ESTONIA
The press is strongly critical of Dmitry Rogozin’s appointment as Russia’s spokesman to NATO.
Some experts believe that by this choice, Moscow wants to demonstrate its lack of interest in normalizing relations with the alliance. “How will the Estonian Ambassador look at … Russia-NATO meetings? He will be facing a man who threatened his country with war.” (Postimees, January 11) “Rogozin was appointed because NATO well understands that he means nothing. The Kremlin also knows this. The message is that we don’t take you seriously enough to send an esteemed man.” (Postimees, January 14)
Analysts are assessing the potential advent of Chinese business to Estonia as an economic breakthrough, but the media are concerned that Russia may create serious obstacles in its way.
“The port of Tallinn and Ningbo have signed a letter of intent; the sides have expressed their desire to build a giant container terminal in Muuga (port of Tallinn). It is promising new life for Estonian ports and railways, as well as big opportunities for the country’s economy, but the project is risky because of Russia. Influential Russian diplomacy may wreck the construction or Russians may refuse to accept commodities through the port of Muuga. At the same time, St. Petersburg and its environs can receive container cargoes from China by railway.” (Postimees, January 12)
LATVIA
Most experts have welcomed the intention of Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus to demand compensation from Russia for the period of “Soviet occupation.” They believe that Lithuanian and Estonian conflicts with the Big Neighbor benefit Riga – in recent time Russian-Latvian relations have been steadily advancing.
“Lithuania and Estonia have done everything… to lose to our country in competing for the limitless Russian market and expanding economic relations with Russia. Estonia has damaged its quite decent relations with Russia by staging a public act of moving coffins… As for Lithuania, it has managed to find an even stronger irritant for Russia – the payment of compensations for the occupation of the Baltic nations… If Russia becomes one of [Latvia’s] main partners in the region, our budget will receive more from this cooperation that Lithuania wants to receive from it in compensations.” (Vesti-segodnya, January 10)
“The events of the Tallinn Bronze soldier have adversely affected relations between Russia and Estonia – Moscow has considerably reduced transit via that country and cut down trade. Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus has also decided to worsen Vilnius’s ties with Moscow. Against this negative background, Russian policymakers may see this country as rather friendly and attractive.” (Chas, January 9).
“The architects of Latvian foreign policy do not doubt the fact of the occupation, but we are not going to follow Lithuania’s example and demand its recognition… Recently, Latvia has been trying to avoid displeasing Russia, even if this humiliates its own dignity.” (Latvijas Avize, January 11)
LITHUANIA
The media are publishing the opinions of some Lithuanian politicians to display reserve in demanding compensation from Russia for the “occupation” because of the growing energy dependence on Moscow.
Public opinion polls show that the overwhelming majority of Lithuanians do not believe that this struggle will get anywhere. “Lithuania’s reliance on Russian energy resources will only grow in the near future. According to forecasts, after 2010 about 90% of Lithuanian demand for primary energy resources will come from Russia… It is necessary to think twice and not unnecessarily provoke Russia.” (Vilnius Dena, January 12)
“The majority of public poll respondents – 83.7% -- do not believe that Russia will pay for the damage in any way. 13.4% of those polled were optimistic, while 2.9% of respondents had no opinion on the issue.” (Respublika, January 11)
Some publications are writing about Latvia’s new policy aimed at improving relations with Russia. “Obviously, Latvia has forgotten its anti-Russian rhetoric, at least for the moment. At any rate, Latvia has chosen a new strategy of relations with Russia – no boisterous announcements, no enemy rhetoric, no rush steps.” (Respublika, January 15)
Experts believe that after Dmitry Medvedev is elected president, there will not be more democracy in Russia: “There will not be even a little bit more of democracy. Real politics will be conducted by the community of security-related services and ‘state-oriented’ oligarchs. The gap between the elite and the common people will still be growing.” (Veidas, January 3)
BELARUS
Experts are emphasizing Russia’s key role in the processes taking place at the Belarusian top echelon.
“After a year of procrastinating, Russia has promptly agreed to grant Minsk a stabilization credit. In 2008, the growth of the price of gas for Belarus is expected to be minimal. But here it transpires that the Belarusian leaders are not willing to be friends with two partners. Having received what they wanted from Russia, they quickly turned their back on the West.” (Solidarnost, January 10).
The press is again writing about the possible deployment of Russian nuclear and other weapons in Belarus. Experts believe that this issue has finally prompted Russia to give an economic benefit to Belarus.
