MOSCOW. (Alexei Makarkin for RIA Novosti) -- The Georgian parliament has taken the most challenging step in the history of the country's relations with Russia.
It has instructed the government to initiate the replacement of the Russian peacekeepers in the breakaway republic of South Ossetia, called the Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, with international forces. This confrontation-provoking decision was made on the assumption that Russia was trying to annex the region.
Georgia has no proof of the alleged Russian intention. In international law, an attempt to annex a part of another state's territory implies the refusal to recognize that state's integrity. Russia has always regarded South Ossetia, as well as Abkhazia, as part of Georgia. This government position has not changed with presidents, which points to the consistency of the Russian policy on this issue. Therefore, the Georgian parliament's decision is not legally substantiated but is influenced by political and propaganda considerations.
The document does not mention Georgia's withdrawal from the 1992 Dagomys Agreements on the format of the peacekeeping operation. It only instructs the government to revise them so that "the current peacekeeping operation is replaced with an efficient international peacekeeping operation." The parliamentarians did not set a deadline, which gives the Georgian executive branch room for maneuver.
On the other hand, the importance of this decision should not be underestimated. Firstly, an absolute majority of Georgian deputies are members of the ruling party of President Mikhail Saakashvili's supporters. Therefore, the decision was most probably taken upon the president's direct instructions.
Secondly, the fact that the parliament has formulated its intention means that Georgia may take action to force the Russian peacekeepers out of the country. This would push Russia out of the settlement process in the region (if the Georgian authorities succeed, they might subsequently apply the experience to Abkhazia) and, therefore, out of the zone of its historical interests. This may also threaten the lives and property of Russian citizens living in the self-proclaimed republics, which no power can tolerate. For example, the Untied States consistently protects the safety of its citizens around the world.
The Georgian authorities may seem unable to force the Russian peacekeepers to leave the region, as the Dagomys Agreements stipulate that they can pull out only by decision of all parties involved - Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has reaffirmed Russia's commitment to the agreements.
But the Georgian parliament's decision will create major risks, as the deployment of foreign troops without the permission of the host state contradicts the norms of international law. If Georgia formulates the question harshly, the reasons for the deployment of Russian peacekeepers, which look unquestionable now, can be challenged and international pressure can be put on Russia to pull out.
Therefore, the sharply negative reaction of the Russian parliament and foreign ministry to the Georgian deputies' decision appears logical. But Russia can prevent the potentially negative developments. Firstly, the format of the peacekeeping operation may not be changed without the agreement of South Ossetia, which is firmly against enlarging it.
Russia's withdrawal from the region would create a dangerous vacuum, into which criminal and opportunist forces will rush, destabilizing the situation in the region. The fact that the Georgian parliament described South Ossetia as a former autonomy means that Georgia does not really want to settle the problem. Ossetians will never accept this attitude toward them.
Does the West, which is backing Saakashvili and seriously influencing Tbilisi's policy, need a new problem?
Secondly, if Georgia commits itself to forcing out the Russian peacekeepers, it will have to forget about the economic privileges Russia has traditionally granted to its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Georgian economy almost totally depends on Russia, and therefore a deterioration of bilateral relations would be fraught with its collapse. And the failing Georgian economy would pull along Saakashvili's plummeting popularity.
In my opinion, the Georgian authorities should think twice before going beyond the point of no return in relations with Russia.
Alexei Makarkin is Deputy General Director of the Center for Political Technologies
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
