An RSM-56 Bulava (SS-NX-32) solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was successfully test-fired on Thursday, October 7. Although an important stage of the Bulava test program, the launch does not signal the solution of all problems plaguing the latest Russian missile.
This became the thirteenth Bulava launch to date, the first launch in 2010 and the first success after three abortive launches from late 2008 until late 2009. This time the number 13 was not unlucky: The missile reportedly operated without a hitch, with its multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) hitting their respective targets.
The successful launch took place at a time when another fiasco would have jeopardized the entire Bulava program, also probably leading to its revision and delaying the adoption of Project 955 Borei class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
The situation is also aggravated by the lack of a realistic and easy to produce alternative to the Bulava missile. The production R-29RMU Sineva liquid-propellant SLBM has outstanding specifications but different dimensions.
Most importantly, the Sineva has to match far more stringent storage, servicing and launch requirements. Consequently, it will be expensive to refit Borei class submarines, so that they could serve as Sineva launch platforms.
The successful Bulava launch once again confirms the program's feasibility. Despite previous successful launches, a number of analysts claimed that the missile's inherent defects made it impossible to implement this program.
It turns out that problems plaguing the Bulava missile are primarily caused by production defects and ineffective quality control.
This situation can be explained by the fact that Russia's crisis-ridden defense industry had long lacked orders and budgetary allocations, that's why this entirely new project proved to be too demanding for the industry. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which lacked prior experience of making sea-launched missiles, had to develop the Bulava missile from scratch. When the institute received a request for proposal (RFP), it was believed that various engineering solutions embodied in the Topol (SS-25 Sickle) and Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles would also be used to make the Bulava.
However, the highly specific SLBM program precluded the use of such know-how.
Test program difficulties were exacerbated by the chaotic nature of technical system failures. The Bulava malfunctioned because of an overall decline in production, engineering and management ethics, rather than due to some defective unit or system. The elimination of various defects did not prevent new ones from appearing seemingly out of nowhere. The decline simply aggravated typically Soviet problems linked with quality control.
It is therefore unclear when the Bulava will be adopted. One successful launch is obviously not enough after a number of setbacks. Additional tests are needed in order to confirm the existence of an effective missile production system.
Improvements in the Bulava design warrant co-production arrangements making it possible to manufacture entirely new hi-tech products.
It appears that Russia has not tackled such objectives since the 1970s and 1980s, when military equipment now forming the mainstay of the Armed Forces' combat potential began to be mass produced.
This objective has to be accomplished at a time when engineering and technical training system is in decline. Training standards have fallen appreciably and now Russia has few skilled specialists. In addition, most employees of defense companies are underpaid.
It is impossible to guarantee the successful implementation of the Bulava program, unless these negative trends are eliminated. However, they cannot be overcome by overhauling the defense sector. Any success will require tremendous spending, with unpredictable results.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
