Collision courses of Russian modernization
“United Russia” officially labeled itself “conservative” last December. This ideological doctrine is quite remarkable in the home of the Bolshevik Revolution. Moreover, it obviously contrasts with President Medvedev’s blueprint on modernization.
By Piotr DUTKIEWICZ, Professor of Political Science, Director of the Center for Governance and Public Policy at Carleton University, Ottawa
“United Russia” officially labeled itself “conservative” last December. This ideological doctrine is quite remarkable in the home of the Bolshevik Revolution. Moreover, it obviously contrasts with President Medvedev’s blueprint on modernization.
However, if you look closely at the behavior of the Russian political elite (particularly over the last decade), it looks as though conservative ideas have indeed served them fairly well in maintaining their hold on both power and wealth. The key tenets of classical conservatism fit well into developmental state project of the United Russia with its distinguishing features such as a lack of trust in civil society, economic development mandated from above, the central role of the state, distrust in liberal democracy, the introduction of low taxes and – above all - trust in the magic effectiveness of vertical power.
Nevertheless, there are at least three problems with the “conservativeness” of the United Russia. First, as Russian citizens seem to be simply objects of the elite’s power game, the Party is unable to genuinely mass mobilize Russian society for any “grand projects”. Secondly, the conservative dislike of change makes it pretty useless for the larger-scale goal of modernization. Thirdly, conservatives usually react oppressively to any societal upheavals, and are – thus - unable to effectively manage or absorb discontent (which is quite natural in a time of prolonged economic uncertainty). Furthermore, the “official” Russian version of conservatism lacks a strategic sense of the future – it is mainly a status quo and narrowly, purely technologically defined “innovative economy” approach.
Against this background, president Medvedev’s critique of the current state of the Federation and his ambitious plan to deeply modernize the Russian economy (and – as an indispensable part of it - society) seems to be only partially compatible with the socio-economic approach of the dominant Party and with its sense of political management of the country. In fact, it is rather difficult to deeply reshape the Russian economy without changing its governance principles and enabling society to be more empowered. So far such a direct collision has been avoided as the President has chosen not to seek broader social support for his blueprint and has wisely limited the scope of permitted change to the realm of the economy. In that sense, President Medvedev’s approach can become the nucleus of a Russian version of progressivism that is aimed at quite deep economic and social modernization but still timid in its depth of political restructuring. Such presidential political engagement can also –potentially- attract followers (otherwise it risks being quickly forgotten along with its authors), particularly among the middle class, small- and mid-size entrepreneurs, and youth. Even a loose coalition of “deep modernizers” around the President can create the additional political space which could make Russia more hospitable to the evolutionary change that eventually will make the country stronger, more prosperous, and more respected.
Apparently, the implementation of the President’s blueprint on modernization will require significant societal support as it will be a real struggle to change key sectors of economy and reshape well-entrenched habits and structures. It will require the participation of organized interest groups that will link their future prosperity with a modernized Russia. The actual level and depth of such support is not well known and thus it would be quite risky politically and socially to start a wholesale implementation of the “modernization project” without the formation of a “progressivist movement for modernization” that eventually may take the shape of a centrist political party that might reconcile sections of the so called “right” and “left” in Russia. But first of all – it will require an implementable plan of action that despite some recently published “strategies “ does not yet exist (as they are too vague and lacking a “real touch with real economy”).
Answering a perennial question of Russia’s intelligentsia - “Chto delat”? (What is to be done?) – the following four scenarios can be suggested:
1. the “developmental state way” (as in the East-Asian model);
2. the “conservative modernization” way;
3. “deep modernization”;
4. The “EU way”.
Each “model” has some in-built uncertainties and contradictions; each requires strong political will and policy implementation capacity. Guaranteed success of any one is everything but certain. The point is, however, that by not making a decision, Russia – willingly or not – will slide down to the junior league of states regardless of a quite sure oil price stable recovery.
(1) A lot of energy, money and political capital have already been invested by the Kremlin in the developmental state option: a deep and systemic modernization of the country. However the initial Kremlin-elite-based trusteeship of the stabilization/consolidation period (roughly 2000- 2005) is no longer enough to move ahead. An all-embracing, staged process of change is needed rather than a narrowly defined modernization defined as the need for new technology and equipment . Let’s imagine the future : It shall be centered on re-constructing a sophisticated industrial base linked to the innovative scientific research and encouraging banks to finance only competitive projects ; rules and procedures are made clear for business and are supported through a strong, corruption-free court system. To ensure a larger pro-modernization consensus and ways to convince/co-opt/neutralize powerful, interest-based opponents, the power-base moves to the small middle class, medium-scale business, and that section of bureaucracy that is dynamic enough to implement new policies.
