MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political analyst Dmitry Kosyrev).
Only a month ago, it seemed that Russia was the only regional country to maintain good relations with Japan, as compared with recently revived animosity toward that country on the part of Beijing and Seoul. This was highlighted by Vladimir Putin's forthcoming visit to Tokyo right after his projected participation in APEC's Pusan summit.
Current diplomatic efforts are toning down to some extent the acute conflict between China, Korea and Japan. For instance, the three national leaders will communicate with each other in Pusan. Moreover, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, South Korean and U.S. representatives are jointly negotiating with North Korea in Beijing.
However, Russia is concerned over problems still persisting in Japan's relations with its neighbors.
At first glance, everything boils down to the belligerence of Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who regularly visits the Yasukuni shrine that commemorates Japan's war dead. This Shintoist temple contains the deities of 2.5 million people who died for Japan in the conflicts accompanying the Meiji restoration, during the Satsuma rebellion and similar domestic conflicts, during the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the First World War, the Manchurian Incident, the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War. They are enshrined in the form of written records, which note name, origin, date and place of birth of everyone enshrined. Also honored here are 14 Japanese Class A war criminals, a fact that has engendered protests in a number of neighboring countries which believe their presence indicates Japan's failure to fully atone for its militaristic past.
Seoul and Beijing nearly broke off all relations with Japan in mid-October, that is, right after Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine once again. China's Foreign Ministry recalled its Ambassador from Tokyo, with Seoul noting that President Roh Moo-hyun might call off his December 2005 visit to Japan. Beijing canceled the then Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutake Machimura's Chinese visit. Asian countries explain these and some other actions by the alleged "revival of the Japanese militarist spirit."
The Russian public does not react in any way to the Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni temple. This is not surprising because Japan did not attack the Soviet Union during World War II, although Josef Stalin's marshals anticipated that scenario. Nor did Japan occupy part of Russia's territory, except south Sakhalin and the Kurile archipelago that were ceded to it under the 1905 Portsmouth peace treaty. However, the people of Russia react harshly to Tokyo's repeated attempts to discuss the national affiliation of the South Kurile islands. But Russian public opinion does not believe that Japan will take over these territories today. Unlike Beijing and Seoul, Moscow therefore perceives no problems in its relations with Tokyo.
Russia now considers Japan to be one of its most important partners. The bilateral trade turnover increased by nearly 50% in 2004, totaling $8.8 billion. The Russian-Japanese trade turnover, which has grown by 17-18% in the last few months, will apparently exceed $10 billion by the end of 2005. Japan's SODECO consortium, Mitsui and Mitsubishi are participating in Russia's $20 billion Sakhalin oil-and-gas projects. There are plans to sign about ten documents on trade and economic issues in the course of Vladimir Putin's Tokyo visit. Consequently, Moscow is more worried about its predominantly raw-materials exports to Japan than Shintoist rites at the Yasukuni shrine.
Unlike China, Russia did not try to prevent Japan from becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is high time Japan, just like Germany, overcame the legacy of the postwar period and left its vanquished country status behind. However, Japan's subsequent role needs to be assessed. Germany found a place in Europe, while Japan is still unable to do the same in Asia. The extent of Japan's future independent role is more important than the revival of its so-called "might," whatever this means.
Koizumi's victory during recent elections is called on to create a "new Japan." What does this mean? Will Japan go nuclear in case of undesirable Korean developments? And how should Moscow react to this? Will Japan eventually acquire nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles? Will this situation further complicate Tokyo's relations with China and both Koreas? Will a "new" Japan strengthen its alliance with the United States? Moreover, Tokyo and Washington have virtually pledged to defend Taiwan from Beijing. Will they maintain consensus on this issue? The extent of Koizumi's new policies seems unclear, as there is nothing new in Japan-U.S. alliance, except that it will inevitably feed up Chinese-Japanese tensions.
Doubtless, Japan's independent role would signify its stable and well-balanced relations with all Pacific powers, above all neighboring countries. This is the main element of the Kremlin's policy with regard to Tokyo. However, a Russian-Japanese rapprochement may slow down, unless Tokyo sorts out the root causes of present-day scandals in its relations with other Asian countries, first of all, China.
