ESTONIA
The local media write about Moscow's plan to promote socio-economic cooperation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They view its relations with the breakaway Georgian republics as the Taiwanization process.
"For Abkhazia, the situation described as 'everything other than independence' means that all goods crucial for its survival will come from Russia, the Russian ruble will be the monetary unit of the republic, which is de facto independent from Georgia, and 80% of its residents will be Russian citizens drawing Russian assistance and pensions. Also, Abkhazian police will wear Russian uniforms." (Eesti Paevaleht, April 19)
Journalists are bitter about the Russian president's visit to Sardinia because they would like Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to welcome not Vladimir Putin but rather the president of Estonia, which is a member of NATO and the European Union.
"This is how the Kremlin views its relations with Europe, with European premiers closing their eyes to the use of force in Russia, kowtowing to the Kremlin, and trying to bring those stubborn EU countries to their senses that refuse to think well about Russia." (Postimees, April 19)
LATVIA
The Latvian press likens the efforts of Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO to Latvia's recent history.
"One can understand Russia's desire to keep back Georgia and Ukraine; what one cannot understand are the Kremlin's methods. The torrent of threats will not stop the advance of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, just as it did not stop Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Then and now, Moscow's military rhetoric can only spur its neighbors' integration into NATO." (Telegraf, April 16)
Some publications write that Russia's actions can be explained not only by the specific political situation, but also by a broader historical and economic context.
"Russia's political ambitions are rooted in history and have remained unchanged [for decades]. Today, they are growing along with oil and gas prices. Russian ambitions were demonstrated at the Bucharest summit. We can expect confrontation in Eastern Europe to grow not only because Ukraine and Georgia want to join NATO and become European states, but also because of unsolved political problems and the redistribution of economic and energy resources." (Neatkariga Rita Avize, April 22)
LITHUANIA
Analysts agree that Russia's Caucasian policy is aimed at deterring NATO.
"Russia can use Abkhazia and South Ossetia for blackmail in the same way Turkey uses North Cyprus ... By recognizing Kosovo, the international community has presented Russia with a veritable trump card that can be used by Moscow in its own interests. One can repeatedly offer convincing proof of the fact that Kosovo is not a precedent. But when it comes to big nations, all precedents are brushed aside ... The most important thing is to start a game, and they [Russians] can do it." (Delfi, April 18)
National publications focus on Vladimir Putin's visit to Libya.
"Gazprom and Libya have agreed to establish a joint venture that would supply Libyan gas to Europe and would build a pipeline from Nigeria to Libya. Russia could thereby deprive Europe of an opportunity to use African deposits as an alternative source of gas ... Libyan leaders approve of Putin's old idea to set up a 'gas OPEC.'"
Although analysts still claim that it is impossible to create such an organization in the near future, Russian-Libyan agreements prove that Moscow wants to coordinate gas trade with Europe. (Lietuvos zinios, April 19)
BELARUS
Some political analysts are disappointed because most Belarusians do not view themselves as an ethnic group distinct from Russians. "The sprint of central and East European nations toward Brussels was largely motivated by a desire to escape Moscow's colonial rule ... The governments of these countries implemented extremely costly and dangerous reforms, transforming their lop-sided economies ... The people supported reformist governments, realizing that even if things were bad today, they were still moving steadily away from the Soviet past and Russian influence. In this regard, Belarus faces the following stark dilemma: greater national self-awareness and "Belarusization" lacking serious Russophobia will hardly democratize the incumbent regime. However, Russophobia will hardly fit into the Belarusian context. ("Nashe Mneniye, April 16)
Most analysts have reacted skeptically to reports from anonymous Russian government sources about the Kremlin's desire to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus in retaliation against NATO's expansion.
"One of the Russian establishment's groups wants to flex its muscles, including nuclear muscles, before the world ... At the same time, Russian leaders realize that the deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles in Belarus would destabilize the situation in Europe and the world." (Belorussky Partizan, April 16)
UKRAINE
The recent meeting between the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine in Moscow, described as failure, encouraged local political analysts to predict increased tensions in bilateral relations because of the Kremlin's unyielding stance regarding the integration of Ukraine into NATO.
