On September 5, the German government endorsed a new strategy on assistance to Afghanistan. Germany will enhance financial and organization support for the recovery effort in Afghanistan, but does not commit itself to the continued participation of its forces in the Enduring Freedom. Moreover, Bundeswehr troops will be sent to Afghan southern provinces only as the last resort.
In turn, the Dutch cabinet is considering possibilities for extending the stay of the contingent in Uruzgan over the planned two years, but in a reduced shape. The Dutch prime minister has announced that the contingent could be withdrawn even before the end of this year if ISAF does not fulfill a number of conditions. One of which is that other countries' troops provide more assistance to the Dutch peacekeepers.
In 2005, the United States implemented its plan of "equal responsibility" in Afghanistan. Its idea was that ISAF, which had exclusively police functions before, was supposed to take part in operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda on a par with the United States and its allies. It was clear from the start that following the plan would draw ISAF into the war.
When it made the decision to send its corps to the ISAF peacekeepers, the Netherlands should have been prepared for war and potential losses. Talking about a possible cut now is too late and makes little sense. It would be more appropriate to increase it. Manpower advantage limits losses in direct proportion. This is the hard and fast rule of military art, which was once neglected by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. He rejected the proposal of Afghan President Hamid Karzai to form big ISAF contingents without delay.
The first ISAF contingent had a meager 5,000 peacekeepers from 18 countries and was stationed exclusively in Kabul. It was touching to see ISAF patrols studying their forthcoming itineraries under the reinforced protection of the local police. At that time, both Karzai and his political opponents (Yunus Kanuni, Burhanuddin Rabbani and former Defense Minister Marshal Muhammad Fahim) told the press that they were in favor of a 50,000-strong ISAF. There were plans to deploy this force in the north (Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz), the west (Heart), in a number of central provinces, Kabul and southward in the provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand. But they were not carried out and it now remains only to regret that these lessons have not been learnt.
There have been other lessons as well. At one time a 100,000-strong Soviet force was not enough to reliably guarantee government performance in the traditionally rebellious provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, Ghazni, Khost and Uruzgan, not to mention control over main routes and communications. By that time, Afghanistan had already built a 100,000-strong national army. Today, Afghanistan is suffering from the same lack-of-power syndrome with a 35,000 strong national army and 80,000-strong police corps.
Unfortunately, this does not take care of wasted lessons. Now some analysts say the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating drastically. They believe that the fruits of victory scored by the coalition forces over the Taliban in 2001-2002 have been virtually lost.
But this estimate seems to be divorced from reality. The situation could be rather called paradoxical - despite the government's efforts to develop democratic Afghanistan, a line which enjoyed support of the absolute majority of the population, and despite the presence of ISAF and the OEF, it is still impossible to establish reliable control over the eastern and south-eastern provinces.
Why is that? The Taliban movement has undergone a major change. Now its absolute majority is represented by the Afghans (instead of the Pakistanis who prevailed before), most of whom are Pushtu. The situation can obviously develop into a domestic conflict. The bitter Soviet experience shows that everything possible must be done to prevent this. It is time to think about the need to meet the interests of all conflicting parties, as is usual in settling domestic strife.
Recently, the Taliban declared they were prepared to hold talks with Kabul. Indicatively, this statement followed the Afghan-Pakistani peace jirga held in Kabul this August, which discussed talks with the Taliban as an option for restoring peace and stability in the country. It would be a crime to miss the chance for such talks. At this point, we should again recall the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the Soviet troop withdrawal, Mohammad Najibullah launched a vigorous policy of national reconciliation; and if the world community had given his regime even some minor assistance, Afghanistan would have most probably avoided the disastrous civil war. It would be a pity if this example becomes another wasted lesson.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
