This meeting is not officially part of the current 62nd session of the UN General Assembly, but it has already become an annual tradition. The yearly gathering of all those involved in Afghanistan is co-hosted by Mr Karzai and UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon. Together, they form an informal organization known as the Afghan Compact. It does not make any mandatory decisions, but reviews developments in the country since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001-2002.
As always, the meeting reviewed each country's successes and setbacks in the joint effort to turn Afghanistan into a normal state. It was not easy for Russia to demonstrate its reconstruction of the Salang tunnel, or the transfer of electricity from Tajikistan's Sangtudin hydropower plant, in which the United Energy System (UES) holds a stake; tunnels and power plants do not come to hand as easily as pencils. But these projects are a serious contribution to Afghanistan's economic development. The representatives of several other countries were also able to impress the audience with what they are doing.
But the good news was overshadowed by the bad - the Afghan economy continues to rely heavily on drug production; central government has little power outside Kabul and its control over most of the state can at best be described as minimal. In principle, the Afghan experiment has failed and the outside world needs to drastically change its policy.
It was easy to divide those gathered in New York into two camps: optimists and pessimists. The latter are predominantly those who have troops fighting in Afghanistan. The Europeans are as eager to withdraw from Afghanistan as the Americans are to pull out from Iraq.
For more than a year now they have been pushing for negotiations with some Taliban leaders, and have even suggested making them part of the legitimate government at Afghan UN sessions and other meetings. In some provinces Taliban leaders are forming parallel government agencies and elect themselves as deputies to parliament. The Europeans' favored strategy is to come to terms with the more moderate Taliban leaders in order to achieve some kind of national reconciliation.
This is an indication of the confusion caused by military setbacks. The International Security Assistance Force (mostly European) is conducting military operations in parallel with the anti-terrorist coalition (mostly American). This is no ground for gloating - Russia has supported the goals of the military mission from the very start. But there are reasons for concern for what we are witnessing is an indirect admission of defeat.
Russia is blocking the return of part of the Taliban to power. The individuals with whom the Europeans would like to negotiate are on the list of terrorists compiled by the UN in line with Resolution 1267. It is only possible to cross names off through the UN Security Council, and for this reason Moscow is being constantly wooed, without much publicity, not to block the relevant resolutions - but to no avail.
Could Russia, or some other country, suggest an alternative to the blind alley in Afghanistan? Probably they could.
First, the current meeting seriously discussed the need to establish adequate armed forces in Afghanistan. True, a normal, strong Afghan government will not be a puppet in American or European hands. The time is ripe for resolving this dilemma.
Second, Moscow and some other countries which do not take part in military operations have their own suggestions and successes in Afghanistan. These might provide examples to follow.
The August summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek devoted a lot of attention to the Afghan situation. It transpired that cooperation with the SCO answers many of Kabul's questions which remain unresolved in relations with other countries.
The main question is how much time it will take to shape a new international policy towards Afghanistan, a policy in which the neighbors will be the first to help.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