"The scandalous speeches by the Kremlin officials largely predetermined the outcome of the meeting. The situation sometimes became so tense that Sergei Lavrov tactlessly cut short the Ukrainian delegates, calling them by their first names." (Zerkalo Nedeli, April 21)
"The Russian leaders will keep using aggressive rhetoric against Ukraine. Acting at Putin's prompting, pro-Kremlin political analysts now claim that accession to NATO will split Ukraine. But these moves will not ensure the desired result; they can only damage bilateral relations." (Gazeta Po-Ukrainski, April 17)
Analysts, outraged that Vladimir Putin allegedly said in Bucharest that Ukraine was not a properly sovereign state, write that this is a provocation directed at the Ukrainian president.
"These words could be used in a conversation between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. Russians are trying to make their Western partners believe that Ukraine's western and eastern regions are two different countries. This is a dangerous illusion. But the worst part is that this 'leakage' from a confidential meeting will now be used in Ukrainian politics, primarily against Viktor Yushchenko, who will be pictured as a leader provoking his country's split." (Gazeta Po-Kievski, April 21)
MOLDOVA
The media are trying to discover the reasons behind the resumption of talks between Moldova and Transdnestr and changes in the stance of the Moldovan president, who previously viewed Transdnestr as only a seat of separatists. Opposition journalists do not think Vladimir Voronin's scenario of the reunification of Moldova is practical.
"To reunite the country, we need, at the very least, the consent of the people living in Transdnestr, which is impossible. Reunification is a Moldovan utopia. We have missed the train, or rather Voronin derailed it when he refused to sign the Kozak Memorandum. Moscow is ready to consider any proposal of Chisinau, but it will also listen to Transdnestr. The primitive scenario under which Moscow will order Transdnestr to act in accordance with Chisinau plans will not materialize." (Olvia-Press, April 16)
The media have no illusions about the role of the West in the reunification process.
"The reunification of Moldova is not the main goal of the United States and the EU. They can only talk about protecting democracy and human rights, which will not change the essence of the problem: first the withdrawal of Russian troops (including peacekeepers), and only then reunification." (Olvia-Press, April 16)
ARMENIA
NATO's interest in the South Caucasus and Central Asian republics is viewed as dangerous for Russia. The media write that Moscow will make appropriate moves in response.
"These countries and territories are a suitable bridgehead for putting pressure on Russia. No wonder that politicians in Kiev say more and more often that Russia still holds Ukrainian territory. The transition status of Ukraine and Georgia as NATO partners is not a hypothetical, but a real threat to Russia's security." (Golos Armenii, April 17)
"The sooner these [response] measures are taken, the better [for Russia], because Moscow will not stop NATO's eastward expansion with words." (Respublika Armenia, April 18)
"The majority of population in the self-proclaimed republics are Russian citizens, and this alone entitles them to Russia's protection. Moscow thinks, with good reason, that if Kosovo is described as a unique conflict, the same can be said about Abkhazia and South Ossetia." (PanArmenian.net, April 17)
Commenting on the talks between Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran held to establish a consortium to build the Qazvin-Resht-Astara railroad, the press writes that this might exclude Armenia from the global transportation network and give Azerbaijan an additional instrument of pressure on Yerevan.
"The railroad will directly connect Moscow and Tehran via Baku and allow linking the Baltic ports with the Indian Ocean. By encouraging the construction of the North-South corridor across its territory, Azerbaijan hopes to gain additional mechanisms of pressure on Armenia, which will lose its last chance to become a transit country in this event." (Novoye Vremya, April 16)
GEORGIA
Russia's initiatives regarding contacts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia have provoked an angry response in the Georgian media.
"Moscow will use its old trick again, talking with pathos about how it must protect its citizens' interests in the two Georgian regions, after having illegally issued Russian passports to everyone there who survived the civil wars and ethnic cleansings of the 1990s, incidentally also inspired by Moscow.
