
Dmitri Simes, President of The Nixon Center, Publisher of The National Interest
Both the U.S. and Russian governments appear to be quite serious about resetting their bilateral relationship. But as the initial confusion surrounding the Russian translation of “reset” demonstrated, it won’t be easy to agree upon what this really means.
Washington and Moscow are clearly approaching the summit seriously and sincerely. Yet they have different expectations regarding what needs to be accomplished and have not been particularly willing to accommodate one another’s perspectives so far. In Russia, many were disappointed that even after talking about resetting the relationship the Obama administration participated in NATO maneuvers in Georgia and agreed with expelling Russian diplomats from NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Conversely, in the United States, many were disappointed that Russia encouraged Kyrgyzstan to force the U.S. out of its airbase in Manas and that Moscow suddenly announced a Customs Union with Belarus, and Kazakhstan at the time when the U.S. government and major American companies were pressing for the completion of negotiations on Russian membership in the World Trade Organization.
I wouldn’t read too much into these mutual disappointments. It would be naïve to think that positive-sounding announcements in both capitals, coupled with the elections of President Dmitry Medvedev and President Barack Obama, would instantly change long-standing negative dynamics in the U.S.-Russian relationship. What is important now is not to allow the baggage of the past to shape U.S.-Russian relations in the future. The summit focuses the attention of leaders in both countries on the relationship and allows a serious discussion of new approaches to working together or, at a minimum, not working against each other.
Strategic arms control might be the easiest area for a breakthrough. In contrast to the Bush administration, President Barack Obama and his advisers emphasize the need for negotiated strategic arms reductions. Both sides agree that the START I agreement supposed to expire in December should be extended and expanded and, while the U.S. and Russian positions are still somewhat apart, a strategic arms reduction deal should be possible with a modicum of goodwill and common sense. This would be a serious and real substantive accomplishment at the summit.
Beyond strategic arms control, new approaches to our relationship may be more important than formal agreements. It will be next to impossible to reach official understandings regarding NATO expansion, missile defense in Europe, sanctions against Tehran and North Korea, and Russian help on Afghanistan. But the U.S. and Russia should be able to create new formats to discuss these controversial and complex issues with a new spirit of sensitivity to one another’s concerns and without unnecessary and counterproductive preconditions. We should not pretend that U.S. and Russia national interests are identical on any of these issues, but nor are our differences so fundamental as to outweigh the benefits to both nations of building a genuine partnership. “Partnership” does not necessarily mean a beautiful friendship, at least not in the immediate future. American and Russian approaches to many issues are not exactly in sync. Neither are the values of the two governments or even our societies. While short of instant affection, partnership based on realistically calculated national interests would allow Russia and the U.S. alike to better achieve their respective international objectives.
During the last several years, the relationship has deteriorated to the point where the old zero sum game in which the success of one power was automatically viewed as a defeat for the other has too often become a pattern in U.S.-Russian interaction. Such reflexive hostility helps no one except perhaps Mikhail Saakashvili in Tbilisi and Hugo Chavez in Caracas. Putting an end to this would be a good start.