MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Viktor Litovkin) - On August 27, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were in Fairbanks, Alaska, for the dedication of a memorial to the Alaska-Siberia Lend Lease program.
The memorial commemorates Soviet and U.S. aviators and support troops responsible for ferrying more than 5,000 American-built warplanes to Fairbanks, where Russian pilots then flew them to the Soviet-German front during World War II.
Ivanov and Rumsfeld also discussed ways of adding substance to bilateral military-technical cooperation and the lifting of U.S. sanctions against Russia's Rosoboronexport state arms exporter and Sukhoi Aircraft Corporation which were imposed by Washington under a far-fetched pretext.
The international media are discussing the main result of the Ivanov-Rumsfeld talks, namely, Rumsfeld's proposal to replace the nuclear warheads of some Russian and U.S. strategic missiles with conventional warheads.
Rumsfeld said the United States is studying the possibility of replacing the nuclear warheads of some inter-continental ballistic missiles with conventional warheads and would like Russia to do the same.
This proposal can hardly be called sensational because two former U.S. defense secretaries, Harold Brown (1977-1981) and James Schlesinger (1973-1975), suggested a similar concept in their May 22, 2006 article "A Missile Strike Option We Need", which appeared in The Washington Post. Brown and Schlesinger said the United States should install non-nuclear reentry bodies on some Trident II D5 missiles aboard operational strategic submarines. Both men said such warheads can destroy terrorists far more effectively than cruise missiles or aircraft bombs. Intelligence reports would make it possible to pinpoint terrorist bases and to promptly launch devastating strikes against them. Such inexpensive, high-precision strikes would not involve any bombers, aircraft carrier task forces or submarines operating in direct proximity to hostile territories.
Military experts criticized the Brown-Schlesinger proposal and said the installation of conventional warheads on strategic missiles cannot effectively be used against terrorists because the latter long ago abandoned the Tora Bora caves in favor of sprawling megalopolises, such as New York and London. Suffice it to say that British authorities have recently arrested several dozen terrorists and their accomplices who planned to blow up commercial planes over the Atlantic Ocean. One can also recall the recent commuter-train explosions in Madrid. Does this mean that strategic missiles should be launched against European capitals? No, because that would be both dangerous and ridiculous.
It would seem even less reasonable because nuclear and non-nuclear strategic missile warheads are not only intended to hit military installations, i.e. command centers, headquarters, ballistic-missile bases, as well as other military bases, ports, arsenals and defense factories. Military plans also envision the destruction of vital civilian facilities, such as electric and nuclear power plants, hydropower dams, canals, TV centers, government buildings, basic infrastructure and data exchange networks.
Although no strategic weapons were used against Yugoslavia and Iraq, their infrastructure nonetheless suffered tremendous damage. Devastating air strikes eventually forced both countries to sue for peace.
Non-nuclear strategic warheads can also hit civilian targets because they have the same throw-weight as nuclear warheads and because their yield is nearly as powerful as that of nuclear munitions. The only difference is that conventional warheads cause no radioactive fallout. However, there would be no survivors anyway after such strikes, which would cause much greater damage than Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans in 2005.
Furthermore, any nuclear power would be sorely tempted to launch a retaliatory strike after detecting incoming strategic ballistic missiles. Its leaders would have to make a split-second decision because ballistic missiles have a short approach time and because it will be impossible to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear warheads in the next fifty years. A retaliatory nuclear strike seems to be the only way to stop an all-out ballistic-missile attack involving nuclear and conventional warheads.
Non-nuclear warheads would make it possible to use strategic missiles more frequently. Until now, such missiles were only fitted with nuclear reentry bodies and served to deter a potential aggressor. However, conventional warheads are another matter because they can be used in conventional wars. Consequently, "political weapons" would turn into "battlefield weapons" with all the ensuing negative consequences for mankind. A costly and unpredictable cold war-style arms race seems to be the least serious consequence.
This is why Sergei Ivanov said he doubts whether this is a reasonable idea. "Russia has some misgivings about such preliminary plans. I am not ready to say that Russia agrees to join this initiative," Ivanov told a news conference devoted to the results of his talks with Rumsfeld.
But Rumsfeld, who reacted differently to this statement, said Sergei Ivanov would probably phone him from Moscow and call his proposal a good idea.
Military experts believe Ivanov will not call Rumsfeld because Moscow does not plan to support this concept in the foreseeable future. No matter what arguments are used to justify a new arms race, Russia has no intention of getting involved.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
