MOSCOW. (Vladislav Inozemtsev and Yekaterina Kuznetsova for RIA Novosti) - In recent months, the Iranian nuclear program has become one of the hottest and most discussed topics in the world press.

On the one hand, many experts consider Iran's moves to be largely a reaction to the policy of the United States and its allies in the Middle East, which have created a sense of defenselessness in most of the region's countries. They say that although Iran began the construction of its nuclear power plant in 1975, it did not try to give the project a military slant until January 29, 2002, when George W. Bush included the country in the "axis of evil." Its fears were confirmed in 2003, when neighboring Iraq fell victim to an American act of aggression. In such a situation, pursuing a nuclear program looks like a justifiable means of self-defense, and Iran decided upon such a course fairly easily, seeing the inaction of the international community.

Article 10 of the July 1, 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty allows any signatory to withdraw from it after giving the other parties three months' notice, and such a withdrawal does not entail any sanctions. Neither are there any other international mechanisms to prevent states from developing nuclear weapons (no stiff measures were taken against Pakistan, India or North Korea). Lastly, the decisions of the UN Security Council carry no weight (it is enough to recall that to punish Iraq for ignoring such decisions, the U.S. attacked it without any UN mandate, and Israel, the "most steadfast stalwart of stability" in the Middle East, is still the leader in the number of resolution breaches). From the point of view of this segment of the expert community, the main threat of destabilization stems not so much from Iran, even a nuclear Iran, as from the West's uncooperative stance, along with moves that increasingly persuade Tehran that aggression is inevitable.

On the other hand, many analysts say Iran is really nurturing plans to develop nuclear weapons in order to have first-strike capability against Israel and other traditional American allies in the region, and that the problem has been aggravated not so much by the U.S. position as by the rise of radical Islamic forces in Iran following the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the June 24, 2005 presidential poll. This logic suggests that measures should be taken to put a stop to Iran's plans, up to and including military strikes aimed at preventing Islamic fundamentalists from acquiring nuclear weapons. (As a successful example, experts usually mention Operation Opera on June 7, 1981, during which a squadron of Israeli bombers invaded Iraq's air space and destroyed the Tammuz 1 reactor, which was about to receive a load of nuclear fuel). This approach corresponds to the official stance of the United States and its closest allies.

From this point of view, Russia looks like a supporter and abettor of Iranian nuclear aggression, one that has for a long time tried to persuade the world of the civilian nature of the Iranian nuclear program and is now seeking a formal pretext to end its cooperation with the country.

For fairness' sake, it ought to be said that though the Iranian leadership gives reason to suspect it has such aggressive designs, most of such statements are addressed mainly to Iranian audiences and, if the Americans and Europeans were to "doctor" them to the same extent that they doctor remarks by some Russian leaders, they would not have anything to worry about.

But we do not believe that either of these approaches reflects the reality which the West will soon face in the Middle East when Iran's regional strategy, rather than its global plans, comes to the fore.

No one doubts that the U.S. and its allies have used the "war on terror" to interfere in the region's affairs on a large scale. And in doing so, they are foisting their own vision of the Middle East situation on the world, portraying the rising forces in the region as dangerous aggressors and themselves as defenders of security and freedom.

Faced with such a situation, the forces opposed to a rise in U.S. influence in the region cannot but grow. What is more, Iran has been enjoying its position recently. The American aggression has practically knocked Iraq out of the running as its main opponent and allowed the Shiite majority to consolidate its power in the country. Last year, Israel lost a war provoked by the Hezbollah movement, and Hamas radicals came to power in Palestine.

By setting up pockets of influence throughout the region, Iran can cement the Middle East not along the lines of bankrupt secular Arab nationalism, but around the traditions of conservative Islam. The current threat stemming from Iran revolves around this factor, not around the possibility that it will acquire nuclear weapons. Iranian Islamism is consolidated at the state level; the country - unlike Pakistan, for example - has no Al-Qaeda cells which could lay hands on a nuclear bomb should the regime be destabilized (something the West is not guaranteed if there is another attempt on General Pervez Musharraf's life). By trying to show the picture in a different light, politicians are only increasing the odds that the plans of the ayatollahs in Tehran will prove successful.

If the West decides to oppose Iran's growing weight, it should not impose new Security Council sanctions, which are ignored even by its permanent members, but rather seek contacts with regional leaders concerned over a possible build-up of Iranian influence. Europe and the United States should no longer be guided by their own propaganda; rather, they should distinguish between what will bring regional stability and what will prolong the "war on terror," which only helps to solve domestic problems and lets firms like Halliburton get rich.

The Middle East needs stability more than ever before. It is time to realize that the country that will do its utmost to achieve that stability will be enjoying the most influence in the region in the next few years. Whether it has a couple of nuclear bombs or twelve aircraft carrier squadrons will be of secondary importance.

Vladislav Inozemtsev and Yekaterina Kuznetsova are analysts at the Center for Post-Industrial Society Studies.

The opinions expressed in this article are the authors' and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.