Parliament even adopted an appeal to members of the UN to recognize the independence of the two former Georgian autonomies, which became de facto independent as a result of ethnic conflicts following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
To sum up, Moscow has drastically revised its approach to Georgia, which had remained basically unchanged since the early 1990s. Having played a key role in freezing the conflicts in the early 1990s, Russia agreed to the existence of the breakaway provinces as the main result of the confrontation. The "frozen" status meant delayed resolution of the conflict (in better political conditions and on the basis of compromise).
Having claimed statehood, these formations were supposed to prove their ability to survive rather than function as "federations of field commanders." Up to 2004, there was a chance of South Ossetia's reintegration into Georgia (considering the Tbilisi-Tskhinvali contacts that had been preserved since the first conflict in the early 1990s).
The uncertain status of these two entities reflected the political realities at the turn of the century, such as general interest in the preservation of the status quo and lack of hostilities (although there were short-term skirmishes in Abkhazia in 1998 and 2001). There was hope that the sides would come to terms. As long as the conflicts were frozen, Russia did not see any point in dramatically changing its approach to Abkhazian and South Ossetian self-determination.
However, four years ago the conflicts began to thaw. Initially, the balance of forces was upset in South Ossetia (which saw the first armed clashes after 12 years of peace). This prompted an attempt to change the political and legal format that had existed since the early 1990s. These terms suggested that the breakaway provinces were - at least formally - equal sides in the conflict with Georgia. However, strategists from Tbilisi believed that these entities should be totally and unequivocally barred from the world arena as independent entities.
The Georgian approach was as follows: "We are not going to talk to the puppets; we want to talk to the puppeteer, that is, Moscow." In this way, Georgia itself removed the two rebellious republics from the political process by sending them a clear signal: "We need the territories, not the leaders or their population."
In the early hours of August 8, the status quo was crushed once and for all. Russian politicians changed their tune. For the first time, the Russian president openly called into question Georgia's territorial integrity. He said that the status of the former Georgian autonomies should be a subject of international discussion, and announced Russia's readiness to guarantee Abkhazia and South Ossetia's security, and the choice of their people.
However, even after the loss of the five-day war, President Mikheil Saakashvili adopted a new strategy to tame the rebellious territories. The New York Times reported that Georgia intended to restore the army after the hostilities, and that Saakashvili hoped for continued U.S. support. George W. Bush said: "We will continue to stand behind Georgia's democracy; we will continue to insist that Georgia's sovereignty and independence and territorial integrity be respected."
There are no more frozen conflicts. It seems that Moscow has done all it can for the time being. Having decided to give a tough response to Tbilisi, Moscow has shown that there are limits beyond which it will not retreat. It is obvious that Russia does not have allies on this issue even within the CIS (as political space rather than an institution), not to mention the United States and other Western countries. At the same time, the West makes it clear, indirectly for the most part, that it is not ready for a complete break-up with Moscow.
John Beyrle, U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation, believes that Russia was absolutely reasonable in responding to the Georgian attack on Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia.
This statement is well grounded, and in this context we think that the best way out is to carry out Medvedev's sixth point of settlement - to discuss the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at an international level. It should be discussed not as an academic issue but by way of active diplomatic persuasion.
Many countries have followed this road, trying to achieve recognition for their allies. Turkey recognized the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus only after its proclamation in 1983 (nine years after its conflict with the Greek part of the island). Even the United States did not recognize Kosovo in 1999 and long simulated talks to define the status of the ex-Serbian province.
After all, Europe will have to come to terms with the idea that the project of a united Georgia has fallen through and realize that Tbilisi has no peaceful means of reintegrating South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia (which is partially also a Caucasian power) will not accept the use of force.
Sergei Markedonov heads the department for problems of interethnic relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
