What the Russian papers say

MOSCOW, November 20 (RIA Novosti) EU reform does not affect Russia's relations with Europe / New Ukrainian leader to change Caucasus policy - analyst / Russia prolongs moratorium on capital punishment / Russian state company to control oil project off Turkmenistan

MOSCOW, November 20 (RIA Novosti) EU reform does not affect Russia's relations with Europe / New Ukrainian leader to change Caucasus policy - analyst / Russia prolongs moratorium on capital punishment / Russian state company to control oil project off Turkmenistan

Gazeta.ru

EU reform does not affect Russia's relations with Europe

Although unlikely to achieve any major breakthrough, the Russia-EU summit in Stockholm will still go down in history as the last meeting where the EU was represented by rotating top officials, a Russian political analyst writes.

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the Moscow-based magazine Russia in Global Affairs, said that last Wednesday's summit was the last in a series of meetings where the Russian president had to deal with changing vis-a-vis. The Lisbon treaty has created the posts of an EU president and foreign minister who will be representing the united Europe rather than prime ministers of countries currently holding the rotating presidency.

It is not quite clear how the new structure will function. The idea was to improve the manageability of the group of nations which have strongly different policies, but the result might be not quite as expected, Lukyanov warns. Ideally, the new system should provide for more efficient decision-making procedures; in reality, it might aggravate the existing discrepancies.

The changes in the European Union, which is Russia's largest trade partner and an important factor of Russia's foreign policies, will certainly have some impact on the group's relations with Moscow. So far, all comments boil down to an assumption that Russia will have more problems in dealing with Europe with "a united foreign policy voice." On the other hand, EU policies are expected to become more transparent and undestandable.

Contrary to a widespread European belief, Moscow is not really opposed to further European integration, the analyst writes. However, it so happens that many issued can be tackled more successfully in bilateral format, while contacts with EU's central government bodies are less productive. EU members, or at least part of them, are interested in benefiting from Russia's cooperation potential. However, the special relations that exist between Russia and certain European countries are a cause of discord in the group of nations which has very different interests. They are not enthusiastic about unification within a single "superstate," but rather interested in a more powerful position on the international stage.

The current EU-Russia relations model is unlikely to change much, Lukyanov suggests. Moscow is relying on its traditional partners, who have to maneuver between development of ties with Russia and sticking to the European solidarity principles. The new institutional design will be more complicated, opening more opportunities for pursuing both policies. A whole range of tones will still be heard in the group's united foreign policy voice.

Kommersant

New Ukrainian leader to change Caucasus policy - analyst

In the past few years, the Ukrainian Government has invigorated its foreign policy activity in the Caucasus.

Russia usually thinks such activity is limited to GUAM, a regional alliance comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova and serving as an alternative to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). An alternative explanation is the shared interests of Presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Mikheil Saakashvili, who led the so-called "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia.

However, the issue is not limited to a relationship between the two presidents disliked by Moscow, writes political analyst Sergei Markedonov from the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

A more detailed analysis shows that the main aspects of Kiev's policy were defined under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, long before the November 2004 and January 2005 Orange Revolution and the establishment of GUAM, Markedonov says.

Kiev positions itself as a geopolitical magnet for Black Sea region countries and as a major driving force behind their integration into Euro-Atlantic organizations.

Moreover, Ukraine strives to play the role of an alternative or additional peacekeeper popularizing its own experience of regional socio-political reforms, which differs from Russia's experience, Markedonov says.

Unlike Yushchenko, his predecessors who had their own opinion on the Caucasus, did not stir up a conflict with Moscow. This was motivated by a self-preservation instinct, rather than any special affection for Russia, the analyst says.

A state with an "incomplete national identity" cannot afford to ignore those Ukrainians who are not prepared for a conflict with Russia, and who consider it their second, if not first, homeland, the analyst says.

A "divided community" can have its own opinion that runs counter to Russia's stand and can even afford to criticize Moscow for "supporting separatists." However, it cannot afford to stir up a conflict with a powerful neighbor because a confrontationist scenario will not meet with domestic support, the analyst says.

