Pyotr Iskenderov, Institute of Slavic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, for RIA Novosti
Montenegro's secession from Serbia-Montenegro has become one more landmark in the endless disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Luckily, this landmark was not tragic (as has often been the case in the Balkans), but more in the genre of a farce. This impression was reinforced by multi-thousand rallies - champions of independence of a tiny alpine republic (as if they were celebrating liberation from centuries-long foreign yoke), and by endless disputes on the existence of a separate Montenegrin nation, and even language (the most zealous advocates of Montenegro's own road in history conveniently forgot that all great rulers of the Montenegro Principality of the 19th-early 20th century proudly declared that they continued the traditions of the Serbian medieval statehood).
In effect, last Sunday Montenegro citizens simply voted for the withdrawal from a state entity which had existed mostly on paper in recent years. Serbia and Montenegro shared only two ministries (foreign and defense), and the President (whose post was even more decorative than similar positions in both republics, where the real power belongs to the heads of state). Everything else -- currency, customs and tax legislation, and state symbols already existed in Montenegro before May 21. For this reason, the words of the father of Montenegro's independence, Milo Djukanovic, to the effect that "in compliance with the decision of Montenegrins... we have obtained our own state," are somewhat exaggerated.
What really prevented Montenegrins to develop independently and successfully in recent years were an objective shortage of industrial capacities (which won't increase after the separation from Serbia), the reputation of abetting Trans-Balkan cigarette smuggling and trade in people, which dated back to the 1990s (the time of anti-Yugoslav sanctions), and unequivocal collisions around EU-Serbian relations. It is not accidental that many of the 55.5% of the participants in the referendum, who voted for Montenegro's independence, justified their decision by a striving to get rid of the grave legacy of the era ruled by the late President of Serbia and Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic, and their reluctance to be responsible for the failure of Belgrade, NATO, EU police, and the Hague Tribunal to arrest the ex-commander of the Bosnian Serbian Army Ratko Mladic.
Be it as it may, but the European Union will now have to develop a strategy towards one more independent state. It will probably not be as contradictory as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as unpredictable as Serbia, but it will need international funding even more than the former.
New Balkan issues are moving to the fore, and once again they have a leaning towards cessation. The most fervent supporters of Montenegro's self-determination were the leaders of Kosovo Albanians. Agim Ceku, Prime Minister of Kosovo and the former Commander of its Liberation Army, has already promised that by the end of the year, the Kosovars and the Montenegrins will be standing shoulder to shoulder in the friendly European family, and that these two new states will "become a major factor of stability in the entire region."
Will the recognition of Montenegro's independence help the Albanian separatists in Kosovo achieve their goal? The answer to this question in unequivocal. On the one hand, the preamble to the UN Security Council Resolution #1244 of June 10, 1999 (which remains an international legal foundation of Kosovo settlement and the activities of the Contact Group with Russia's participation) lists Kosovo as part of the Union Republic of Yugoslavia (which was legally succeeded by the now dead Serbia-Montenegro state entity). The same preamble speaks about the UN commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union Republic of Yugoslavia and other states of the region. Hence, Kosovo does not seem to be entitled to do as Montenegro did on May 21.
On the other hand, the road following which Montenegro has obtained (or reaffirmed, if you wish) its independence has nothing in common with the way chosen by the ethnic Albanian extremists from Kosovo. The referendum was conducted in line with the Constitutional Charter drafted by the European Union and approved in 2003 by the parliament of both Montenegro, and, importantly, Serbia. Hence, Belgrade agreed from the very start to accept any result of the referendum and the subsequent steps of the Montenegro leaders.
As for Kosovo, there is no such document, and its appearance is highly unlikely. The Serbian leaders are emphatically opposed to the independence of Kosovo, and its entry as a sovereign state into key international institutions like the UN or the EU. Thus, the solution of the Kosovo problem is irrelevant to the Serbian consent with the proclamation of independence following a hypothetical all-Kosovo referendum (the current Albanian majority has largely formed due to massive anti-Serbian purges, launched de facto back in 1998). It has to be based on compromise. But unlike Belgrade, the Kosovo Albanians are reluctant to search for it, while the world community, which is now praising the political conscience and restraint of Montenegrins, does not seem to have grasped that the Kosovo Albanians are following their own - bloody and violent - road to Europe.
Those who regret the civilized divorce of Serbia and Montenegro may take consolation in the fact that the two nations remain neighbors with a rich historical tradition of close partnership, and agree, to a certain extent, with the opinion of Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski, who called former Yugoslavia a "project created with good intentions." Today, other projects are praised in Europe, but the Balkan past, present, and future remain volatile.
