When Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrived in Turkey on Tuesday May 11, it was clear that the main outcome of his visit would be the establishment of a High-Level Cooperation Council (to be co-chaired by Medvedev), the signing of an agreement on one-month visa-free travel for tourists, and cooperation in the construction of nuclear power plants.
The first meeting of the council, to be attended by the Russian president, is to formalize the agreement to launch a three-stage roadmap for strategic cooperation in the political, trade and economic spheres and between public organizations.
Medvedev will also meet with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The sides plan to sign a score of agreements and political documents, which should advance bilateral cooperation to a higher level. Turkey describes it as privileged cooperation and Russia as multifaceted strategic partnership.
Europe is always slightly alarmed when a Russian president (or a prime minister) goes to Turkey or a Turkish leader visits Russia. It fears that Turkey may lean too closely towards Russia and that the relationship could revive imperial ambitions in both Russia and Turkey.
Also, Europe sees a double danger in the fact that Russian-Turkish political friendship is being reinforced with energy, oil and gas deals.
Russian energy giant Gazprom supplies 63% of Turkey's gas needs (the third largest amount after Germany and Italy). The two countries are building the Blue Stream gas pipeline along the Black Sea bed and have decided to build a second line of the pipeline. Turkey is also considering joining the South Stream project to transport Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and on to Italy and Austria.
Russia supplies approximately $1.8 billion worth of oil and between $1.1 billion and $1.3 billion of refined oil products to Turkey annually.
Russia is ready to contribute to the construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which Turkey approved in 2006. The 550-km (342-mile) pipeline is to link Samsun, a Turkish port on the Black Sea, with the Kirikkale refinery located 15 km (9 miles) from Istanbul, where it will be connected to the Kirikkale-Ceyhan pipeline.
The new pipe will annually transport 50-70 million metric tons of oil from Russia and Kazakhstan to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.
The question of who needs the oil and gas friendship more, Russia or Turkey, and if they would have been friends without their pipeline projects is impossible to answer because it is difficult to say where pipes begin and politics end.
Turkey has been cleverly using the Russian card in its relationship with the European Union. After it was denied entry into the organization at the EU summit in Copenhagen in 2002, Prime Minister Erdogan went to Moscow, and Turkey has used that political option several times since then.
The EU's unwillingness to admit Turkey is in fact pushing it into Russia's embrace. Officially, Turkey is continuing its accession talks, which it started in 2005, but France and Germany have announced that they don't want to see a country with 60 million Muslims in the EU. This has put off its entry into the EU for ten years, and it is therefore not surprising that Turkey is looking for alternatives. The best option is to strengthen its regional political and economic prestige, which Turkey cannot do without Russia.
Turkey's cooperation with Russia is turning it into the oil and gas dispatcher hub of the whole Asia Minor, southern Europe (including the Balkans) and the Middle East and strengthening its economic role.
At the same time, Turkey has been trying to become involved in the South Caucasus policy in the past few years. Coordination of its positions with Russia could produce very good results there.
The South Caucasus countries - Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia - currently have no regional leader. Azerbaijan is leaning towards Turkey, Armenia has embraced Russia, and Georgia has been seeking rapprochement with NATO and the United States. When these countries lean (or are prodded) towards different supports, it usually ends badly, as proved by the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia.
So, if Turkey and Russia go over from coordinating their energy plans to cooperating in the sphere of regional security, this could encourage the region to create a common security system. Such a system should clearly stipulate what its member countries may or may not do with regard to their neighbors.
Since the OSCE, the EU and the UN have failed to ensure this, Russia and Turkey could try to establish a regional forum to address this task. In 2008, Turkey proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact, which would include the three South Caucasus countries plus two regional heavyweights, Turkey and Russia.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin)
