General Michel Suleiman, the candidate in question, faces a legal obstacle on his road to the presidency: under Article 49 of the Lebanese constitution, public servants can run for the presidency no earlier than two years after resignation. At first glance a minor constitutional amendment may seem enough to settle that, but, as the General is likely to find, things are not so simple.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese parliament, which must approve any presidential nomination, has postponed its vote five times since September as no nominee could be found to satisfy both the pro-Western majority in parliament and the opposition, backed by Syria and Iran. President Emile Lahoud's term expired on November 23, and there was no way to put off the crucial vote any longer. Yet another compromise must now be made for the constitutional amendments the situation requires.
General Michel Aoun, a prominent opposition leader, does not think such a compromise will be possible unless the parliamentary majority accepts certain provisos. In particular, the opposition demands that the presidential term be reduced to two years. This would mean the next election would closely follow the parliamentary poll in 2009. The opposition also insists on holding power of veto in a government led by a prime minister from outside the ruling coalition.
This goes far beyond any procedural controversy concerning Suleiman's nomination. The political tug of war round the presidency began long before the presidential race formally started two months ago. The big question underlying these developments concerns the external powers vying to determine Lebanon's future policy.
Ironically, the crisis started with constitutional amendments required by Lahoud's nomination in 1998. As army commander at the time, he faced the same constitutional hurdle as Suleiman does today. To get round this, parliament amended Article 49 to authorize his original nomination as an exceptional instance. In one of those Lebanese compromises made under foreign pressure - Syrian, in this particular case - it was amended again in 2004 to prolong his presidential term for another three years. Parliament approved the amendment in a unanimous vote despite resistance amongst the country's political elite.
This remarkable constitutional flexibility makes it easier to reach compromises on particular political impasses. The down side is that such compromises are often short-lived, condemning the country to lurch endlessly from one crisis to the next.
Debates around the presidential nomination have been raging for months in a country that is unsteadily balancing on the brink of a civil war and shaken by political assassinations.
The current problems have their roots in the 2004 amendment. It was followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1559, in which the international community, led by France and the United States, objected to Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs. The resolution bluntly demanded that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Lebanon, when the only foreign military presence in the country at the time was Syrian, and denounced foreign intervention in the upcoming Lebanese election - another clear reference to Syria.
Unfortunately international indignation only proved counterproductive-the tug of war for Lebanon got worse. America and France were no less persistent than Syria and Iran. The condition of Lebanese politics over the subsequent three years has uncannily reflected the confrontation between these powers. Even the compromise nomination of General Suleiman smacks of foreign, rather than domestic, negotiation.
Tellingly, the nomination coincided with the Middle East peace conference in Annapolis, Maryland. Though centered on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syrian attendance was amongst the most crucial issues in the run-up to the conference. It remained unclear up to the opening day whether Syria would accept an invitation-if any were made, that is. The problem was not so much Syria's demand that the Golan Heights be included on the agenda, as in the background of recent US-Syrian tensions. Washington repeatedly accused Damascus of backing Palestinian extremists and Iraqi insurgents, and destabilizing Lebanon. The US ambassador was recalled from Syria immediately after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri two years ago. The Americans put the blame for the assassination on Syria.
A Syrian delegation appeared in Annapolis nonetheless, though led by a mere deputy minister. A few days later, after prolonged resistance, the pro-Western Lebanese parliamentary majority approved Suleiman's nomination. Was this a compromise between Lebanese politicians or between the West and Syria? Or was it part of a grand American gamble to drive a wedge between Damascus and Tehran?
Lebanon still gives grounds for apprehensions. Have the West and Syria made up for good, or at least for the foreseeable future? Have they really reconciled or do they just share passing interests? What turns will the situation take when they fall out again? Last but not least, how many more compromises in Lebanon will serve only to make things worse?
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