“Alexander Lukashenko is not likely to miss his chance to play the anti-missile card in a situation where the upcoming presidential campaign in Russia will make this issue particularly sensitive for the local ruling elite… It seems he has made it. A price below the bottom point has been fixed. Compensation for economic and moral damage in the form of a super-easy credit gas been received, and a bigger one has been promised.” (Belarusy i rynok, January 5)
The opposition press is traditionally accusing Russia of swallowing the republic economically and politically. “Whether we want it or not, we are further pushing our head into the Russian throttle. New Year gifts from Putin – stabilization credit and the gas price – are part of the same deal. Russia is increasingly drawing Belarus into the sphere of its influence… This does not require even a constitutional act. Russia wants economic control, which is no weaker than the political by any means. The only difference is that formal independence is preserved, but the presence of one’s own flag, emblem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the presidential office is not a guarantee of sovereignty.” (Solidarnost, January 9)
UKRAINE
The media are writing that Yulia Tymoshenko is trying to weaken the monopoly of UkrGazEnergo (where Gazprom owns 25% of the stock) in a bid to change gas relations with Russia.
The gas princess is serious in dealing with the main seller of Ukrainian gas. Now the ball is in the court of the suppliers… The current authorities already have many grievances against these companies. Therefore, it is not surprising that the newly-appointed government turned its eyes to the company of Dmytro Firtash [co-owner of RosUkrEnergo, a supplier of Turkmen gas to Ukraine].” (Podrobnosti, January 10)
The media are extensively covering the arrest of Mikhail Gangan in Ukraine. An activist of the Russia-banned National Bolshevik Party (NBP), he was among the organizers of the March of the Dissidents in Samara in May 2007 and a protest at the Russian presidential administration reception on December 14, 2004. He was arrested on December 31 in the Vinnitsa Region on a request from Russia, where he was sentenced to three years in prison in absentia.
Gangal asked Ukraine to grant him political asylum. Some sources have considered his extradition a “test for democracy” in Ukraine and used his case for strong criticism of the Russian authorities. “It would be great if this time the Ukrainian government would not be afraid to ‘upset’ some of their ‘partners’… It is clear to any unbiased observer that Putin’s Russia reeks of fascism… Let’s not give the young National Bolshevik Gangan to Colonel Putin. Let’s not give a gift to the cannibals.” (Obkom, January 8)
MOLDOVA
Experts are commenting on the warmer relations between Moscow and Chisinau.
Some authors are accusing the president and the government of deliberately sabotaging agreements with European partners, renouncing the line of unification with Romania and advancing toward the Kremlin. Still others are angry with the European leaders’ advice of closer cooperation with Russia to resolve the disputable issues. The media believe that this may cost the country its independence.
“The Moldovan leaders do not want the country’s integration with the European Union, while the opposition is unable to convince the population and European partners in its necessity. Today we are watching a strategic change in this country’s course.” (Moldova.Azi, January 9)
“Having found itself between a rock and a hard place, the Kremlin’s revanchist ambitions and the NATO and EU expansions, Moldova can only save itself by joining the West. But… the EU has shut the door before its eyes.” (Jurnal de Chisinau, January 11)
Analysts are writing that the ruling Communists have chosen the Russian vector of development in the hope to get assistance from the Kremlin in building the Moldovan version of “sovereign democracy.” “The Communists have realized that the line towards European integration would lead to genuine political competition, which will deprive them of an opportunity to monopolize the power forever… The desire to please the Kremlin is boundless. These politicians are mostly former Communist bureaucrats and they believe that Russia is returning to its former grandeur, while the European Union is too weak to resist its advances to restore its influence in Moldova.” (Moldova.Azi, January 9)
GEORGIA
Most analysts maintain that Mikhail Saakashvili’s attempts to make peace with the Kremlin are doomed to fail – in the past, the Georgian president made too many mistakes.
