Japan has real and understandable interests in Central Asia. According to the Japanese prime minister's departing remarks, these are above all energy resources, because no one in the world wants to depend wholly on the Middle East any longer.
This concerns not only oil. In Astana, Koizumi signed an agreement with Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Kazakhstan is perhaps the world's second largest country for uranium ore reserves. Uzbekistan, too, has uranium. Kazakhstan exports up to one million barrels of crude daily, and would like to increase this figure to 3.5 million by 2015. And that is not the only Central Asian resource - the region sought after by everybody now.
Kazakhstan is clearly the key power in the region, and not only in energy terms, or in per capita gross industrial product (higher than in Russia). Kazakhstan is also a social and political model for its neighbors to emulate. It inspires them with the hope that their societies can also undergo peaceful and steady development.
Japan's attempts to foster a relationship with Central Asian countries are understandable and predictable. Its trade with Kazakhstan already stands at $700 million a year, and its investments into this country have reached $1 billion. But how far is Japan prepared to go? The point is how independent will Japan's foreign political activities be in this region, as in many others.
It is no secret that Tokyo's new foreign policy, launched in 1997 and aimed specifically at developing relations with its biggest neighbor, China, has failed. Its relations with China are strained, and not only because Japan cannot properly summarize the results of World War II. Beijing sees in Japan a country that after some wavering in the 1990s has again come round to playing second fiddle to the U.S. in Asia.
Here's the kernel of the problem. Being second fiddle is unenviable not only in the Far East. In Central Asia a junior U.S. partner is not a central figure either. The collapse of American policy in the region is obvious: in an area increasingly dominated by such powers as Russia, China, Iran and others, Washington should not pose as a teacher of democracy or the only superpower. The U.S. now needs a new policy not only in the Middle East, following a month of fighting between Israel and Lebanon and many months of the U.S. unsuccessful occupation of Iraq, but also in Central Asia.
Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to the U.S. now being prepared may mark a step towards formulating such a policy. Perhaps American diplomacy needs the Kazakh leader's support to regain its positions in Central Asia - on new and more reliable conditions more acceptable to the region.
While Washington is slowly and painfully drawing up such a policy, Japan had better play an independent role in Central Asia, highlighting this in every possible way. In that case Tokyo will avoid problems like those it recently faced in Tehran. The Japanese companies that signed a contract in 2004 to develop the giant Azadegan oil field have received a warning from their Iranian partners: if no work is started on the field in September, as specified in the contract, Azadegan will be turned over to the Russians or Chinese.
Perhaps if Japan were not seen in Tehran (deservedly or not) as a dutiful American ally, the situation with the contract could be interpreted as a purely technical rather than a political one. Independent powers are respected and needed by everyone. Koizumi himself, during his Astana visit, praised Kazakhstan "for maintaining good diplomatic relations with the U.S. and the European Union, despite its geographic location between China and Russia." He said he wished to express deep respect for Kazakhstan's balanced foreign policy. Nazarbayev's answer was also characteristic: "We welcome the increased efforts of Japanese diplomacy in Central Asia." The adjective "independent" was not used, but clearly implied.
