No matter what Bush decides, there can be no ideal plan; there can only be a choice between a bad and a very bad plan.
The group's report will focus not on an ideal solution, but on a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. More precisely, it will discuss whether the public should be informed of this timetable.
Those who advocate making it public say that resistance forces in Iraq should know when the Americans will leave, since such knowledge will curb the violence.
However, these arguments should have been advanced back when Iraqi groups still stood behind the resistance campaign. They have since been replaced with terrorist organizations that do not care if there are Americans in the country or not.
The withdrawal of U.S. troops will not stop the Shia-Sunni confrontation, but it may deepen the divide between them.
Those who oppose making the timetable public say that terrorists will use the information to their benefit, curtailing their operations until the Americans leave Iraq.
The concerns of both sides are legitimate, but that is not the main problem. A withdrawal timetable can and should be drawn up, but I'm not sure about making it public, let alone implementing it.
Washington has done its best to squeeze a political settlement in Iraq into a timeframe, setting dates for turning over power from the occupation authorities to the provisional government, adopting a provisional constitution, and holding parliamentary elections. Every one of these goals was achieved on time, but this has not ended or even eased the chaos in Iraq.
In addition, debates about the withdrawal timetable have overshadowed the initial reasons for stepping into Iraq. Has the U.S. gone there only to pull out?
Bush told participants in the Young Leaders Forum and the Riga Conference during the NATO summit: "I am not going to pull our troops off the battlefield before the mission is complete."
But what exactly is the mission? To build a democratic society in Iraq? To stop terrorist attacks and stabilize the country? Or merely to revive an effective Iraqi army and police that will take over responsibility for their country?
Members of the administration have spoken about every one of these objectives, but which one is Bush's priority now?
One of the most significant documents (apart from the Iraq Study Group's report) devoted to practical goals in Iraq is the classified memorandum prepared for cabinet-level officials by President Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley. It expresses serious doubts about whether Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has the capacity to control sectarian violence in Iraq and recommends that the United States take new steps to strengthen the Iraqi leader's position.
What Hadley proposes is mostly reasonable, but is it practicable? Hadley's proposals and the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group are an attempt to work out a compromise between different influential groups in Washington, Iraqi clans, and regional players.
For example, the Iraq Study Group proposes involving Iran and Syria in addressing the Iraqi problem, which makes perfect sense. But the idea has alarmed Saudi Arabia, which does not like Tehran's growing influence in the Middle East. Many people in Saudi Arabia and outside it have been calling on the country's authorities to intervene in Iraq.
In an article entitled "Stepping into Iraq: Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis If the U.S. Leaves," published in The Washington Post on November 29, Nawaf Obaid, an adviser to the Saudi government, wrote that if America leaves Iraq uninvited, "one of the first consequences will be massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shiite militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis."
As long as Americans remain in Iraq, Saudi Arabia will not interfere, but if they leave, anything could happen, from providing financial assistance to Iraqi Sunnis to cutting the oil price in half, which "would be devastating to Iran, which is facing economic difficulties even with today's high prices," Obaid wrote.
King Abdullah is acting cautiously, but if the domestic opposition begins to put pressure on him, especially in event of a deterioration in the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq, he will have to resort to emergency measures to preserve his power and maintain stability in Saudi Arabia.
Other countries, including the Untied States, Russia, and European nations, should be interested in maintaining stability in Saudi Arabia, on which the stability of oil markets depends and which has blocked some channels for financing extremist organizations, notably al-Qaeda.
Nawaf Obaid wrote that Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal had warned President Bush in February 2003, a month before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, that he would be "solving one problem and creating five more" if he removed Saddam Hussein by force.
More problems could be created if America leaves Iraq "uninvited." The crisis is deepening, and it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to stop it, no matter what strategies Washington adopts.