It appears that a new Ukrainian leader, due to be elected in January 2010, will have to take this reality into account and will also have to seriously modify Kiev's policy on the Caucasus, the analyst concludes.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Vremya Novostei

Russia prolongs moratorium on capital punishment

Yesterday's reports on the abolition of capital punishment in Russia are untrue. The Russian Constitutional Court has only prolonged the moratorium, introduced in 1999, until Russia ratifies Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights abolishing the death penalty, or refuses to comply with its provisions.

The draft law on ratifying Protocol No. 6 has been gathering dust in the State Duma, the lower house of Russia's parliament, since 1999. The Constitutional Court ruled on Thursday that capital punishment cannot be administered as long as the parliament is considering the issue. However, if the State Duma blackballs the bill, Russia will have to consider re-introducing the death penalty.

"The State Duma has likely not ratified the protocol because Russian society has not yet decided if it needs capital punishment or not," said Mikhail Krotov, the president's representative in the Constitutional Court. "In general, the authorities are leaning toward the abolition of the death penalty."

"The political consensus in the country - irrespective of individual politicians' views - is that capital punishment cannot be reinstituted in Russia," said Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Policy foundation.

"Capital punishment will be kept as a reserve measure of the justice system, but I think Russia should ratify the protocol abolishing it irrespective of public opinion," said Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the upper house's committee on international affairs.

Analysts say Russians are not as cruel as some think.

"The political elite believes, without good reason, that the people are merciless and love capital punishment," Pavlovsky said. "But people are merciless only when polled by sociological services. The respondents say they support capital punishment, but when they sit on the jury they usually avoid the death sentence, assigning it only for exceptionally cruel crimes. It is one thing to say you support capital punishment and quite another to sentence someone to death."

Kommersant

Russian state company to control oil project off Turkmenistan

Itera, an independent Russian oil and gas producer, is expected to sign an agreement today to sell a 51% stake in its Block 21 PSA off Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea to Zarubezhneft, a state company with extensive offshore drilling experience fully owned by state property management agency Rosimushchestvo.

This means that the government will assume control of the first hydrocarbons project coordinated with the Turkmen president.

Itera sold the stake soon after it was granted more access to the pipeline system. Analysts say it was no coincidence that the two events came in such close succession.

"We will sign the deal on Friday and close it by the end of the year," said Nikolai Brunich, head of Zarubezhneft.

Itera will hold the remaining 49% in the PSA.

The value of the deal cannot be calculated precisely because there is no reliable information on the block's reserves and potential production volumes. Itera has long been working in Turkmenistan, but the block turned out to be too big for it and so it decided to diversify risks and share them with a state company, said Valery Nesterov of Troika Dialog.

Until recently, no Russian company has implemented an oil or gas project in Turkmenistan. Itera has a Turkmen subsidiary, Zarit, which announced the acquisition of several offshore blocks in the Caspian Sea, but Block 21 is so far the company's only real project there.

Russia's gas export monopoly Gazprom has no hydrocarbons development licenses in Turkmenistan and has not won the tender for the construction of the East-West pipeline from the giant South Iolotan gas field to the Caspian shore.

"Given the political crisis in relations between Russia and Turkmenistan following a stop on Turkmen gas exports in April, it was very difficult for Itera to get the development license [for Block 21], which makes it a major achievement for Russia," said Maxim Shein from Broker Credit Service.

Nesterov said that Zarubezhneft did not provoke Turkmenistan's irritation and that the terms of the PSA agreement, provided they are not changed, suit all parties.

On Thursday, Itera increased gas supplies from the Beregovoye gas field in West Siberia's Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area to Russia's gas transportation system from 5-6 billion cubic meters daily (in April) to 14 million cu m.

Vitaly Gromadin, an analyst with Arbat Capital, said the sale of part of Itera's project in Turkmenistan was connected with its access to the Gazprom-controlled gas transportation system.

Tentative data for Block 21 puts its recoverable reserves at 160 million metric tons of oil and 60 billion cu m of associated gas. Estimated annual production at the $1-billion project could reach 10 billion cu m of gas and 20 million metric tons of oil.

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