Epoch of global disorder

The world has returned to a neo-realistic foreign policy that seeks to divide the world into spheres of influence, which also affects post-Soviet countries. (By Gabor Stier, a foreign policy commentator and editor at the Hungarian newspaper Magyar Nemzet)

Gabor Stier, a foreign policy commentator and editor at the conservative Hungarian daily newspaper Magyar Nemzet
   
We must reassess many events of the last 20 years, but one thing is clear – the Cold War is over. Although some analysts are talking about a new Cold War, and journalists and politicians are prone to use this catchy expression, the Cold War era has come to an end. And not only because this term is now used in a historical context, but also because its main parties have left the scene.

Russia is still an enormous country with rich mineral resources and the world’s second nuclear arsenal. However, it lags far behind the Soviet Union in terms of power and potential for deterring war. It is abundantly clear that Russia and the United States will not fight a nuclear war. Regrettably, the chaos among the world’s nuclear powers makes up for this. New nuclear countries, such as Pakistan, India or North Korea, pose a much bigger threat to peace than the world’s biggest nuclear powers.

Ideological confrontation has also ended. Opposing systems no longer compete with each other. Most disputes take place within one and the same system, for instance, about the role of government or ways of overcoming the crisis.

Needless to say, we have heard some sabre-rattling rhetoric reminiscent of the past era in recent years. The attempts of neo-conservatives schooled in the Cold War to divide the world into democratic and authoritarian regimes have also failed. It turned out that the efforts to exacerbate ideological confrontation are limited by political opportunities. In this context, in the last few years, Russian-American relations have brought us into the past. The administration of George W. Bush, which felt keenly the post-Soviet collapse of the 1990sreacted bitterly to Russia’s self-determination, and came up with an answer. The Georgian war was the geopolitical consequence of the coloured revolutions. At that time, the West did not have a clear enough idea of what was happening in Russia, and underestimated the unity of the Russian elite. But even this conflict was not typical of the Cold War era.

It is also true that many, including the politicians who, in a letter to US President Barack Obama, expressed concern over the future of Central Europe because of warmer Russian-US relations, miss the black-and-white times of the Cold War, when confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western bloc was open and direct. Now the situation has changed. But despite reassuring statements and talk about common values, goals, understanding and cooperation in the war on terrorism, the relations are not that great. Fine words conceal serious confrontation and competition. On the one hand, this makes life more difficult, but on the other, maintaining a façade of contentment facilitates cooperation. One can put it as follows: Today’s equilibrium is more dynamic than the Cold War’s static stability.

We have entered the epoch of global disorder. In other words, the world has returned to a neo-realistic foreign policy that seeks to divide the world into spheres of influence, which also affects post-Soviet countries. The great powers continue their geopolitical games. However, the Cold War was also a stage in geopolitical competition, though overloaded with ideology. Now the ideological component has vanished, and the sides are competing exclusively for spheres of influence, although the gist of the confrontation is still the same.

Many hoped in vain that East-West tensions would subside after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, but events took a different turn. Russia’s success in modernization will only further exacerbate tensions. As Zbigniew Brzezinski said in 1997, Eurasia is a grand chessboard in the continued struggle for world supremacy; now what matters is how firm America’s primacy will be in Eurasia, and what goals it will pursue. Evidence of this can be found in Afghanistan, and some jingle-jangle  in the post-Soviet  space, but the game in China is the most important.

In Russian-US relations, the “reset” will be only rhetorical. US vital interests will not change in a year. Georgia, Ukraine, and part of Central Asia will remain its geopolitical bridgeheads. The only change that may take place at this point is that Washington will not directly link its efforts to resolve global problems with the conflicts developing in these areas.

There are many players of different calibres in the changing global system. The United States is growing weaker, but it is still considered a fully-fledged great power in all respects, even if taken alone. There are also regional superpowers, such as China, Russia, the European Union (EU), and Iran to a certain extent. Their relationship does not allow even the strongest of them to ignore these regional powers with their own influence in their direct entourage. They may oppose the imperial ambitions of other countries. The means of warfare are also changing in the world of globalization. Deterrence has not disappeared, but the media, so-called “soft power,” and especially the economy are playing an increasingly important role. The energy sector has acquired a strategic importance, and the technological level requires special attention. The current crisis is unlikely to substantially change the correlation of forces. A tangible increase in the importance of the G20 points to the need to reassess the importance of various international bodies. The countries that will emerge the strongest from the crisis are likely to become the great powers of the future.