Thomas Gomart, exclusive interview with RIA Novosti

Thomas Gomart – Director of the Russia/ Newly Independent States Centre at IFRI (French Institute of International Relations based in Paris and Brussels)

How would you characterize Russia’s current foreign policy?

I think that Russian foreign policy has changed to a certain extent over the past two years. There are three main reasons for this. The first is the consequences of the war with Georgia in August 2008 and the fact that Russia won. This was indeed a very important event for the Russian armed forces and for Russia itself. It has altered Russia’s conception of European security and security in the Caucasus.

The second reason for this change is the economic crisis. After Russia’s victory in September 2008, there was this illusion in Russia that the country would not suffer from the economic crisis. But, as we know, the crisis took a huge toll on the Russian economy, with growth dropping approximately 8% in 2009. So clearly there was shift in terms of financial capabilities, which reoriented Russian foreign policy toward restoring trust with its natural partner, the European Union.

The third reason is the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations. There was a marked shift in U.S. attitudes toward Russia. The Obama administration does not share the belief that Russia can be neglected. And the Russians clearly regard negotiations with the U.S. on strategic weapons as a priority. So I think that this evolution in U.S.-Russian relations is the third main change in Russian foreign policy.

Now, regarding the trajectory of Russia’s foreign policy, I think it’s clear that Russia is anchored to the EU for its economic development. The fact is that approximately 55% of its foreign trade is with the EU. In this respect, it is absolutely crucial for Russia to develop strong bilateral ties with some key EU member states, most importantly with Germany, and also with Italy, France, Netherlands, Spain, and so on.

Secondly, Russia wants to retain its sphere of influence. Russia is going to invest in these countries, but let’s not forget that these countries are also important investors in the Russian economy. The recent election in Ukraine was consequential for Russia as the new regime will take a more balanced approach in its relations with the EU and Russia than former President Yushchenko.

And finally, Russian foreign policy is aimed at promoting the idea of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), which identifies Russia as an emerging power. And I think in that sense it is interesting to view all Russian foreign policy as also being constrained by Russia’s very deep economic ties to the EU.

What significant changes have you observed in Russian-French relations in the last two years? What is the outlook for bilateral relations between Russia and France?

On the first point, it has been interesting to see how President Sarkozy’s views on Russia have evolved. Sarkozy positioned himself as an anti-Russian candidate to some degree, but once he took office he smoothly transitioned into the traditional track of French diplomacy, which seeks a sustained and consistent dialogue between Europe and Russia and opportunities to work together when possible on various international issues.

In that sense I think that Sarkozy is a traditional French president. However, in my opinion there are two main differences between Sarkozy’s policy and Chirac’s. The first difference is that Sarkozy is much more transparent and much more interested in the so-called new member states of NATO, namely the Baltic states and Poland. Secondly, he does not use a deeper dialogue with Moscow as a tool against Washington. And, actually, dialogues with Moscow and Washington are not mutually exclusive.

There is also the idea that the French government should provide political support to French investors in Russia and that Russian investors should be more welcome in Europe generally and in France in particular.

And now there is the news that Russia and France have started talks on the purchase of four French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. This would be the first time that a NATO member state sold weapons to Russia. I think it is important that NATO-Russian relations be revamped. It is also very important for the Russian military complex to evolve.

To be clear, the central issue in security discussion between Russia and France is Iran. The Russian position on Iran has evolved since last September, which is a welcome development for Paris. We would like to impose sanctions on Iran. I think it is important to deepen these relations. The Iranian issue is an important one, but it should not be the focus. 

I think that the key issue will remain relations between Russia and Germany. Germany is very important foreign investor in Russia. France is number nine on the list of foreign investors. So it’s important to not only to think in bilateral terms, but to always ask whether the good relations between Paris and Moscow can be used to improve overall relations between the EU and Russia. I see this as the crucial point.