These questions might seem of little importance, but Moscow and Washington are approaching them with great seriousness. They are all the more important now that the Western public, particularly the thinking public, is gradually giving up the primitive accusations of "imperial Russia" for attacking a "small and democratic Georgia," and starting to doubt the wisdom of the policy pursued by their politicians.
It is not the first time that Russia raised the issue of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's participation in a Security Council session, but this is the first time that it is ready to go to any lengths to reach this goal. A more neutral version - to conduct a session in Geneva, was under discussion, but Moscow decided to up the ante, all the more so since it can afford to.
Speaking strictly, as distinct from the case of Abkhazia, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was not on the agenda of the Security Council or any other UN body until the start of Georgia's aggression on August 8. Even now, this conflict is still discussed as part of "the situation in Georgia", the label traditionally applied to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict since 1992.
But to discuss the situation in Georgia, the Security Council should listen to all sides of the conflict. Otherwise, how can it make a decision? Apart from the Americans, practically nobody in the Security Council objects to the invitation of Abkhazians and Ossetians. Recently, even the United States has not made any official statements on this score, although not so long ago American diplomats speaking off the record hinted that they would never agree to that. Moreover, there have been no visa denials, traditional for such cases. But no visas have been issued, either.
In just one day, Washington turned down the Russian draft resolution of the UN Security Council to impose an embargo on arms supplies to Tbilisi. But U.S. officials said nothing about the idea to conduct an informal meeting in New York on October 7 or 8. Previously, the U.S. envoy to the UN immediately voiced Washington's official position.
Why is Washington so indecisive now? It looks like its geopolitical Grand Masters are threatened with a fork - either to lose face and allow Abkhazian and South Ossetian diplomats to attend the session, or to give up on the presence of UN observers in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone, because their mandate expires on October 15. Russia made this abundantly clear. Vitaly Churkin, Russian's Ambassador to the UN, said in no uncertain terms that Moscow cannot imagine a situation where the extension of the mandate of the UN observers in Abkhazia will be discussed without the latter's participation. Meanwhile, these UN observers are the only international source of information from the republic. Washington badly needs this information because it has no other sources, except for technical reconnaissance.
Statements by UN observers are no less important for Washington (as well as for Moscow, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali). The same applies to statements that may be made by UN leaders based on the mission's information. They are all elements of the information war the United States is seriously involved in on the Caucasian front. Winning the sympathy or loyalty of UN observers is no less important for the United States than receiving information from them on the location of Abkhazian and Russian troops.
But all these opportunities will disappear if the mandate of the UN mission in Georgia is not extended. Unlike its mandate in Kosovo, this one is not permanent. Russia will simply veto the relevant resolution if the American visa is not put into the Russian passport of the Abkhazian representative. The Ossetian case is more complicated, but Abkhazia will be enough for a start.
This has become a tough game. The United States is exploiting its huge advantage as a host country. Russia will have to reply, making it embarrassing for its opponent. It will do this with a heavy heart, because acrimonious quarrels will not help resolve the problem.
For a long time, Moscow tried to compromise with Washington. It agreed to many things, like the participation of representatives from Kosovo (not a UN member) in sessions of the UN Security Council. Russia noted that there is a format allowing Security Council members to communicate with representatives of states that have not been recognized by the UN (the formula of Diego Arias, the Venezuelan ambassador to the UN who headed the Security Council during the beginning of the war in Bosnia). Moscow pointed out that the UN itself has officially recognized Abkhazia as a side in the conflict, and spoke about double standards in dealing with Abkhazia and Kosovo, but the Americans were adamant.
In this match, the capital pieces of U.S. commitment to principle were defended by numerous pawns in the dorm of U.S. consular staff. They do not have to explain visa denials.
After Russia's latest move, nobody is even asking about reasons for denial, and this is why the pawns have become useless. Washington should either give up its principles, or lose a source of information and influence.
There are some unsportsmanlike options, like overturning the board, or stealing a rook. But the flag on the clock has not yet fallen, and this is still the opening debut.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
