Drugs have been one of the most serious threats facing Russia for some time now. The rise in drug addiction, the ever increasing traffic of illegal drugs and the accompanying increase in crime and social problems call for extraordinary counter measures. The head of the Federal Service for Drug Control, Viktor Ivanov, proposed such measures that would provide for significant changes in the organization of Russia's military and foreign policy at a meeting of the State Anti-Narcotics Committee on September 24, 2010.
The army against drugs
First of all, Ivanov meant having special counter-drug units set up as part of the Russian Armed Forces. The Armed Forces currently have no such units. Fighting drug trafficking was (and still is) outside the Defense Ministry's sphere of duties. Military successes in this field were only a side effect of fighting against militant groups where many combatants earned their living through the drug trade.
The intended use of the Armed Forces for such purposes may be divided into two issues. The first, and most important one, is the political effect of such efforts. The second issue is the format: the establishment of a special organizational structure; the use of units in different troops based on force rotation; the limited use of special force units combined with an enhanced support and training of counter-drug forces in Central Asia.
When considering the political consequences, one should keep in mind that such efforts make sense only outside Russia. The situation is different inside the country: the flow of drugs splits off into numerous lethal streams. As before, the primary role here should be played by law enforcement bodies and special services that have extensive investigative resources and available forces, which allow for the possibility of overcoming armed resistance. Given all this, the use of the Armed Forces to fight drug trafficking inside the country is impossible: their methods are not suitable for struggling with small-scale wholesalers and individual drug dealers in residential areas.
The Armed Forces should be focused mainly on the sources of this threat: the cultivation of opium poppy plants and the major caravans that have not yet divided their load among a host of individual couriers. There are no drug plantations or major caravans in Russia, and this automatically suggests the need to use the Armed Forces abroad.
There are international precedents for this. First, the long-standing counter-drug operations conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces in Latin America, most of all in Colombia.
However, this activity has not made the United States popular in Colombia. A large part of the local population that is opposed to the government considers U.S. involvement, including not only military operations but also support for the Colombian army, as an interference in the country's internal affairs.
Unlike the U.S., Russia has a certain advantage: many in Central Asia regard Russia as a mediator. In this context, its support, training and equipment of the relevant local forces may be the best way to fight drug trafficking.
If it succeeds, Russia may be able to limit itself to minimal direct involvement as well as intelligence and analytical support of special operations.
In addition to his initiative on counter-drug units, Viktor Ivanov also proposed the formation of a national counter-drug budget which would consolidate funds for counter-drug efforts. Concentrating funding into a single source, given proper expenditure control, could be a key factor of success, but it may be made more efficient by combining all the forces of the state machinery. The situation on the southern border is the most striking example. The openness of the Russia-Kazakhstan border and its vast length make it much easier for drug traffickers. Border security, although it requires a huge amount of money, is seen as a national priority not only in the struggle against drugs trafficking but also in view of the potential terrorist threat from Central Asia.
Border security may well be accompanied by introducing a visa regime with Central Asian neighbors clearly stating that the reason for such measures is mass drug smuggling and illegal migration instead of a Russian hostility to its allies in the CIS, SCO and CSTO.
RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
