Col. Gen. Boris Cheltsov, chief of the Air Force staff, said that "the deployment of an ABM system in Europe will give the Pentagon and its NATO allies the potential to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces at the most vulnerable stage: the initial, ascending leg of the trajectory."
But there are some Russian experts who think that deployment of these systems does not pose a direct threat to Russia from a military-strategic point of view.
The American plans may not weaken Russia's nuclear shield, but they do damage its military and strategic interests, to say nothing of national security. It is quite possible that in the future the United States will use its new military infrastructure to build up its military presence in Europe. According to American sources, the U.S. may expand this system to include sea-based elements and space-based monitoring equipment. Moreover, there have been proposals in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to follow the eastern European example and invite the Americans home.
Even if today's American plans are not a tangible military and strategic threat to Russia, they are jeopardizing its international interests, and not only in the sphere of security. The military rationale for placing ABM elements in the Czech Republic and Poland is far from obvious - the nuclear missile threat posed by the axis of evil is exaggerated, to say the least. All this testifies to the fact that the United States' intention is not just to protect itself and Europe against emerging missile threats from the Middle East. These plans have other motives, as well.
Recently, the U.S. has been playing a smaller role in Europe. On the one hand, Washington somewhat downgraded Europe on its list of foreign policy and security priorities. The U.S. has shown more interest in Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. On the other hand, its positions in Europe have been weakened by European opposition to the American military campaign in Iraq. All this compels the U.S. to search for new ways of enhancing its role in Europe. Deploying new ABM elements may help perform this task.
First, it would draw central and eastern Europe into cooperation with its plans - many countries there orient their foreign and defense policies toward partnership with the United States.
Second, the new elements of American military presence in Europe are bound to be taken into consideration by Europe when it formulates its security policy, which would allow the U.S. to enhance its influence.
Third, the potential consolidation of American political positions in the European security system would give it levers of influence beyond security - on the European Union's policy.
Fourth, America's practical plans may go beyond NATO countries. Of special concern is Ukraine's position - it may be interested in cooperation with and reliance on the U.S. in view of its possible NATO entry. In early March 2007, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko said at a joint news conference with his Polish counterpart, Lech Kaczynski, that Ukraine welcomed the start of consultations on the European deployment of U.S. ABM elements and that such steps enhanced European security.
The American plans are also designed to reaffirm Washington's resolve to counter threats coming from international terrorism and the axis of evil using whatever methods the U.S. government considers appropriate for national interests. This demonstration of resolve is also addressed to the U.S.'s foes, such as Iran: they should have no doubt that the U.S. will not stop short of the most radical measures, including the use of force.
It is possible that considering Moscow's unequivocally negative reaction to this plan, the U.S. expected a tough Russian response. Initially, these expectations turned out to be justified to some extent. Moscow started talking about adequate military and political responses, not excluding potential unilateral withdrawal from the 1987 treaty on intermediate- and short-range missiles. In mid-February, Chief of the Russian General Staff Yury Baluyevsky made an authoritative statement on this score, emphasizing that Russia's participation in this treaty would depend on U.S. actions in the ABM field, while Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov called the treaty a Cold War relic.
Such a response may have negative political repercussions for Russia. It gives the U.S. a chance to deflect Russian objections and prevent its European allies from recognizing Russia's position as justified. In this sense, statements about Russia's withdrawal from the treaty are counterproductive. On the one hand, the Russian military have emphasized that all ABM elements are poorly protected and the available defense potential (missiles and the air force) is strong enough to neutralize any threat emanating from an ABM deployment in eastern Europe. But on the other hand, they are talking about taking steps as serious as withdrawal from the treaty. This may create the suspicion that Russia is trying to use the U.S. plans as an excuse to justify its own unilateral actions.
No matter what motives stand behind the U.S. plans, the fact remains that it will destabilize the military and political situation in Europe with far-reaching consequences. Russia cannot view the American plans as a limited, preventive measure. It can only evaluate it in the general context of the strategic and military-political environment and relations with its Western partners.
Russia would like NATO to participate in the discussion of the American plans. The U.S. is justifiably concerned that like the EU, its NATO allies may block its plans, and so it prefers merely to notify its allies about its steps. If the U.S. fails to win political support from its European partners (not only in eastern Europe), such as Germany and France, it will have to make a difficult choice - either follow the chosen road and ignore the allies, or abandon the plans.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has already said that it is necessary to start open talks with Russia on deploying elements of an American ABM system in eastern Europe.
Dmitry Danilov is the head of the European security department at the Institute of Europe.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
