| January 2012 |
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Russia might want to re-create in a new form its own periphery that would be based on common security and energy cooperation with its immediate neighbors. It will be a complex task, however, as Russia has lost during the last twenty years a significant portion of its industrial base and thus is not as attractive partner as China or India.
If we assume that Russia’s interests in post-Soviet states lie in propping up their authoritarian governments, undeveloped democratic institutions and civil society, and a lack of transparency in relations between government and business, then Russia will have a negative view of the Partnership for Peace program.
Russia has ceased to be an empire (a neutral term with no negative connotations). It is now seeking to assert itself and find its place in the world order as a modern great power. In this case, the term “great power” means the ability to take independent decisions at all levels, including strategic.
On June 25, twenty years ago, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. This was followed by the Serbo-Croatian (1991 - 1995), Bosnian (1992 - 1995), Kosovo (1998 - 1999) and Macedonian (2001) wars, which became the official facts in textbooks on the history of international relations. Thus, the question arises: Do the Balkan wars of the 1990s offer something more than academic interest?
Contact between Russian representatives and foreign opposition leaders aims to help conflicting sides find a mutually acceptable compromise. The Syrian institutes of power that were created several decades ago do not meet modern standards of democracy and efficiency. Unfortunately, there are no conflict and crisis settlement and prevention mechanisms in the Middle East.
U.S. Congress deserves a voice on human rights and the development of the rule of law in Russia. When China's exemption from Jackson-Vanik was granted in the 1990s, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created. A similar body could be created for Russia.
It is difficult to give an unequivocal assessment of the causes of the disaster of 1941. The army and the nation were preparing for war. Clausewitz saw the military as an instrument of diplomacy, and indeed the Soviet military and political leadership had ordered the army not to provoke Hitler to invade prior to the start of the war.
Healthy electoral competition between Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin could be the natural end of the “dual power” relationship in Moscow, giving Russians the final choice on who should reside in the Kremlin for the next six years.
The lessons of the Korean War are especially important for Russia. At the time, by trying to expand its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union put its own international prestige at stake by stretching its relations with the West to a breaking point – risking the disintegration of the still nascent United Nations and almost turning the Cold War into a hot one.
A horribly plausible scenario for the future looks like this. The Afghan civilian regime disintegrates after Karzai steps down in 2014, leading to a coup by the Tajik commanders of the Army. This is followed by a counter-coup by Pashtun troops, and civil war in the government controlled areas.
In recent years one of the main aims of the EU energy policy was to reduce dependence on Russian energy. However, the start of 2011 has prompted to take a different view on the security of energy supply to Europe, especially given an unprecedented increase in gas demand observed in the European market in 2010.
Russia can no longer afford to pay for its nominal allies with tax-payer money. Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Egypt all owed money to the Soviet Union, but what did we receive in return? And what do we expect to receive from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko? Russia has finally stopped lending large sums of money to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which is only natural because the economic and political returns have been so negligible.
Over the past twenty years, both Russia and the United States have experienced several cycles of convergence and divergence in their bilateral relations. It seems that Moscow and Washington are doomed to repeat these cycles time and again.
China and Russia have to coordinate their foreign policies more closely, especially when it comes to resolving crises and conflicts, such as that involving North and South Korea or in the Middle East. The Russian-Chinese strategic partnership set out in this treaty is a powerful political tool not just to resolve crises and conflicts, but also to prevent them.
Russia is an attractive market for capital but not the only option. There are other BRICS countries, or the emerging economies in the broader meaning of the word. Russia will have to compete for investment against other dynamically developing economies.
Turning towards the East is not Russia’s willful decision – it cherishes its European market. It is not a forceful move either but an objective reality. The East is experiencing the need for a coal substitute. Besides, there is a partial gap to fill following the loss of some of Japan’s nuclear energy.
The speculation surrounding the French assault ships seems to have finally been settled. Yet the Russian expert community is still hotly debating why Russia needs the Mistral at all, and, so far, no one has a clear answer. The admirals of the Russian Navy have kept as conspicuously silent as the political leadership. But why?
Despite their differences, the large, diverse BRICS economies, suffering from technological underdevelopment, equally require common rules of the game that will be fundamentally different from universally imposed liberal dogmas. A growing understanding of this idea unites BRICS countries in their common development ideology counterpoising the crisis-ridden West.
It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause. The causes of Russia’s backwardness lie in its inherited production structure. The physical structure of the real economy (that is, the industries, plants, their location, work forces, equipment, products, and the production chains in which they participate) is predominantly the same as in the Soviet era.
| January 2012 |



