The aggravation of the Mideast conflict has complicated the foreign policy agenda of the EU, where Finland is currently presiding. There are also serious problems with EU's possible expansion.
Finland has achieved great progress in EU-Russia relations. The complex issues of bilateral relations, primarily in the energy sphere, were discussed to mutual satisfaction at the informal EU summit in Lahti, which President Vladimir Putin for the first time attended in this format.
Finland did not limit its agenda to the required meeting of foreign ministers but held five sessions of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council. As a result, the agenda of the summit in Helsinki initially included the official beginning of talks on drafting a new EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement.
However, Poland has blocked the possibility, insisting that Russia should first ratify the European Energy Charter and lift limitations against Polish agricultural imports.
The move came at the wrong time, and now Poland may lose face, and its government may lose Russia's and Europe's trust. The summit will be held irrespective of the European partners' ability or inability to convince Poland to lift the veto. But if they don't succeed, Finland will be unhappy, and the atmosphere at the summit will be less easy.
Poland has a solid reason for using the energy pretext: the EU openly says that energy dialogue and cooperation are at the core of its relations with Russia. Moreover, a growing number of European leaders believe, and have expressed their opinion at the July 2006 meeting of the EU Council, that energy is the key issue of the EU-Russia relations and should be the core of their future agreement.
But Brussels has not yet convinced Moscow to ratify the Energy Charter, because the Kremlin says it does not meet Russia's interests and mutually beneficial partnership with the EU.
Russia does not need additional commitments stipulated in the charter. It wants to keep its energy policy flexible, including by strengthening international relations and projects, such as the North European Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream). Poland sees this as a threat to its own and to European energy security, but the position of other EU countries and their business communities is not equally clear-cut.
Although Moscow is aware of the importance of energy cooperation, it is doing its best to prevent Europe from seeing Russia as predominantly an energy supplier. It wants to develop comprehensive and equal partnership with the EU.
In other words, the policies of Russia and the EU have different points of departure, but they do have one thing in common. Both partners think oil and gas should be complemented with something else.
The solution could lie in the agreement on four common spaces: economic issues and the environment; issues of freedom, security and justice; external security, including crisis management and non-proliferation; and research and education, including cultural aspects.
But the concept and outlines of the four spaces and the end goals of the relevant roadmaps have not been coordinated to this day. The roadmap is not a concrete program but a new word for the list of possible areas of cooperation.
So far, the EU and Russia have achieved the biggest success in the economic space, but this cannot be directly attributed to the adoption of the relevant roadmap. The results are much more modest in other spaces due to the embracing nature of agreements and the vague future of Russia-EU relations.
Therefore, the main problem is not when the partners sign a new agreement, but the "new quality" of relations it should seal.
The Polish veto is one more proof that the EU is divided over relations with Russia. Some EU countries, especially new members, are against strategic partnership with Russia, and not only because of their common history with it or anti-Russian sentiments. The expansion of the EU has complicated the attainment of internal unity, and there is a deep divide between the political priorities and positions of its members, as well as between the interests of the member states and the EU bodies, and between the political class and the business community.
Poland's move has shown that an attempt to pressurize Russia under the pretext of guarding European interests does not meet these interests. It is using the EU for attaining national political goals, which is apparent to the other EU members. Another recent example is serious criticism of Russia by some EU members, which prevented the approval of the roadmaps at the autumn 2004 summit.
Will this policy of "restraint" in cooperation with Russia change? Summits are the wrong place for lifting accusations of Russia's alleged use of energy instruments for political reasons, of pursuing an imperial policy towards post-Soviet states and an authoritarian policy at home. Russia will attend the Helsinki summit with an image marred by the recent murder of investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and a harsh stand with regard to Georgia.
The Polish veto is not important, but it is indicative of EU-Russia relations. Partners will eventually convince Warsaw that it was Poland who joined the EU and not vice versa, possibly during Germany's presidency, when Poland could try to "sell" its agreement at a higher price (although the losses will be bigger too).
Germany has the political weight and will to hold successful talks with Russia, and Moscow does not make secret of the special hope it pins on the German presidency. But this will not change the essence of EU-Russia cooperation. It may sound strange, but Germany's growing weight and its deepening relations with Russia could complicate its Russian policy: the other EU partners will inevitably wonder about the balance of Germany's national interests and the interests of united Europe.
Dmitry Danilov is head of the European security section of the Institute of Europe.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