The process might be painful and unexpectedly long (5-6 years). As it advances, the rising social discontent - normal as the re-distributive function of the state is becoming step-by-step diminished and increasingly targeted - is peacefully undermined. In the end enough support is accumulated to make the bold move of reforming the resource and energy sectors. In the first stage (1-2 years) it requires harsh measures as – paradoxically – one of the impediments to the successful implementation of the “developmental state scenario” was that V. Putin was “not-dictatorial enough” to implement it . The final move however will be a decisive democratization of the developmental state.
(2) Another option - a “conservative modernization” - embraces at least five components : a) some transfer of most modern technology (mainly to military industry as it will be the only sector capable of absorbing it); b) keeping the budget filled with petro-dollars (that will be quite sufficient at $ 68-70 per barrel to fulfill current level of social and security obligations); c) strengthening military and security capacity to secure its diminishing economic and social power both domestically and internationally ; d) implementing even more assertive international policies to hide domestic weakness (for instance in the Arctic); e) at least partial renewal of the elite that is capable of moving beyond the “stability-stagnation phase”. The deep modernization can be postponed and re-considered at the later stage. Energy price stability at above $70 per barrel would be very important to that scenario and Russia shall try to support/create a global mechanism for oil and gas price control. The above scenario is socially risky – as the state shall contain any political upheavals and continue to block any significant source of opposition - but it is nonetheless doable. The implementation of this scenario will be quite appreciated by the current politico-economic elite as it would mean a stabilization of their power/wealth/influence and also diminish the level of uncertainty related to the implementation of any alternative scenarios. In the long run, however, it might relegate Russia to the “secondary powers” club within some years.
(3) The third - “deep modernization” scenario assumes – quite safely – that one cannot modernize the Russian economy without, in time, modernizing the state’s governance principles and enabling society to be more empowered. Thus a meaningful modernization in Russia will require significant societal support as it will be a real struggle to change the key sectors of the economy and reshape well-entrenched habits and structures. It will also require the participation of organized interest groups among the middle class, small- and mid-size entrepreneurs, and the youth, that will link their future prosperity with a modernized Russia. Even a loose coalition of “deep modernizers” around the President – taking the shape of a movement for modernization or even a new centrist political party - can create the additional political space which could make Russia more hospitable to the evolutionary change. Admittedly though, the actual level and depth of such support not known.
(4). The “EU way” is a fourth possible option. It requires that Russia accepts at least part of the EU-wide regulations known as acqui communitaire, complies with European ecological, competition, trade and some social protection standards the modernization of this country may take another direction. As Russia is far away (institutionally/legally and strategically as far as state is concerned) from the EU this scenario would also mean re-shaping Russian foreign policy and some portion of the elite’s mentality. But as Russian economic interests are located between Europe and Asia this (becoming a “compatible state but not within the same system”) might be a sustainable choice. It would give Russia a firm place within the EU-quasi-empire, guarantee its security, better access to the EU market, reinforce Russia’s position as also a European power, and form a natural counter balance to the “China vector”.
In all cases, the ruling group shall consider moving from the “trusteeship” mode of ruling Russia to a “social coalitions”-based system. At this moment the game is not exclusively about technology and innovation transfer, as some members of the elite advocate; rather, it is about making Russian society and economy innovatively oriented, with the state- private partnership playing a decisive role in that process.
The choice between accelerated continuity, “deep modernization” and “status quo evolution” should be carefully considered as a future of a huge country is at stake. What is certain is that the lack of real modernization/innovation implementable policies of the last 3-4 years cannot be continued without serious, negative, long-term consequences.
However, there are significant risks to such development. Firstly, any “progressivist” type movement might be too all-embracing and thus too loose to formalize itself as a coherent political party, and secondly, as history tells us, socio-economic modernizations are capable of delivering a deathblow to the existing system — something that nobody in power is likely to welcome.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
OTTAWA. (Piotr Dutkiewicz, Professor, Director - The Center for Governance and Public Policy, Carleton University)