MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti commentator Pyotr Goncharov.) Statements by Tehran officials that Russia has made no "concrete" proposals on uranium enrichment are little more than subterfuge, and a rather uncouth at that.
The other day the Russian Embassy in Tehran handed the Iranians an official note confirming that the earlier Russian proposal to Iran to set up a joint Russian-Iranian uranium enrichment venture in Russia remained in effect. It seems that here could be no more concrete wording.
The crux of the Russian proposal is that uranium should be enriched on Russian territory, instead of Iran's, as Tehran insists and the U.S. and EU categorically reject. And today this is perhaps the only possible compromise able to break the vicious circle of the Iranian-EU negotiating process (on the Iranian nuclear program).
Iran is insisting on the right to a full nuclear program on its soil. Moscow is offering a trade-in and aid. But Tehran, in the person of its official Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, says they have "never received any concrete or detailed proposal from Russia." But then he adds: "We will make close study of any plan or proposal that will officially recognize our right to enrich uranium on Iranian territory."
Now everything falls in place. A "concrete" proposal for Iran seems to be one that recognizes its right to enrich uranium on its soil. In other words, Tehran is taking the negotiating process back to the scenario patently unacceptable to the EU.
There is one fairly important aspect of all "concerns" regarding a nuclear program started from scratch (not only by Iran but any other country). Many states initially developed full nuclear fuel programs exclusively to acquire nuclear weapons, and did not immediately convert them to peaceful programs. Whatever the peaceful aims that were pursued by some or other state, this did not preclude a reverse process - re-engineering any very peaceful nuclear program back into a military one - thereby creating a full nuclear fuel program.
These concerns are heightened by the fact that development of a full nuclear program even by a state having advanced technologies involves what experts describe as "monstrous" expenses, while buying ready-made nuclear fuel is economically more profitable. Incidentally, Japan and Britain are not ashamed of using this second alternative, seeing no harm either to their nuclear sufficiency or their sovereignty.
Tehran keeps claiming that Iran's conversion to ready-made nuclear fuel will retard the natural progress of its nuclear technologies. Meanwhile, the Russian version is good in that it presupposes participation of Iranian specialists in uranium enrichment technology, especially since Russia has something they can learn from.
Russia's solution to the Iranian nuclear problem did not happen overnight. The idea of a joint venture crystallized in the course of Iranian-EU negotiations (with France, Germany and Britain). The idea fits best into the concept of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) chairman ElBaradei, who is proposing a "multi-pronged" approach to the Iranian nuclear issue, therefore removing any political misgivings about the Iranian nuclear program.
Talk about the Russian solution became definitive last year, especially following the November Iran-EU round table in Paris. At the time Tehran signed an agreement temporarily suspending uranium enrichment, while IAEA inspectors sealed nuclear facilities in Isfahan and Natanze. Instead, the European Trio pledged to prepare a package of economic and political proposals that could compensate the Iranians for losses from the suspension of their nuclear industry operation and lead the negotiations to a compromise taking Iran's interests into account. The Russian option could be one, but as yet, there seems to be no alternative.
Tehran is not suggesting any alternative. And when all the things are said and done, it appears Iran seeks to get out of the nuclear non-proliferation straightjacket. Not formally and not according to the letter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but in actual fact. For example, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has signed a law automatically suspending Iran's observance of the additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in case the IAEA submits the conflict around Iranian nuclear program to the UN Security Council. This is a very clear signal. Tehran cannot but realize that it is the additional protocol that is the only guarantee of transparency of the signatories' nuclear technologies.
What is next? This coming January Iran is to have a very delicate discussion with the EU on its nuclear program. Tehran has a lot to prove in regaining the world community's trust. The Russian solution would be very handy to steer the dialog into constructive channels. It is in Tehran's best interest to confirm that the Russian proposal concerning joint uranium enrichment was phrased clearly and succinctly. Moscow is entitled to a more specific answer from Tehran on whether or not they are agreeable to that option. Practicalities of the concept may always be discussed at a meeting of interested parties.
