By Professor Grigory Kosach, The Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University

The issue of solving the Palestinian problem as a prerequisite to regional stability is multifaceted and multidisciplinary. Its multidisciplinary nature is principally expressed in the extent to which the Palestinian factor affects both regional security in general and the position of the Arab players, in their capacity as one side of the  Middle East conflict, in particular.

The Palestinian factor has an undisputed influence on public opinion in countries throughout the Arab world and as both history and current events indicates, is being used to de-lay or preclude the possibility of establishing mutually beneficial, partnership relations between Arab countries and Israel. The fact that Egyptian-Israeli relations are acquiring the characteristics of a “cold peace”, and that Jordanian-Israeli relations are moving in the same direction, is just a part of this process. This is also proved by the disconnect in economic contact between Israel and certain Persian Gulf and North African countries, and highlights the role that the Palestinian factor in its current form plays as an obstacle to a breakthrough on other lines of Middle Eastern reconciliation. The Palestinian factor, which is a long way from possessing any of the serious attributes of a “power center,” nevertheless acts as a “quasi-power-center”, negatively transforming efforts directed at stabilizing the regional situation. Internal Palestinian divisions turn this “quasi-power-center” formation into a “black hole,” rendering stabilization illusory.

Accordingly, Israel’s actions are directed not so much at restoring those positions the Jewish state gained after the signing of the Oslo Accords or at allowing it to unilaterally legitimize the politically and territorially waning Palestinian National Authority, but at removing Palestinian statehood and Palestinian autonomy from the agenda (exploiting the internal Palestinian situation to the greatest degree). Naturally, the official Arab response, such as the position adopted by the Arab League on the Saudi monarch’s initiative, in addition to the independent measures taken by the Arab League member states, might only be a public show of support for the creation of a full-scale Palestinian state within the June 1967 borders. The Palestinian factor’s role as a “quasi-centre” turns the Middle East into an arena for fierce confrontation between both sides of the conflict (including those Arab countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel). This conflict is not just concerned with today’s reality, it seeks to resolve this issue of the leading “power center” in the region, for the foreseeable future. At the same time, the Palestinian aptitude (which doesn’t look limited at all) for political maneuvering has considerably expanded the list of those jostling to become such a “center.” These contenders are all those who appeal to religion, to hopes held by their own ethnic and religious communities, political movements, as well as those strong forces outside the region that support these movements (Iran perhaps chief among them), none of which have any interest in preserving the existing status quo. 

    
The destabilizing effect of the Palestinian factor on the situation in the Middle East mani-fests itself, among other things, in the increasing number of players within the regional geopolitical space and also supports considerable expansion of their capabilities. These “new” players, by proclaiming their support for the “Palestinians’ struggle,” could openly contend for their im-plementation of their “lawful right to resistance" to Israel, disrupting the existing system of na-tional statehood. In this case, the example of Hezbollah is more than illustrative. But at the same time, by supporting the “just” solution to the problems of their coreligionists in the Arab world, the “new” political actors, citing the unregulated nature of the Palestinian situation, could even upset the system of regional security. The current Saudi opposition to the Iran-backed Yemeni Shiite “infiltrators” is nothing more than another conflict in the Middle Eastern regional space. The very possibility of its emergence, in the final analysis, is governed by the internal destructive condition created by the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Nevertheless, the question arises of whether it is possible to solve this problem in the more or less distant future. Answering this question requires a serious correction of the existing point of view associated with the conditions and circumstances of its formation. The essence of this correction is that the coming into being and evolution of the Palestinian problem is not only connected to the actions of Israel. The current state of the Palestinian problem is the sum of the cumulative actions of many Middle Eastern (Palestinian and Arab) and other international players, including political activist organizations and governments. Such a wide range of those who created the Palestinian problem and helped it to acquire its current severity, will hardly allow reaching a consensus today that would lead to its resolution.

To what degree will this consensus be possible in the future? Only those who created the Palestinian problem and the inheritors of those creators can answer this question.