Tensions on the Korean Peninsula recently led to one of the largest armed clashes between North and South Korea in the past 50 years. Will this conflict evolve into something more serious? Can the international community prevent such conflicts in the future? Konstantin Asmolov, senior researcher at the Center for Korean Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Far Eastern Studies, shares his views on future relations between North and South Korea.
Samir Shakhbaz: Good afternoon, Mr. Asmolov. Is war on the Korean Peninsula inevitable? What do you think?
Konstantin Asmolov: No, war on the Korean Peninsula is avoidable for a number of reasons. When a country goes to war, it usually plans on winning it. Now let’s look at the balance of power through this prism. We are accustomed to hearing speculations that North Korea has the world’s fourth largest army with 1 million soldiers. As we know, Russia is ranked fifth, and South Korea, with an army of almost 700,000, is sixth. Moreover, South Korea possesses state-of-the-art military equipment, while North Korea’s is from the 1970s or 1980s. In addition, South Korea and the United States signed a mutual defense treaty in the late 1950s that stipulates that if South Korea is attacked, the United States will not only enter the war on its side but also take the South Korean army under U.S. command as an integral part of its own armed forces. It was only relatively recently that South Korea regained independent command over its armed forces in peacetime. Given the balance of power on the peninsula and the fact that South Korea’s military budget is 25 times bigger than that of its northern neighbor, even if North Korea were to use its nuclear weapons, it wouldn’t change the outcome of the war. And if it did change the outcome, it would change it for the worse because the international community would sanction any response against a country that violated the nuclear taboo. So let’s not assume that North Korea is driven by irrational motives.
S.S.: But if North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, South Korea would suffer tremendous losses. Could you even talk about there being a winner in that case?
K.A.: North Korea’s real nuclear potential remains unclear. Currently, we know that they have the bomb but not the means to deliver it to a target. Obviously, Seoul lies within the range of North Korean missiles and artillery, and this proximity acts as a deterrent. The fact is that South Korea and the United States have no intention of starting a war because it will be a devastating, Pyrrhic victory. North Korea does not plan to start a war either, as I have already explained, because the country’s leadership has not lost its instinct for self-preservation yet.
There is great tension between the two countries now, and as a result, there is a high risk of unexpected triggers. In modern warfare, the order to open fire does not come from the top. Rather, middle and lower command levels have permission to respond to a situation and act according to instructions. Given this constant state of tension, with South Korea holding almost monthly exercises near the sea border with North Korea following the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval vessel, nerves on both sides are likely strained to the breaking point. Any unexpcted movement may be wrongly interpreted as the start of something bigger. In this situation, the natural reaction is to shoot first and ask questions later.
S.S.: Does this mean that the current conflict is the result of some junior officer losing his cool? Surely you agree that we haven’t seen an incident like this on the Korean Peninsula for quite a while.
K.A.: Regardless, I don’t think it was a provocation authorized at the top.
S.S.: And now this unauthorized provocation is turning out to be rather costly. At the very least, we can expect a response from the UN.
K.A.: The situation with the UN is actually very interesting. The UN is sure to express indignation, but it should be noted that South Korea – unlike with the sinking of the Cheonan – has neither raised this issue with the UN Security Council nor described North Korea’s actions as unprovoked aggression. Naturally, these were the words used by the South Korean media, but we should ask ourselves why Seoul did not try to actively seek out international support. There are two events that are worth noting. First, the deputy head of Russia’s Security Council, Vladimir Nazarov, made a rather unexpected statement, saying that South Korea was responsible for the incident since it held a military exercise with 70,000 troops in a disputed area. Second, the Chinese foreign minister cancelled his visit to South Korea, whereas it would be logical for China to send an official to South Korea to look into the matter and try, together with Seoul, Tokyo and Washington, to find ways to resolve the conflict and take measures to avoid problems like this in the future. We are forced to ask ourselves what the reason behind all this is and whether we know everything about this incident.
S.S.: Another noteworthy event that suggests that the current conflict is not entirely straightforward is the replacement of South Korea’s defense minister. Does this mean that he is to blame?
K.A.: Not necessarily. In fact, the defense minister was replaced because his response was too slow and timid. The South Korean media are harping on the fact that during the incident North Korea fired 120 shells while South Korea fired only 80. A significant portion of South Koreans accuses the government of failing to respond appropriately. One point is crucial in understanding the motives of the South Korean leadership. Before becoming president of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak was the mayor of Seoul, and as such he did not have foreign policy experts on his team. He had to rely on a group of people who are more paleoconservative than neoconservative. These people had been out of power for a long time, and they had been nursing a grudge that entire time. They still suffer from a Cold War mentality. In fact, their distorted perception of reality and their obsolete propaganda make them a lot like the North Koreans, with the only exception being that North Koreans live behind an iron curtain, while these people ostensibly live in the real world. When they returned to power, they decided it was an historic opportunity to accomplish what South Korea failed to do after Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 – to topple the North Korean regime and go down in history for reuniting the Koreas. So the problem is that these tensions are being fueled from both sides rather than just one.
S.S.: What can be done now to normalize the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and do you believe that the international community, above all the United States, currently has more important issues to deal with?
K.A.: The United States definitely has more important issues to deal with. This is why, strange though it may sound, the United States should be seen as a restraining rather than escalating factor in this situation.Current U.S. policy on the Korean issue boils down to strategic tolerance. What does this suggest? It suggests two things, one good and one bad. The good thing is that not all threats emanating from North Korea are as dangerous as Bush’s propagandists believed. The country’s nuclear capacity is not as strong and the risk that they will export nuclear material is not as high as was assumed, especially in comparison to Pakistan. North Korean military aggression against Seoul is unlikely. The bad thing is that North Koreans will not give up their nuclear arsenal, so there’s no reason to give this problem more weight than it deserves. Propagandizing the issue won’t do any good. The best option is to sit back and wait for the situation to change.
S.S.: Thank you for your time and comments.
