MOSCOW. (Sergey Karaganov for RIA Novosti) -- The controversy around Iran's nuclear program has entered its final stage. The EU Troika and Russia spent a great deal of time trying to persuade Iran to give up the potentially dangerous parts of its nuclear program, which could theoretically lead to the creation of the A-bomb.
The United States played the role of a bad cop, but in the past year it began to show some flexibility.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) acted in parallel. From time to time its experts would find evidence of military research in Iran's nuclear efforts, or reveal some secret programs. But as a rule, they said that formally Iran had not violated its commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
However, in the last few months Tehran has made it clear that it would not unequivocally give up its potentially military nuclear research and its uranium enrichment technology. The EU Troika saw this as an effort of the Iranian leaders to use the talks to drag out time. Russia was the last to give in. A reliable partner, for many years it had stoically resisted the Western demands to stop the building of the nuclear power station in Bushehr. We even supplied Iran with conventional weapons.
On the whole we have viewed and continue to view Iran as a friendly nation, and a potentially valuable geopolitical partner in the region.
Iran has managed to limit its population growth, establish a relatively modern educational system as a supplement to its great ancient culture, and achieve a small increase in per capita GDP even before the oil boom, which was a remarkable feat compared to the situation prevailing in the overwhelming majority of its neighbors.
We offered Iran to set up a joint venture to upgrade uranium for its nuclear power stations on Russian territory in order to rule out suspicions of Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
The talks were launched but without much success. Our proposals were turned down, then the talks were resumed, next Tehran suggested that China joined the project.
In parallel, Western experts and politicians, joined recently by Russian researchers and specialists, have been leaning towards an almost unanimous opinion that Tehran's diplomatic efforts pursue only one goal - to gain time to build the bomb.
The arguments that Iran wants to exchange its nuclear program for broader international acceptance and higher prestige, are no longer convincing.
Tehran is vehemently trying to dispel suspicions over its craving for the bomb, but it is not trusted as a country with a closed political system. Soviet peaceful intentions were repudiated for the same reason.
The Iranian President made a bad situation worse with his statements about Israel. The cultivated image of a responsible country went tumbling down like a house of cards.
I would like to make one reservation. The Iranians have the moral right to wish to possess nuclear weapons. They live in a very dangerous region. In the south Iran borders on nuclear Pakistan, which may explode any time. In the west, it is flanked by unstable Iraq with American troops, and further on, there is nuclear Israel, which Tehran considers its worst enemy. (Although in many respects this is the problem of Tehran, which nurtures the image of a foe). The Iranians justifiably complain about the world community's largely unfair attitudes. They recall that during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. helped Iraq, and kept shameless silence when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran.
The problem is that acquisition of nuclear weapons by Tehran is unacceptable either for the region's countries, or for the great powers, primarily for Russia, which is located in the direct proximity of Iran, and within reach of potential Iranian nuclear delivery vehicles.
If Iran goes nuclear, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are likely to build the "Arab nuclear bomb." The notion of strategic stability, which the old nuclear powers arrived at after teetering on the brink of nuclear disaster several times, will cease to exist. The likelihood of nuclear war would increase tenfold. Nobody can predict what nuclear Tehran will do, whether its leadership will be dominated by those who urge the destruction of other countries and the sealing of the Persian Gulf. NPT will be killed forever. The risk of all kinds of pre-emptive blows will sharply increase even before Iran goes nuclear, although neither the U.S., nor anyone else wants to resort to such blows because of their limited military value and unlimited political damage.
In this context, and considering our own vital security interests we could not, and did not have the moral right to continue resisting the growing Western pressure for reporting the Iranian nuclear file to the UN Security Council. All great powers agreed that the IAEA should report to the Security Council on the file on February 2. The latter will review it in a month, after the final IAEA report. Moscow gained this "window of opportunity" for Tehran, and even after the discussion there will be more time before the imposition of potential sanctions.
Now the ball is in Tehran's court. Its representatives say that the transfer of the file to the Security Council will destroy the possibility of talks. This is not true. Others claim that the Parliament and the people will not tolerate such a concession. It is hard to believe this statement because references to public opinion do not work in Iran with its "controlled democracy" and virtually no freedom of the press.
Tehran is faced with a historic challenge, which it should parry without any delay. Iran may wish to trade its renunciation of potential nuclear weapons (for instance, by accepting Russia's proposals) to gain acceptance to the international community and its recognition as a responsible player of the new world. In this case it will receive a flood of investment, step up its advancement, and markedly enhance its international prestige and role.
Or Tehran may try to stick to its nuclear program, which looks military, in which case it will face sanctions, cold, if not hostile treatment, limited opportunities for using external resources and technologies, a slowdown of economic progress, and will be doomed to lag behind others. In addition, it will have to be permanently on guard for pre-emptive strikes at its nuclear, and maybe even industrial facilities.
I would like to hope that successors of the brilliant Persian culture - the intellectual elite - will cope with the old grievances and suspicions, overcome the leftovers of religious fanaticism, and pull Iran out of the nuclear loop. In this case Iran will have an opportunity to become a great power of the future, a bulwark of regional stability, rather than a threat to it. All sides are interested in this turn of events.
Sergey Karaganov is Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, Chairman of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy
