalcy is creating a politics of representation, moving away from the politics of power toward the politics of social interests. The economic success of Putin’s political normalcy and Russia’s economic boon has given life to what will eventually result in a political agenda uniting Russia’s nationalist-patriotic and liberal elements. This new agenda will have little interest in firebrands such as Zhirinovsky, Rogozin, Khakamada, Yavlinsky, Kasparov, and Ryzhkov - it will move in directions these ideologues will not understand or accept.
Russia’s developing patriotic-liberal agenda will probably be replete with rough edges for a while longer, but it won’t take another revolution for them to eventually become politically hegemonic. It won’t be overly concerned with property rights regarding former Soviet assets, or with human rights; it won’t be anti-Western, or interested in Western charity to support its cause, although it can be expected to be very much pro-individuality and entrepreneurship. It will be a very pragmatic agenda, and open to compromise. At its very core, this patriotic-liberal agenda will be about Russia’s potential. Today’s ideologues, both Western and Russian, are experiencing their last moments in the sun; those who truly care and expect to benefit from a resurgent Russia are set to determine their country’s destiny.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board. -0-
