Who can Europe-based missiles threaten?

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MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti commentator Nikolai Khorunzhy) - On October 6, 1986 K-219, a Soviet strategic nuclear-powered missile submarine (NATO's name "Yankee II) sank in the Sargasso Sea in the Atlantic Ocean.

One of the versions was a collision with USS Augusta. Despite the start of perestroika and the new mentality, the collision became possible because the Soviet Union moved its submarine patrol area closer to U.S. territory in response to the deployment in Europe of American medium-range missiles, which were capable of reaching Soviet territory in 15 to 20 minutes.

It is essential to recall the Cold War times. Few remember now the massive European protests against the deployment of American Pershings. But it was clear that missiles attract missiles, and the Soviet Union was bound to target its missiles at every new site that threatened its security.

Today, a new missile crisis is unfolding before our eyes. Head of the U.S. Missile Defense Systems Henry Obering said the White House deems it necessary to provide missile defense not only for U.S. territory, but also for overseas American troops and its allies. At present, the Pentagon has 10 anti-missiles deployed in two sites - in Alaska and California. Officially, the missiles have been positioned there to thwart a threat of Iran's missile strike against Europe and the U.S. In addition, the U.S. intends to deploy 10 long-range interceptor missiles in Eastern Europe, close to the Polish-Belarusian border, to protect against Iran. But this excuse is beneath criticism. The Iranian Shakhab-3 missiles with a range of 3,500 km can only reach Europe, but not the U.S. The shortest flight path from Iran to Europe lies through the Caucasus, the Black Sea, and Ukraine rather than Russia.

Washington claims that its ABM defense, which is being built at overseas bases, is not targeted against Russia. But Russia has not received any guarantees to this effect so far. The Russian Foreign Ministry declared that until this happens, Russia cannot ignore a potential threat to its security.

When Supreme Allied Commander in Europe American Gen. James Jones visited Moscow last April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed concern over the appearance of NATO's similar military installations in Bulgaria and Romania.

In an article published the other day by the Polish newspaper Dziennik, Yury Baluyevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, explained: "We are convinced that implementation of the U.S. plans may lead to the deployment of (missile) systems close to the Russian borders. These systems are capable of upsetting the existing balance between the Russian and American strategic delivery vehicles."

Washington claims that these systems are not aimed against Russia or China, but these words are glaringly at variance with deeds.

Quoting Baluyevsky, ITAR-TASS wrote: "If U.S. missile defense plans are carried out to this or other extent, the existing correlation between the U.S. and Russian strategic offensive potentials will change, and Russia may have to adjust its position on reducing these weapons."

As it always happens, deployment of U.S. military bases overseas will be accompanied by the formation of solid military infrastructure, which will deal a final blow to the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. The CFE treaty has had one foot in the grave since the Baltic countries joined NATO without signing it.

First, the American ABM deployment area in Europe will have to be protected from the air, at least against terrorist attacks. In practical terms, it means that NATO's air force can move to the borders of Russia's ally, Belarus. Secondly, this area will require radars, which, in turn, will have to be thoroughly guarded as well.

Deputy head of the Main Department of International Military Cooperation Lt.-Gen. Buzhinsky believes that "NATO will build new facilities in the European deployment area under the pretext that they are required for the functioning of the ABM system. It will need other forces, such as the navy, air defense, aviation, and ground-based troops in order to protect the security of these facilities."

Moreover, Europe-based military installations may be used for other purposes. If need be, NATO could install attack missiles in silos after minor adjustments. Neither Russia, nor its CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) allies, Belarus in particular, can ignore these plans.

Indicatively, NATO has not yet made a decision on the ABM scale and structure, and for this reason the system will not be integrated into NATO's command network. Declarations about defense of the NATO countries by the ABM system mean that NATO will have to pay at least some of the expenses involved in maintaining its infrastructure. But at the same time, the residents of the countries with ABM deployment areas will risk being hit by the fragments of intercepted ballistic missiles and interceptor missiles, whereas decisions on launching anti-missiles will be made thousands of miles away from Europe.

Until recently, the Europeans believed that instead of building an ABM system with long-range interceptors, it makes sense to upgrade the existing air defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in Europe. It was not ruled out that Russian and Western systems could be used together for the protection of peacemaking operations. This idea was sealed in the declaration on new NATO-Russia relations, which was adopted in Rome in 2002.

After talks with his Polish counterpart Anna Fotyga, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made this statement on the reconfiguration of the U.S. military presence in Europe in general, and the third advanced ABM deployment there (after the U.S. and the Far East) in particular: "Let's not forget that NATO is discussing the building of its ABM system. In this context reconfiguration may question strategic stability. I've told my counterpart that we are interested in these processes being transparent and understandable for us. Of course, we will take them into account while planning our own measures to ensure global strategic stability and Russia's national security."

In late August, replying to the proposal of his American colleague to replace nuclear warheads on strategic missiles with high-precision re-entry vehicles to fight terrorists, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov suggested considering withdrawal from the treaty on medium-range missiles. Former Air Force Commander Anatoly Kornukov mentioned Kaliningrad as a possible site for the deployment of C-400 air defense missile systems with a range of up to 400 km.

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