The situation in the conflict area will remain unstable until the Israeli soldiers leave Lebanon, and the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers replace them in the buffer zone on the Lebanese-Israeli border. This is what the resolution calls for. But even its implementation would not guarantee an end to the conflict and the eradication of its causes.
Both the Israeli and Lebanese governments have approved the resolution. Each government considers the text of the document a diplomatic victory for its side. At any rate, that is what they want to bring home to their citizens. The Lebanese government is happy that the bloodshed will stop; its proposal on the deployment of Lebanese soldiers on the border was accepted, and an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory was specifically called for.
Likewise, as Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has emphasized, the Israelis are happy that Resolution 1701 offers a solution that prevents a return to the former situation. Hizbollah will no longer be a state within a state, and the Lebanese government will become an institution to which Israel will be able to appeal if the terms of the agreement are violated. Members of the cabinet and other Israeli politicians echo this sentiment, as if singing a mantra: Hizbollah will no longer attack our cities; it will be removed from our borders and disarmed. These were the strategic goals which the Israeli government pursued when it decided to start a military campaign in response to Hizbollah's capture of Israeli soldiers and its attacks on Israeli cities.
But the fact is that Resolution 1701, as well as other UN Security Council documents, is nothing more than theory. The international community simply had no choice, and the members of the Security Council could not but adopt the document, although it is far from ideal. They had to stop the bloodshed at any price. But is it possible to implement the resolution in full, and to prevent hostilities from breaking out again? This is a problem.
Who will disarm Hizbollah and how? The UN Security Council confers responsibility for this on the Lebanese government. Let's recall that before the war the Lebanese failed to reach a consensus on this issue. Only Hizbollah can disarm itself, but the problem is on what terms it will be ready to do so. How will it disarm itself in practical terms, and who will control this process? When a similar problem arose with a Palestinian militia on Lebanese territory, the weapons were laid down in Palestinian refugee camps under Fatah's control. Those Palestinian groups which had weapons outside such camps did not hand them in, but this was hushed up and then forgotten altogether because of other Lebanese problems.
Should the Israelis rejoice at the resolution's clause barring the sale and supply of weapons and ammunition to Lebanon except when allowed by the Lebanese government? This is no doubt a good idea. But has the world community ever wanted Hizbollah, the Palestinian militias, or other groups and movements (there are hardly any political forces in Lebanon without weapons) to be armed? Did it encourage supplies of weapons to them? Who will see to it that weapons do not arrive in Lebanon unofficially, and how can this be done? UN peacekeepers will only be deployed along the border with Israel. But there is also the border with Syria, as well as maritime routes.
Time will tell how effective the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers will be. Much will depend on how quickly the Lebanese army can become strong enough for independent action, as well as the political situation in Lebanon.
It is no surprise that many Israelis have a bitter feeling about the resolution and the cessation of hostilities, and not because they are craving for war and bloodshed. There are too many questions, and the prospects are too vague. In addition, literally on the eve of the ceasefire, Hizbollah launched a record number of rockets at Israel despite the intensive combat operations of the Israeli army in Lebanon. This means that the enemy has not been beaten, and that the Israelis cannot indulge in wishful thinking and believe that these were the last weapons from Hizbollah's arsenal. Many Lebanese do not trust the resolution either. History has taught them not to trust anyone, and to wait for the time when Israeli aircraft will reappear over Beirut.
Finally, the resolution does not bring home the Israeli soldiers whose kidnapping by Hizbollah led to the military campaign. Nor does it free Lebanese prisoners in Israel, as Hizbollah demanded. Resolution 1701 merely recognizes the need for the unconditional return of the soldiers, and encourages efforts to settle the problem of Lebanese prisoners without delay. This is a vicious circle.
To sum up, the resolution does not resolve any problems or give anyone cause to declare victory, although it is victory which some Israeli politicians and Hizbollah are talking about.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
