That crisis was provoked by mistrust and misunderstanding, above all in regard to determining common strategic goals. The situation was compounded by the negative trend in the international political climate, which is crucial for understanding the essence of Russia-EU differences.
One of the reasons for the crisis was the fact that Russia, which has grown stronger, decided that it was time to revise the system of its relations with the West which took shape in the 1990s. That system is based on Russia's concessions, which have not earned it major dividends.
Today Russia wants to speak and act as a full-scale partner of the West. But the West is not ready for this and regards Russia's concerns, complaints or interests (for example, the Kosovo problem or Polish meat imports) with suspicion, as proof of its neo-imperial ambitions.
Other reasons are the United States' foreign policy, which disregards international law, including in the sphere of disarmament, and its European allies' tolerant attitude to that policy and sharp criticism of Russia.
Russia is becoming a stronger rival of the EU and NATO in the former Soviet republics. Although it has been said more than once that the expansion of the EU and NATO is two interdependent processes, it is still creating tensions in the region. Besides, the influence of the EU and NATO on the Commonwealth of Independent States is growing stronger, which Russia views as a policy of squeezing it out of the zone of its national interests.
And the last reasons are internal political development in Russia and fears of its Western partners concerning the direction in which it is moving. One of the most widely spread Western stereotypes is that there is an unfathomable, an almost genetic, gap between the Russian and EU values. It is said that Russians have an inbred tendency for authoritarianism.
There is indeed a deep divide between Russia and the EU, but only in the length of their democratic traditions. Our Western partners apply top democratic criteria to Russia's actions, criteria they do not apply to new EU members or even some parts of the so-called Old Europe. They forget that Russia rose from the charred ruins of the Soviet Union only 15 years ago without a political elite. Harsh criticism of Russia cannot be considered fair in this situation.
Despite minor deviations, Russia has quickly passed through periods of initial accumulation of capital and oligarchic capitalism, and has entered the stage of state monopoly capitalism, which has specific political consequences. It took many West European countries (for example, Italy) more time to cover that road, and they did it about 50 years ago, in the 1960s.
A relevant example of the essence of Russian-EU relations is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which will expire in November 2008. It can be extended, but both sides agree that it has become obsolete. About 64 of its provisions do not work in the modern world.
Or take the 2003 St. Petersburg initiative, which provides for creating four common spaces - a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of cooperation in the field of external security; and a space of research and education, including cultural aspects. The initiative allows bypassing the delicate issue of Russia's admission to the EU, and at the same time gives a higher meaning to the status of an associated member.
Many Russian experts mistrust that initiative, which they view as a sugarcoated pill offered to Russia ahead of the EU expansion.
In short, we need a new PCA. Following relevant debates, which were much broader in Russia than in the EU, the sides have formulated a consensus decision on the new PCA. Russia proposed dramatically revising the old PCA by incorporating in it the idea of the four common spaces and agreements in the spheres of vital interests for Russia and the EU.
Unfortunately, PCA negotiations are marking time, allegedly because of Russia's refusal to import suspect Polish meat and its stance on the Energy Charter.
Some Russian experts and politicians wonder if we need a new agreement with the EU in this situation. However, the Russian authorities have not disavowed their former stance regarding it, and disputed issues can be settled, given a mutual will.
The Russian-EU energy dialogue reminds me of a person with a headache provoked by Europe's actions. The EU seems to regard Russia only as a supplier of oil and gas, and is worried only about the amounts it can provide.
The idea of the four common spaces, and mainly the common economic space, is extremely important in this respect. But the common economic space cannot be created without the development of a free trade zone, at least in a distant future, as a fundamental prerequisite for dynamic economic interaction.
Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) is crucial for establishing a free trade zone. I believe that the period of adaptation, which is stipulated in the WTO accession procedure, will give Russian companies a chance to accumulate experience and become competitive on the international market. Many respected economists say there are strong companies that can be interesting to Western partners in nearly all sectors of the Russian economy.
The common space of freedom, security and justice (internal security) is another vital area. Its core political element is a visa-free regime. Russia can work day and night to develop relations with the EU, all to no avail, but a visa-free regime (or the absence thereof) will nevertheless remain an indicator of its relations with the EU. The regime is very important to Russia and its people. I do not propose cancelling visas tomorrow, but a positive solution of this problem would help rapidly develop a common European mentality across the continent.
External security is one of the most delicate issues. The history of the European Union shows how difficult it is to form such a common space and clearly formulate its goals even for a group of likeminded countries. Russia and the EU have diverse forms of discussing their political relations, but they clearly need many more. They should not only discuss political problems and express their opinions, they must also formulate a common stance on the most painful problems of international security and, if this meets common interests, agree on joint actions.
Therefore, the new PCA should stipulate the establishment of a new agency, the Russia-EU Security Council. The idea has been aired in Russia, but Brussels is so far not ready for this form of relations.
The situation in the space of research and education, including cultural aspects, is much better, but achievements there cannot fill all other gaps.
What will happen if Russia and the EU fail to agree on a new partnership and cooperation agreement? Hardly anything, as Russia has stable bilateral relations with almost all EU member countries.
However, the world will be different without the PCA, and Russia's internal development may take a turn from full-scale cooperation with Europe to select forms of relations with its individual members.
Does anyone stand to gain from this?
Nadezhda Arbatova is section head at the Center for European Studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations under the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
