Weekly column by Fyodor Lukyanov
Twenty years ago, on November 6, 1992, newly-elected US President Bill Clinton phoned his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin. When asked what they talked about for 20 minutes, Clinton gave journalists an evasive answer: "We just talked about what he was doing, and I said I supported democratic and free market economics in Russia. We had no substantive conversations."
The Russian side was a bit more open – the Kremlin press service quoted Yeltsin as saying: “I think, Mr. Clinton, that my warm and good relationship with George Bush will not prevent our relations from being even better. The boldness in politics and firm rejection of old dogmas and stereotypes that you stand for, match well with the principles of our Russian-American relations."
Yeltsin was probably being a little disingenuous in referring to his warm relations with Bush. During his presidency, Bush Sr. clearly favored then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev during his intense rivalry with the future Russian leader. It was only when it became clear that Gorbachev had lost his grip on power that the White House switched to Yeltsin.
Moscow pinned high hopes on Clinton – during his election campaign he criticized Bush Sr. for his reluctance to provide large-scale aid to Russia and promised to adopt an entirely new approach to the issue. It came as no surprise when, shortly after the election, one of Clinton’s associates, in Moscow on an unofficial visit, was essentially presented with an ultimatum: help us now or else we will be in trouble and that will hurt you, too.
That December, the Philadelphia Inquirer wrote sarcastically: “There is a fearful symmetry in the pace at which President-elect Bill Clinton is assembling his administration and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is dismantling his. Just as the ‘new ideas’ people are being introduced in Little Rock, they are being thrown out the door in Moscow”.
Nonetheless, Clinton backed Russia, seeking to make its “democratic transformation” one of the crowning achievements of his presidency. This he failed to achieve.
Clinton eventually became extremely disappointed in his “friend Boris” and at the end of his term had to deal with Vladimir Putin, whom he saw as a symbol of the fact that Russia was heading in completely the wrong direction.
However, Putin established a good personal relationship with George W. Bush, underpinned from the very start by their mutual desire to open a new chapter in US-Russia relations. However, at the interstate level, the dialogue ran into a complete dead end. Barack Obama revived it, but the limited agenda of “the reset” was fulfilled fairly quickly without delivering any qualitative shift.
During the last 20 years, relations between the two countries have come full circle. Mitt Romney’s description of Russia as America’s “number one geopolitical foe” was the most striking statement made about Russia during the recent election campaign. Although even his supporters took this statement with a pinch of irony, nothing more meaningful was said about Russia.
In parallel, Moscow decided to get rid of the legacy of the 1990s once and for all. On October 1, Russia ended the activities of USAID, with whom an agreement was signed in 1992. It is also curtailing the Nunn-Lugar program, under which Washington funded the dismantling of Russia’s excessive nuclear warheads, obsolete missiles and chemical weapons.
Both decisions were motivated by the same logic: Russia will no longer sign agreements as a junior partner or accept foreign involvement in its domestic affairs. We will resolve our problems on our own and you will have to deal with Russia as it is today and on an equal footing.
But the United States has almost no tradition of equal partnerships. There was a kind of partnership, albeit a very peculiar one, during the Cold War: nuclear parity. But rather than leading to cooperation, this prevented conflict and thus ensured equality.
On all other issues America builds its external relations on the basis of the master-slave principle. Moreover, any partner either needs to sign up to its idea of the socio-political order, or at least recognize it, and agree to help introduce it as quickly as possible. Modern Russia has no intention of accepting either of these conditions.
Russian-American contacts are in for a radical overhaul.
Russia is not so aggressive as to justify the need for deterrence against it, which Romney clearly feels is necessary. Russia will not expect aid from the United States as had been the case in the past. Nor will it try to match the US-established criteria of democracy.
Russia remains an influential global power and cannot be ignored, despite George “dubya” Bush’s attempts to do just that. However, its position in the world is too amorphous, and is aimed above all at retaining a free hand that will allow it to build systemic relations. Moscow is not strong enough to hope for full equality. These are objective facts that do not depend on who is in the White House or the Kremlin.
The two countries must realize that they will never enjoy linear relations – they will neither be unequivocal foes or genuine allies. Nor will they be soulmates or ideological opposites. A desire to achieve full clarity, in whatever field, undermines all attempts to create a solid foundation for relations, whereas a willingness to be flexible on current issues makes it possible to achieve concrete results.
In this context Russia, above all, needs to overcome its fixation on the humiliation of the recent past, and America has to realize that the primacy of its values cannot be a prerequisite for cooperation in the 21st century.
There is no long-term agenda that accommodates the potentially crucial changes ahead. Today’s agenda will take on new accents only when other issues come to the fore, such as the situation in Asia, the prospects of the commercial development of the Arctic, the reform of the nuclear non-proliferation system, etc. These issues require serious discussion, which for now nobody seems willing to conduct.
To quote Yeltsin’s words from his conversation with Clinton 20 years ago, we need a “firm rejection of old dogmas and stereotypes.”
If we do not change anything, our relations will continue going round in concentric circles of cooling off, detente and resets, whoever the US president is.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Is Russia unpredictable? Perhaps, but one shouldn’t exaggerate – its randomness often follows a consistent pattern. But is the world at large predictable? The past two decades have seen all forecasts refuted more than once and have taught us only one thing – to be ready for any change. This column is on what the nations and governments are facing in the era of global uncertainty.
*Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal – the most authoritative source of expertise on Russian foreign policy and global developments. He is also a frequent commentator on international affairs and contributes to various media in the United States, Europe and China, including academic journals Social Research, Europe-Asia Studies, Columbia Journal of International Affairs. Mr. Lukyanov is a senior member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and a member of the Presidential Council on Human Rights and Civic Society Institutions. He holds a degree from Moscow State University.
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