Many people view these two events as Russia's main, and interconnected, foreign policy achievements in 2006.
One can say that the West has simply decided to close these two issues. Others can describe this as the Western capitulation to Russia, or recognition of its might. The West had initially attempted to scare Russia by threatening to ignore the G8 summit and to prevent its admission to the WTO, but eventually backed off, claiming that it had been only a joke.
In fact, things are not what they seem in foreign policy.
First, the Western and U.S. media, as well as the opposition publications of Russia, launched a campaign against the St. Petersburg summit and in general against Russia's presidency of the Group of Eight. Articles about a place for Putin's Russia, which does not meet European standards, in the G8 did not affect preparations for the summit. Moscow knew that its partners had long taken the main decisions regarding it.
Second, the G8 summit almost coincided with another noteworthy event, which the general public did not notice: Russia repaid its debts to the Paris Club of Creditors. A year before that, it repaid its debts to the International Monetary Fund. Russia no longer owes anything to anyone, and has started lending money to developing countries. It was a significant event that happened at the right time.
Third, Russia's foreign policy scored its main achievements in 2006, as well as the year before, in the East. They were so numerous that it is almost impossible to connect them to specific events, such as summits or declarations. Russia's position in the East has grown considerably stronger in 2006, and the West has to take this into account.
But these are minor details, whereas the key events are Russia's presidency of the G8 and accession to the WTO. They will have a formidable effect on the life of every Russian. However, they were not so much foreign policy events as a result of sober assessment in the West of the forthcoming change in its global position. Given this new position, the West should not try to isolate Russia or irritate it over minor issues.
The West - the greater part of Europe, the United States and several other countries united in formal unions and alliances, as well as in terms of civilizations and ideologies - has probably not noticed yet that the world is changing, and that this change is not to its benefit. But the Western political elite see very well that the world is changing, and faster than they anticipated.
China and India are expected to become the world's leading economies by 2020 rather than by 2050, as had been estimated previously. The Western political influence in the world has diminished owing to defeats in the Middle East, which experts describe as a lost region that is yet to come up with many unpleasant surprises. Latin America's challenges to the West are part of the general picture. And Europe's internal threats, which it cannot tackle (Kosovo, and the boiling discontent of Muslim and indigenous populations), are only intensifying the feeling of insecurity.
The shattered illusions about Russia are mere pebbles compared to the huge mountain of these problems.
It was generally believed in the 1990s that Russia, the largest fragment of the Soviet empire, would have to become part of the West, adjusting to it in all spheres and accepting Western political, moral and other norms and standards. That belief fit the illusory picture of the "new American" (or Euro-American) age.
But these expectations did not materialize. Russians and subsequently their political elite opted for other standards, which can be described as Chinese or Kazakh ones, but are mostly indigenously Russian. Due to growing prices of energy resources, Russia progressed at more than 6% annually for several years, repaid its foreign debts, and is now turning into an economic magnet for many neighboring states. Although not indispensable, Russia has a certain calming aura, and its involvement in global trade, just as in the case of China, appears to be reasonable for more than just economic reasons. Vivid proof of this is the inflow of foreign direct investment in Russia, which totaled $17 billion in 2006.
Acceptance of Russia as an indigenous and independent state rather than part of the West gone astray, as a country that will most likely remain different, could have become a cultural shock to European and American societies. However, they almost simultaneously saw that Russia is no longer the main character in a historical drama. For Russians are not the only nation to start looking down on Americans and Europeans, who are no longer viewed as lucky nations and examples to emulate.
For the first time in many centuries, the Western civilization has admitted, if not accepted, the possibility that other (and older) civilizations can regain their historical precedence and stop feeling inferior and obliged to learn everything from the younger Western nations. Europeans and Americans no longer shudder when an Indian political analyst says that India and Russia are the world's largest democracies, India in terms of population and Russia by its sheer size.
One of the biggest events in global politics in the past 12-24 months was the U.S.-Indian "nuclear deal," and not only because it recognized the admissibility of what India had done to attain a nuclear status. Most importantly, it marked the beginning of American policy of developing fundamentally new relations with a future world leader.
Russia's presidency of the G8 and admission to the WTO are events of the same scale. Their essence has not been formulated so far, but then putting meaning into words takes rather long.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
