According to one version, in an attempt to try to convince Putin to join sanctions against Iran, the White House signed the Russian-American agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the longtime dream of Russian nuclear fuel exporters giving them the right to directly export low-enriched uranium to the United States without intermediaries.
Under another version, Putin decided to spare Medvedev from making the unpleasant but necessary decision.
It would be surprising if Russia, a co-author of the UN sanctions who voted for them, had not joined their enforcement.
Before signing the order shortly before Medvedev's inauguration, Putin had instructed Valentin Sobolev, acting secretary of the Russian Security Council, to tell President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his visit to Tehran that Russia would remain committed to the principles of its relations with Iran, and that its policy does not depend on the man in power.
This secured the continuity of Russia's policy regarding Iran under the new president. Happy with the news, Ahmadinejad asked Sobolev to convey his greetings to Putin and Medvedev.
Iranian Ambassador to Russia Gholamreza Ansari said, with good reason, that Putin's rule was a golden period in Russian-Iranian relations. During it, the two countries signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement for 10 years, even though it has not even been halfway implemented because of Iran's passivity.
Putin was also instrumental in the Bushehr nuclear power plant project, because he convinced Iran to agree to return used nuclear fuel to Russia and sign a supplementary protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This has alleviated some of international concerns over the Bushehr plant and allowed Iran to complete its construction.
Putin also proposed setting up an international uranium enrichment center in Russia, which Iran would be able to use. This idea allowed International Atomic Energy Agency experts and international negotiators to convince Iran to suspend, if not terminate, its uranium enrichment project, and also offered a chance for a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear problem.
And lastly, Iran has greatly enhanced its status in Central Asia by receiving observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and becoming a prominent candidate for membership in that regional body. Thanks to Moscow, Iran is now involved in many Central Asian projects, including in Afghanistan.
In addition, Iran is also Russia's strategic partner in such crucial regions as the Caucasus, the Caspian and Central Asia, as well as in the energy and gas spheres. Russian and Iranian interests do not clash there, but complement each other under all development scenarios. Such partners are worth their weight in gold.
The above are positive elements in Russian-Iranian relations, which the administration of the new Russian president will use to carry on the predecessor's policy. But they cannot safeguard the two countries from problems. The largest of which is Iran's nuclear program.
Tehran seems to be speculating on Moscow's desire to solve its nuclear problem diplomatically. It knows that the UN sanctions co-authored by Russia can be easily neutralized by the package of positive proposals on Iran, drafted at the insistence of Moscow.
But it is not clear why Tehran prefers not to notice that each new Security Council resolution makes the space for solving its problem diplomatically much smaller.
The new Kremlin administration may advance new demands to Tehran regarding its nuclear program, and not because the new president will change Russia's policy. By refusing to resume negotiations on UN conditions, Tehran is paving the way for the only possible solution - harsher sanctions against it, including international isolation. No matter what Moscow may do now, the international community will eventually impose sanctions.
Iran's nuclear program is not the only headache for the international community, including Moscow. Other problems are Iran's missile program, its anti-Israeli rhetoric, and its questionable stance regarding the Arab-Israeli problem.
Despite all of this, Tehran still hopes that Russia's third president, Dmitry Medvedev, will carry on Putin's policy regarding Iran. And he is likely to do this, under certain mutual commitments.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
