Both sides have so far failed to sign a new long-term partnership and cooperation agreement that would replace the 1994 document, which had entered into force in December 1997. Moscow was also surprised by Brussels' plans to introduce tougher regulations for Russian investors operating on the European energy market as this could prove detrimental to the interests of energy giant Gazprom.
Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Russian President's special representative for developing relations with the European Union, spoke to RIA Novosti on these and other issues.
Question: The upcoming Russia-EU summit will, obviously, discuss the new partnership and cooperation agreement. When will the talks make headway? How important is this for Russia? Or will Moscow still consider it a "technical issue?"
Answer: Neither Moscow, nor Brussels have any misgivings about automatically extending the partnership and cooperation agreement for another year in early December. This will make it possible to avoid a legal vacuum. However, Russia and the EU are equally worried about the lack of progress in the talks on a new agreement. Both sides need this document. The Polish veto on Russia-EU talks aims to politicize a technical problem, namely, Moscow's decision to limit Polish-meat imports, in our relations with Warsaw. We should solve it at bilateral level and should not involve the entire EU in this. The lack of a mandate for Russia-EU talks is primarily Europe's problem. The EU should first reach consensus because the European Commission does not receive its mandate from Moscow. We will launch talks as soon as the mandate is received from Brussels.
Q.: Will the new Polish Government help settle the situation with the Russian-EU agreement? To what extent are Russia's relations with the EU and Warsaw expected to improve?
A.: Much will depend on the new Polish Government's goals and actions. So far, we can rely only on election campaign promises, which give reason for cautious optimism.
Q.: But Lech Kaczynski is still President of Poland...
A.: According to the Polish Constitution, considerable foreign policy authority is vested with the Government that will rely on a substantial parliamentary majority. Although I am in no position to predict the new Polish Government's stand, I have a feeling that it will be more flexible and pragmatic.
Q.: Is the Russian ban on Polish meat imports the only factor hindering the signing of the partnership and cooperation agreement? Why has Brussels stopped calling on Moscow to sign the Energy Charter, another pre-condition for lifting the Polish veto?
A.: The EU does not raise this issue because we will not ratify the Energy Charter. Moscow has made its stand on the issue clear at several summits, including the 2006 summit in Lithuania. We no longer hear any official statements from the EU, after President Vladimir Putin discussed this issue in great detail. And everyone knows about the previous Polish Government's stand on the issue. This is no longer relevant.
Q.: Will the upcoming summit raise the issue of the European Commission's plans to limit the access of foreign companies to the regional energy market? How feasible are such plans, and what will be their consequences?
A.: The EU, which has not yet made a principled decision, is offering a rather vague concept to its members. However, many economic players, as well as some EU members, among them France, Germany, Italy and Austria, are criticizing it. So far there are no changes, and we will certainly discuss this issue.
Q.: Some members of the Russian delegation proposed drafting a new Russia-EU energy agreement at the latest Russian-German consultations in Wiesbaden. But does it make any sense to conclude such an agreement?
A.: We are discussing this issue in the context of drafting a new partnership and cooperation agreement. Moscow did not object to the EU's reasonable proposal on devoting some of the document's clauses to energy cooperation principles. This would help formalize the principles uniting us in the spirit of the plan of action to enhance global energy security, adopted at the 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg. This plan suits both Russia and Europe, and is a key for bilateral negotiations. As for a separate energy agreement, it would hardly settle anything.
Q.: An agreement on easing the visa regime entered into force this summer. Which countries are not abiding by its provisions?
A.: At the summit we plan to review the fulfillment of agreements on simplified visa procedures and readmission. Although the readmission situation can be called satisfactory for the most part, we are not completely happy about simplified visa procedures. Unfortunately, some embassies and consulates are requesting too many documents from applicants. Some EU counties' consulates have even increased the list of such documents. For instance, the German Embassy wants all long-haul drivers to submit 21 documents, including copies of their Russian domestic passports, employment history, drivers' licenses, etc. This special category of applicants still faces excessive restrictions (although it is separately mentioned in the agreement).
Another cause for concern is the establishment of the so-called visa service centers at the consulates of France, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands. These centers are allegedly called on to provide better services to Russian citizens travelling abroad. But, in reality, their establishment led to higher visa costs. Under the agreement, the cost of a standard visa has been set at 35 euros, and 70 euros should be charged for a rapid-issue visa. However, visa centers also want to be paid for their services and as a result, visa costs almost double. This is a direct violation of the agreement and we will certainly raise the issue at the summit. The agreement must be observed, otherwise we will be forced to take similar action against violators.
Q.: In what context will the Kosovo issue be discussed?
A.: As a rule, we hold an in-depth discussion of the Kosovo issue. At their recent summit in Samara, Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel at their informal meeting discussed nothing else but this issue and focused on the possible consequences of any specific decisions on Kosovo, as well as possible precedents for similar territories on post-Soviet space.
As a rule, the concerned parties devote a great deal of time to Kosovo, an extremely serious issue of direct concern to Europe. The EU is divided on Kosovo, and some countries fear possible unilateral solutions. We will discuss the Kosovo issue in a similar format. Moreover, the efforts of the EU, the United States and Russia mediating the Kosovo conflict have produced preliminary results, which will also be discussed.
(Transcript by Yelena Shesternina.)
