Alexei Miller, leading research fellow at the Institute for Scientific Information in Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences

The question as to whether the Cold War has ended all too often implies that all of the West’s negative stereotypes about Russia are a legacy of the Cold War. This is a mistake that leads to more misunderstandings.
In European opinion, Russia has played the role of the “constitutive Other” since the Enlightenment. It was then that the modern European geography based on an East-West axis and the image of “semi-wild” Eastern Europe emerged. In the European discourse, Russia was seen either as a “barbarian at the gates” or an “eternal apprentice.” Russia was made to play this role of an “apprentice.” Hypothetically, it was not denied the opportunity of future admission into “the shop of artisans,” but in reality it continued to be delayed for various reasons, be it an inadequate form of government, a low level of civilization or lack of personal freedoms. In turn, this enabled the West to assume the convenient role of a teacher and appraiser. The Russian elites became aware of this arrangement in the early 19th century, which exerted considerable influence on the development of Russian identity and the Russian ideas about Europe.

It is easy to see that this discourse has not changed one iota in the post-Soviet era. A number of important conclusions may be drawn from this. First, the roots of the discourse that alienates Russia and ascribes different roles to it are much deeper, and the inertia is much greater, than would be the case had these roots taken shape during the Cold War. Therefore, a change in the Western view of Russia does not depend exclusively or even fundamentally on whether the Cold War has ended or not. Second, Russia is not a “master of discourse” and cannot change the discourse on its own for this reason. The West has the decisive say on this issue.

Importantly, this issue is not only and not so much limited to Russia’s ability to conform to these or other Western standards. It can successfully begin to conform to the standards of the Western political model only if it is given a direct and firm promise for membership in Western organizations. In other words, membership should not depend on conforming to standards. It is membership or the clear possibility of membership that creates the motives and conditions to conform to these standards.

Are their examples from history, when Western discourse about Russia substantially changed for the better? This happened when the West or individual Western countries needed Russia as an ally in the struggle against a serious threat. Therefore, it is possible to make several points.

First, the West may change this alienating discourse if key Western ideologists deem it necessary. Simple “normalization” of attitudes towards Russia after the end of the Cold War’s acute confrontation is impossible because of this discourse’s powerful inertia, and the invariable presence of political forces striving to support it for the sake of their own interests.

Only if the West decides to invite Russia to become its ally, and Russia is ready to accept this invitation, will we see the marginalization, if not the completion, of the two centuries-long discourse of Russia as Europe’s “constitutive Other”.