MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov.)
Officially closing its airspace for NATO military aircraft starting Wednesday, November 23, Uzbekistan has undoubtedly undermined the logistics system of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan amid a general logistical crisis caused by the American pullout from Khanabad.
Tashkent's decision will hardly stop the independent antiterrorist operation the United States conducts in Afghanistan, which had been primarily supported through Khanabad, but it will make life even harder for the U.S. troops there.
A senior official at NATO headquarters in Brussels dismissed rumors that the closure of Uzbek airspace would lead to a reduction in procurements, saying the Alliance would redirect the supplies to alternative channels. After all, Germany was the only country that used the air route from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan, he added.
Though the last statement is largely true - so far Germany was the only client of the air force base in Termez, which was the only route for the supplies of its Afghan military deployments. But Termez is one of the few regional cities having a railway connection to Afghanistan across the border river of Amu Darya. The Soviet-built Friendship Bridge linking it to the Afghan river port of Hairatan makes Termez the only potential logistical hub in the region. Denial of service through this hub is a challenge for ISAF as a whole as well as for Germany, whose force makes up the backbone of this antiterrorist operation.
The analysis of possible "alternative channels" also reveals a grim picture for all ISAF contributors. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, who could have provided alternative supply routes, vowed to act primarily in line with the interests of their Central Asian neighbors, one of which is Russia. The largest remaining, though geographically inconvenient, Western-controlled logistical capability in Central Asia is the U.S.-leased Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan, but it is already overcrowded with C-130s and C-17s withdrawn from Khanabad.
The Spanish Defense Ministry will be sending additional personnel to Afghanistan strengthing its current force of 540 to 2,500 next year. Spain will take over the lead in ISAF operations and has expressed concern over the anticipated logistical problems. It has also admitted the changes would make the necessary airlifts longer, more complicated, and more expensive.
These, however, are minor issues. What really is at stake now is who will be the main player in Afghan security.
U.S. generals, who had been so unilateralist on Afghanistan from the early days of the anti-Taliban movement, suddenly became very NATO-cooperative as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional security gathering including Central Asian countries, Russia, and China, urged the White House to set a deadline for the presence of its troops in Central Asia. In other words, as soon as the Americans claimed major progress on Afghan security, they had to go. In response, the Pentagon, a leading NATO player (though certainly not the only financial contributor), increased pressure on other ISAF nations to establish an overall NATO jurisdiction over both antiterrorist efforts in the country - clearly with the intent to redirect its own supplies to Afghanistan to the German-dominated Termez route. This had been an option indeed - until Tashkent also cut it off.
Meanwhile, the antiterrorist effort in Afghanistan is far from being successful. The general outlook is basically optimistic but the Taliban and al-Qaeda have stepped up their activities this year, inflicting heavy peacekeeping (primarily U.S.) and, worse, noncombatant casualties. Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently called on the coalition to "revise both strategy and tactics of counterterrorist action in the country."
The bottom line is that, facing the denial of airspace usage, as their military objectives in Afghanistan become harder to achieve than ever, the ISAF contributing nations will clearly be reluctant to hand over the peacekeeping authority in Afghanistan to the Atlantic Alliance. Nor the Alliance will willingly take upon itself Washington's new logistical headache.
