MOSCOW. (Yuri Zaitsev for RIA Novosti.) Despite political differences Russia and Ukraine used to play on the same "space" field in pre-"Orange" times. Today the situation is radically altered and the Ukrainian space industry risks stagnating and losing its positions as the space component of the national economy.
Russia and Ukraine have always cooperated in the space effort. Ukraine made and supplied Russia the Tsiklon and Zenit launch vehicles, Tselina signals intelligence satellites, and ocean-monitoring spacecraft. Russia and Ukraine have formed an international company, Kosmotrans, to promote launches of the converted RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) missile and are partnered in the international Sea Launch project. An agreement has been signed to set up the Ground Launch company involving Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Sea Launch. Both ventures make use of the Zenit rocket manufactured in Ukraine. Plans also existed to jointly develop a Ukrainian research module to be added to the Russian segment of the International Space Station. The Russian 2006-2015 space program was harmonized in some respects with the program Ukraine was envisaging for the following few years to develop communications and telecommunications and remote sensing of the Earth.
It is no secret that most of these results were due to direct support for the Ukrainian space industry by former President Leonid Kuchma and his personal arrangements with Vladimir Putin, including easier customs terms for mutual deliveries of space hardware.
However, the new Ukrainian leadership has announced its emphasis on "European values" not only in politics but also in the economy. The missile space branch was not spared: it was told to line up with western companies and work on joint projects. But the main point here is not what Ukraine wants to get from western cooperation, but what it can give.
One of the central problems of the Ukrainian space and rocket industry is that it lacks some key production components, specifically capacities to manufacture high-powered propulsion units. Consequently, despite Ukraine's desire to cooperate with Western Europe, joint efforts are concentrated on one program of developing the light-weight Vega European launch vehicle. The Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhnoye Design Bureau is developing a low-powered fourth-stage engine, or rather a booster. (The work is being conducted parallel with the Russian-French Ural program to develop a high-powered multiple-launch engine - 50 flights - fueled by liquid oxygen and methane. The engine is the basis for a family of promising European rockets.)
Nor does Ukraine develop any launch complexes. This is one of the reasons why building the Ukrainian-Brazilian Alcantera-Tsiklon-Space launch center featuring the new Ukrainian Tsiklon-4 carrier rocket has been suspended, although it is the most impressive project for Ukrainian rocket builders. Brazil has practically mothballed its part of the effort, pleading delays in the construction of the complex by Russia's KB Transport Engineering.
A full-blooded and self-sufficient space industry (something for which China and India have opted) does not yet appear real for Ukraine. It lacks financial, technological and personnel resources for such a venture. Its budget is running in the red, to say nothing of the social commitments of the "Orange revolution." The actual sum budgeted for space needs is $10 million, or one-fifth of what the Ukrainian law on space activities stipulates.
The industry's standing a low priority, and hence problems with retooling and staff recruitment. According to the general director and general designer of Yuzhnoye, the average wage is $200 dollars and needs doubling at the very least if staffing shortages are to be solved.
Space operations have lost a lot of the ground it gained earlier. In 2004, Yuzhnoye won a tender to develop a satellite for Egypt. The terms of the contract were thrashed out before the "Orange revolution" and the changes later made by the Ukrainian leadership in its budget policy. A campaign against preferences and perks (which were abolished in March 2005) caused the project to become a losing venture. One way or the other, an option on two additional Egyptian satellites following the launch of the first went to Russian enterprises.
Even so, Ukraine's new leadership believes that the country can establish itself in the launch services market and looks to favorable strategic prospects with high commercial yields. In recent years Ukraine's share of space launches has been 12-13% of the world's total. But the launch vehicles Tsiklon-2 and Dnepr (a converted Satan) were produced when Ukraine formed part of the USSR, and the cost of Russian components for the currently manufactured Zenit (which likewise was developed under the direction of Academician Vladimir Utkin) makes up more than 65% of the vehicle's overall price. Besides, Ukrainian rockets, apart from Sea Launch, lift off from the Baikonur space center, which is on a long-term lease to Russia. Dnepr launches, on the other hand, are scheduled in 2006 from Dombarovsky in the Orenburg region, the missile deployment area of a Strategic Missile Force unit stationed there. (The first time a Dnepr blasted off from Dombarovsky was in December 2004.) A point to note: Dnepr launches even from Baikonur are impossible without direct involvement of Russia's missilemen.
The production of the Tsiklon-3 is today halted because of the unraveling of cooperation between the two countries, including inside Ukraine itself, while the fairly large number of manufactured Tsiklon-2s may be utilized for commercial launches only thanks to the fact that the Russian Makeyev Missile Center in Miass, the Urals, has developed for it the new ADU-600 third stage (the first lift-off is planned for 2006).
In 2006, it is planned to launch the first Zenit-M (its two-stage version Zenit-2M and three-stage version Zenit-3M) under the Ground Launch program. Three to four blast-offs are planned in the course of a year, with full return on investment expected in five to six years' time. Considering its contribution to the manufacture of the rocket and development of the launch complex, Russia's share of profits from the commercial use of the Zenit-M will be 70%, compared with Ukraine's 30%.
Ukrainian rocket builders had every chance of sharing in the manned spacecraft Kliper project by making its Zenit boosters. In line with that, Russia was to abandon the development of its own Onega rocket. The Russian leadership made such a proposal despite the fact that the Kliper's all-up weight was to be reduced from 14.5 tons (launched by an Onega) to 13 tons (if launched by a Zenit). The pre-requisite was Ukraine joining the Common Economic Space. Today even these plans were modified, while a political decision (despite all economic advantages for Russia and Ukraine) is hard to second-guess. Ukraine is considering all factors to come to a "carefully weighed conclusion" and Ukrainian launch vehicles may simply be "banished" from Russian space programs.
Incidentally, something similar has already happened to a number of military programs after Ukraine announced its intention to join NATO. Although the world's best intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed in Dnepropetrovsk, the new Topol-M and Bulava missiles were designed and are being manufactured in Russia without any help from its Ukrainian colleagues.
There is some logic to that: it is risky to depend on someone else in such a matter.
Yuri Zaitsev is an expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Space Research Institute.