"[President Vladimir] Putin proposed lifting visa restrictions, restoring postal services and canceling the illegal embargo. Isn't it a tried and true Soviet policy of making things worse, then still worse, and then, once the situation is unbearable, launching negotiations on a lesser evil?" (Georgia Online, April 22)
"Russia is creating the illusion that it is willing to cooperate with Georgia." (Pankisi.info, April 19)
"Russia must have felt humiliated and aggrieved after the West recognized Kosovo's independence, and thought it had to react in some way. So it retaliated by humiliating Georgia, a partner of the West." (Kviris Palitra, April 21)
"Russia did not dare come forward and recognize the breakaway regions' independence and therefore resorted to "latent annexation," meaning giving the two Georgian regions equal rights and possibilities with Russian regions. (Georgia Online, April 18)
"Russia will use Abkhazia's independence as a bargaining chip until it buys some proof that NATO forces will not be deployed on its border." (Ramaz Sakvarelidze, political analyst, for Rezonansi, April 18)
AZERBAIJAN
The local media comments on the situation around the two self-proclaimed republics were harsh.
"It is an open secret that Russia was directly involved in fuelling Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, de-facto if not de-jure, and the Kremlin is clearly sympathizing with the separatists." (Zerkalo, April 16)
"The war in Abkhazia is not a case where Moscow could easily dodge responsibility by citing the Kosovo precedent. It was not from Pristina that the "unidentified bombers" flew in 1993 to shell the Georgian forces at the approaches to Sukhumi, and the separatist leaders were received by [Vladimir] Putin in his Sochi residence, not by Hashim Thaci." (Echo, April 18)
The local print media are tracing alarming similarities between the current developments in the North Caucasus and the "Kosovo precedent."
"Georgia is already paying for the 'Kosovo precedent.' The worst thing is that the United States has so far been unable to provide its allies, Georgia and Ukraine, with NATO's military-diplomatic backing, which gives the Kremlin even more room to maneuver." (Zerkalo, April 17)
"In Kosovo, if we really call a spade a spade, it all began with raised concerns over the disastrous human rights situation in Kosovo under the Milosevic regime. So a UN humanitarian intervention was launched in response... But if one recalls the parliamentary hearing in Russia attended by representatives of the so-called self-proclaimed states, then the lifting of the economic sanctions on the breakaway regions, one can see that the "Kosovo precedent" is slowly but surely spreading to North Caucasus." (Echo, April 17)
KAZAKHSTAN
Commenting on the current political processes in Russia, experts are certainly "giving credit to President Vladimir Putin as a strategist" for managing to retain power legally after leaving office.
"He managed to keep a cool head and a clear mind with all the worshipping and flattery from his team. But this by no means justifies his policy aimed at preserving the corruption-plagued administration, even though it proves that he is a man with a strong and independent will." (Gazeta.kz, April 16)
"Putin's political era will last at least another eight years according to all the evidence ... He now heads the party in power, and will also head the government after [Dmitry] Medvedev's inauguration. Which means that, in addition to the unlimited powers within the ruling party, he will be able to use it as a tool to pressure the legislative and executive branches and his successor, Medvedev. So, with all of its complicated political schemes, Russia still does not seem to have moved an inch closer to democracy." (Liter.kz, April 18)
TAJIKISTAN
Analysts see the Kremlin's reluctance to support opposition movements that are gaining momentum in Central Asian countries as one of the weaker points of Moscow's foreign policy.
"It was a huge drawback of [President Vladimir] Putin's policy toward the post-Soviet nations that Moscow did not participate in forming new political elites that shared democratic values. Russia should have supported the emerging democratic forces in Georgia and Ukraine. It never did so, and is now having strained relations with both countries as a result. Georgia and Ukraine have opted for Western support instead; the developments in other CIS states can follow similar scenarios." (Asia-Plus, April 16).
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