Iran has again shocked the world by sanctioning the construction of ten more uranium enrichment plants, five of them immediately.

The decision confirmed the general fear that Iran is carrying out secret nuclear development programs. If not, it would have needed more time to select construction sites and prepare project documents.

Iran made the fateful decision after the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved a resolution on November 27, 2009 according to which Iran violated several crucial provisions by starting the construction of a second uranium enrichment plant at Qom.

The resolution reads, in part: "Iran's declaration of the new facility (...) gives rise to questions about whether there are any other nuclear facilities under construction in Iran which have not been declared to the Agency."

It further reads that "Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol (1997) nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern," such as the Green Salt Project involving uranium processing and the designing of a ballistic missile warhead, as well as the testing of high explosives and high-voltage equipment for activation of HE detonators.

The IAEA resolution is not a binding document, but its approval is evidence of Iran's growing political isolation. It was supported by 25 of the 35 countries represented on the Board of Governors. Cuba, Venezuela and Malaysia voted against it, while Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Brazil, South Africa and Egypt abstained.

Tehran's reaction to the resolution was clearly exaggerated for several reasons.

First, Iran thought it could act with impunity because the lead countries do not have a majority on the IAEA Board of Governors. This is why in the past Iran insisted that its nuclear file be returned to the IAEA, thinking that this would protect it from "Western pressure."

Second, Iran has been stealthily working for several years to complement its uranium enrichment facility at Natanz with several other such plants, including the nuclear facility near Qom. The IAEA inspectors who visited it wondered if its construction began earlier than Iran claims it had, and suggested that Iran likely has other such facilities.

Now Tehran has deliberately decided to aggravate its relations with the IAEA. While formally agreeing in October to remove 80% of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) in exchange for fuel for its nuclear research center in Tehran, Iran started impeding the implementation of that presumably advantageous deal.

The IAEA did its best to take Iran's interests into account and proposed compromise solutions. Therefore, only a deterioration in relations with the Agency could allow Iran to keep the accumulated LEU reserves. The resolution was a good excuse for doing this.

Tehran is clearly working consistently to develop a full nuclear cycle as the technological basis for producing nuclear weapons. It so far wants only to have the ability to create nuclear weapons, but will it stop when it gets it? This is a question of fundamental importance for the neighboring countries, including Russia.

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that Tehran will stop at the red line. In the past, it did not create nuclear weapons because the United States and/or Israel threatened to physically liquidate its nuclear facilities. But now the U.S. is busy planning its gradual withdrawal from Iraq and trying to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. As for Israel, external political influence has become unfavorable in terms of using military force against Iran.

Therefore, the international community can only encourage the UN Security Council and other groups of countries and individual states to approve sanctions against Iran.

There is still hope that Iran will not sever relations with the IAEA because it does not have enough natural uranium for its projects, it is badly short of modern technology (especially in the gas sector), its aircraft and physical plant have long become obsolete, and social problems are growing in scale.

Given these conditions, the international community should demonstrate flexibility with the right timing and start to gradually integrate Iran into the international economic system and subsequently into international political relations.

Vladimir Yevseyev, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the International Security Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

MOSCOW. (Vladimir Yevseyev for RIA Novosti)