MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov)
U.S. President Barack Obama is confident that American commandos in Afghanistan will be able to arrange for negotiations with moderate members of the Taliban.
All things considered, this recent initiative is part of his declared new strategy in this country.
Experts from the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) have recently emphasized the need for a new policy in Afghanistan. Paul Burton, one of the ICOS leaders, said that the Taliban is now determining the political dynamics in Afghanistan, while the current U.S. strategy does not secure stable development.
It is clear that this strategy should be changed. Most experts agree that the U.S. project on introducing democracy in Afghanistan is in a deep if not desperate crisis.
Now the question is how to overcome this crisis with the Taliban's help. What role is it playing in the country? Is it a military-political movement that is openly confrontational to the central government, while enjoying widespread support of the local population? Or does it consist of extremist radical groups that only engage in terror? One thing is clear - Afghan society is going through a deep systemic crisis.
How effective, and, more importantly, appropriate, will talks be with the Taliban? The paradox of the situation in Afghanistan is that its current government has recently been ill at ease, although it has no alternative - neither the Taliban, nor yesterday's mujahidin can replace it. Most experts do not lay the blame on corruption at all levels of government and poor implementation of social programs for the current state of affairs.
Corruption has always been part and parcel of life in Afghanistan. As for poor social programs, the international community could provide assistance but they are sooner a consequence of instability, insecurity, and weak central government than the cause behind them.
There are several reasons for the crisis, such as corruption, insufficient social programs, and largely the absence of a leading party that could become a consolidating political force. But the main cause is the weakness of Afghan national security agencies, and, against this background, an obviously inadequate ISAF and U.S. military presence. The main reasons behind the crisis in Afghanistan boil down to the following:
First, this is a traditional Afghan syndrome - no unity in the political elite, no consolidating force in society, and no leading national party. Second, Afghan society is itself in crisis - it cannot decide whether it is ready for democratic reforms or not. Third, Afghanistan is not strong enough militarily - its army, police and security bodies remain weak.
Talks with moderate members of the Taliban are by all means necessary, but not only with them but also with the opposition as a whole. What to do with the leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan Gulbuddin Hekmatyar? His party is one of the most important political forces in the country. His position differs considerably from that of the Taliban. Mullah Mohammed Omar insists on complete withdrawal of the international peacekeeping forces from Afghanistan, whereas Hekmatyar urges their replacement with troops from Muslim countries. This idea is popular with some strata of the public and should be taken into consideration.
There is one more specific feature of Afghan life. Although a substantial part of the population supports the central government's efforts to restore the country, the governing bodies are unable to establish confident control over the larger part of its territory. Under these circumstances, it would not be enough to start talks with the Taliban. No matter how moderately oriented those members of the Taliban may be, talks with them will be perceived by the population as the central government's search for compromise with the Taliban at large. Why should the Taliban be given such honor? Does the movement have enough moderate members to ensure stability with their help?
Most likely, the answer is no. Otherwise, the country would not have been swept by such a powerful wave of terrorist acts. Most likely, Afghanistan needs an open, nationwide dialogue. Sooner or later, Kabul will have to resort to the tried and tested method of achieving national accord, that is, to convene the Loya Jirga (parliament). This would be a timely measure and Kabul should take it before losing the vote of confidence from the Afghan population. In this case, it will be easier for America to decide with whom it should talk and how.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
