MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Peter Lavelle) - For some reason a subterranean belief persists among Russia-watchers and members of the media that the Russian electorate remains enamored with the political extremes of the old Communist left and the seemingly resurgent ultra-nationalist right.
A closer look proves the opposite. The majority of voters have supported the Kremlin’s middle-of-the-road “party of power” and is set to do so for some time to come.
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and the so-called ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky have declined relative to other parties elected to parliament since 1993. The combined voting returns for both parties in the 2003 parliamentary elections show an astounding 70% percent drop compared to ten years ago.
This should come as no surprise: both the KPRF and the LDRP strive to attract voters from essentially the same constituency.
The communists have tried to adapt to the post-Soviet reality with little success. The party continues to hold in high regard what it considers to be the best elements of the failed Soviet Union (which is just about everything), with a grafted on element of Russian nationalism. For the rank-and-file former members, this hybrid ideology is not compelling. Those who are attracted to the party’s unconvincing embrace of Russian nationalism have other parties to choose from, and have voted with their feet (and votes).
Zhirinovsky’s “cult of personality” party suffers from similar woes. The LDRP is often called an ultra-nationalist party, but its voting record in parliament demonstrates that it supports the Kremlin’s party of power (whatever party that happens to be at the time) more times than not and basically is a proponent of the prevailing status quo. Zhirinovsky can be counted on for a star performance on television standing up the “average Russian” and conjure up amazing one-liners that entertain and are often even hard to disagree with. But in the end his party’s platform is a near reflection of the communists with more stress on the nationalist issue. The LDRP’s populism differs little from the KPRF’s socialism and both parties leadership appear more than happy to play a role in a political game they know they can’t really change or be bothered to understand.
The writing is on the wall for the communists and Zhirinovsky’s one-man show. During the last four parliamentary elections the “red-brown” vote has traveled south from 35%, to 33%, to 30 percent, to finally 24%. Given this trend, the 2007 election result could expect a return of approximately not more than 20% (and could be as low as 15%).
Dmitry Rogozin’s Rodina (Motherland), is of course, somewhat of an exception. Garnering an unexpected 9% of the vote in the 2003 parliamentary election, it claims the mantle of a more strident Russian nationalism. Be that as it may - for now. The fact is that Rodina is dealing with its own internal divisions - one faction appears to want to take on its former Kremlin sponsors in opposition and the other opting to adopt a more Kremlin-friendly position akin to the LDRP. It should not be forgotten that Rodina came into being not to capture the ultra-national card, but to steal voters away from the communists.
During the 2007 election, Rodina may not expect official patronage, but it surely has to reckon with new election laws: a party now has to win at least 7% of the vote to make it into the Duma, parties cannot form electoral blocs (which Rodina is), and the minimum number of members is 50,000 and requires parties to have organizations in at least half of the country’s regions. Rogozin’s Rodina has its work cut out for it if it hopes to be well represented in the next parliament.
The fate of all three parties is probably irrelevant in the scheme of things. None can compete with the party that most of the electorate has supported since 1993 - the perceived “party of power.”
Today the “party of power” is United Russia. Its previous incarnations include Russia’s Choice in 1993, Our Home Russia on 1995, Unity/Medved (meaning “bear”) and Fatherland/All Russia in 1999, and finally United Russia in 2003. Victory or defeat for the “party of power” actually had little to do with “administrative resources,” “political spin,” or invention of “artificial opposition parties.” The final outcome was determined with whom the establishment politician supported as its representative: voters deemed Yeltsin as a loser and later Putin as a winner. Importantly, this determination had little to do with a candidate’s “populist” or “nationalist” credentials.
Russia’s “red” and “brown” parties are facing a slow, but steady decline. Since 1993, voters have supported parties to deal with the post-Soviet collapse - sometimes it has been to recapture a sense of a fondly remembered past normality, but most of time it has been to get on with the job of creating a modern Russia. Russia’s “reds” and “browns” offer neither in any meaningful way.
The next step is to watch how United Russia - full of differences and contradictions - deals with the same issues.
(The author gratefully thanks Patrick Armstrong, defense analyst for Canadian government, for his in-depth analysis and insight on Russia's political parties).