“Saakashvili’s policy toward Russia has been a complete fiasco… These authorities started from scratch four years ago… But [during this period] Russia was perpetually humiliated and there is no way it will agree to talk with him. Also, [Russia] knows that Saakashvili does not want such talks. If he had wanted them, he would have taken some steps during the past four years. He has not made one serious step toward Russia. So, Russia has every reason to doubt his statements.” (Akhali Taoba, January 15)
Some experts believe that the two countries need a go-between to normalize their relations. “It is clear that against tense relations and even cases of humiliation, the Russian and Georgian presidents cannot initiate a thaw. This is why they need a mediator.” (Alia, January 15) “It is hard to start fresh with old faces because previous steps are limiting opportunities. The members of both the Georgian and Russian political elites have said too many negative things, which will prevent any improvements in bilateral relations.” (GeorgiaOnline, January 13)
AZERBAIJAN
Analysts are writing with restrained optimism about the prospect of Dmitry Medvedev’s election as the Russian president. “What is Medvedev all about and how does he differ from Putin? It is still too early to say. But there is one advantage… Medvedev does not have the security-related background… [Hence,] Russia will not have the totalitarian-authoritarian system, which we have seen there lately.”
“If the Putin-Medvedev tandem exists, it will make a wonderful, strong and working team for Russia. Maybe, it will still be below European political standards, but Europe has never had tsarist autocracy or Soviet socialism, and it is too early to expect Russia to be similar to Britain with its centuries-old democratic traditions.” (Day.Az, January 7)
KAZAKHSTAN
The media are still extensively covering projects dealing with oil and gas supplies to Europe bypassing Russia. Romania is lobbying for the Pan-European Oil Pipeline (PEOP). Many analysts believe that these projects are hard to implement because of the still outstanding Caspian status, the Iranian position and the dispute between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. This situation is making the Russian route all the more attractive.
“All European and Romanian options are unlikely to be carried out until there is real progress about the Caspian’s status… Even with all the appeal of the European projects, for the time being the Russian part of the pipeline is the most reliable way of getting energy resources to Europe both for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.” (Delovaya nedelya, January 11)
KYRGYZSTAN
Political scientists are writing about Kyrgyzstan’s interest in consolidating economic cooperation with Moscow and receiving more investment from Russia, but they are not convinced about the government’s ability to guarantee security for Russian capital.
“Kyrgyzstan expects Russia to guarantee the continuity of its political line, but for the time being, it is not clear whether Kyrgyzstan can ensure the stability of the political situation. Under Vladimir Putin, bilateral relations were even and untarnished by either political or economic scandals… It is not yet clear whether Russia will adhere to its strategy of interest and non-interference in Kyrgyzstan. There are some problems, which have already worsened their ‘idyllic’ relations… One subject for separate discussion is the repatriation of Kyrgyz finances, which had to be taken out of Kyrgyzstan because of the 2005 revolution.” (24.kg, January 10)
UZBEKISTAN
Discussing international cooperation in countering drug trafficking, some publications are strongly critical of NATO for its lack of interest in contact with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). “Brussels received a signal from Moscow and its allies three years ago. Alas, the West is silent… Its logic is simple… Let it be a headache for those who are unlucky enough to be Afghanistan’s neighbors… Some policymakers would like to list Russia and its partners as ‘mortal enemies.’ This is the only way to justify skyrocketing arms spending, the arms race, and NATO’s increasing eastward expansion. As for Afghan heroin and the hundreds of thousands of destroyed lives – they are just a card in this big game.” (Vesti.us, January 10)
TURKMENISTAN
The media are actively discussing the real reasons for the unplanned suspension of Turkmen gas supplies to Iran.
Some of them believe that Turkmenistan does not have enough resources for the multi-vector policy declared by the president. They are pointing out that Russia is still Ashgabat’s major partner in energy supplies.
“One of the Turkmen hydrocarbon specialists said that there is simply not enough gas in the republic, and the shortage is particularly bad in the winter. It is no accident that in a gas-rich country, gas supplies are not stable and sometimes suspended even in regional centers. Therefore, everything is being done at the expense of the population and other importers in order to find the missing gas for its main partners, particularly for Russia… In the last two weeks alone, gas supplies were stopped in western Turkmenistan because of a shortage in several wells.” (Gundogar, January 15)
TAJIKISTAN
The press is commenting on the Russian Federal Migration Service’s intention to sharply reduce quotas for guest workers. Experts are predicting unpleasant political consequences for Moscow.
“Further toughening of the guest worker policy may cause serious international problems for Russia… Sooner or later, the migrants may decide that it is better to live in misery than with permanent obstacles and humiliation. In Tajikistan, this realization will cause a serious socio-economic crisis. The Tajik president will have to adjust his foreign policy in order to quickly develop relations with those countries that are contributing the most to its national economic development, carry out some programs or render aid. These countries are China, the United States and Iran. This is why Russia may face an unpleasant surprise when Tajikistan, a close friend of many years, may suddenly turn away from it.” (Asia-Plus, January 3)
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